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Abstract
In my dissertation, I have covered multiple different topics. First, we consider the
concept of natural density over the integers, and extend it to holomorphy rings
over function fields. This allows us to give a function field analogue of Cesàro’s
theorem, which gives the “probability” that an 𝑚-tuple of random elements of
the holomorphy ring is coprime. We also generalize this and consider the density
of 𝑘 × 𝑚 matrices over holomorphy rings which can be extended to unimodular
𝑚 × 𝑚 matrices.
In the second part, we determine the natural density of shifted Eisenstein poly-
nomials. This means that we compute the density of integer polynomials 𝑓 (𝑥) of
a fixed degree 𝑛 for which some shift 𝑓 (𝑥 + 𝑖) for an integer 𝑖 satisfies Eisenstein’s
irreducibility criterion. We then also compute the density of affine Eisenstein
polynomials.
Thirdly, we consider an arbitrary set of monic quadratic polynomials over a
finite field and ask ourselves which compositions of copies of them are irreducible.
We first give a criterion to decide whether all such compositions are irreducible,
and then show that in general, the irreducible compositions have the structure of
a regular language.
In the final chapter, we study cryptographic protocols for key exchange in
ad-hoc groups. We first translate some protocols from the literature to the more
general setting of semigroup actions, and then propose our own variants of these
protocols, which aim to have improved security or efficiency. Then, we demon-
strate a couple of active attacks on certain such protocols which are in some ways
more powerful than man-in-the-middle attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background on Cryptography
Cryptography is the theory of secure communication. This primarily encom-
passes two goals. The first is confidentiality, that is, ensuring that no third party
can listen in on a communication against the will of the communication partners.
This is done via the process of encryption. The second is authenticity, whichmeans
preventing adversaries from modifying messages in a communication, and from
making up messages entirely and attributing them to another party. This is typi-
cally done with digital signatures or message authentication codes.
Cryptographic schemes can broadly be divided into two categories: Symmet-
ric cryptography and public key cryptography. In symmetric cryptography, the
participants in a communication share a common secret key, which is then used
to encrypt and authenticate all messages between them. Symmetric ciphers like
AES are typically very fast and well-trusted. Their main weakness however is
the need for a shared secret between the parties, which needs to be exchanged in
some other secure way beforehand. In some situations, this can be very difficult
or downright impossible.
In public key cryptography, on the other hand, the parties do not share a
common secret. Rather, each party possesses a key pair consisting of a public and
a private key. As the names suggests, the public key is known to the other parties,
whereas the private key is known only to its owner. Encryption is then done as
follows: The sender of a message encrypts it using the public key of the receiver,
and the receiver can decrypt this message using his private key. If the cipher is
secure, the encrypted message cannot be read by anyone who does not possess
the corresponding private key. Authenticity is achieved via digital signatures:
The sender of a message uses his private key to create a signature for his message,
and sends it alongside the message. Anyone who has his public key can then
verify this signature. If the signature scheme is secure, no one can create a signed
message that is accepted by a given public key unless he knows the corresponding
private key. Commonly, encryption and authentication are used together on the
1
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same messages. One of the most used public key cryptosystems is RSA, which
can be used for both encryption and signing. Other cryptosystems can often only
do one or the other, so they need to be used in pairs.
In practice, public key cryptography is usually not used to encrypt and sign
longer communications, since it is comparatively slow. Instead, it is used in con-
junction with symmetric cryptography: A public key cryptosystem is used to se-
curely exchange a shared secret key between the parties, which is then used with
a symmetric cipher to encrypt and authenticate the rest of the communication.
A common way of doing this is with key exchange protocols, whose sole pur-
pose is establishing a shared key between multiple parties. The most famous such
protocol is theDiffie-Hellman key exchange between two parties (commonly called
Alice and Bob).
Protocol 1.1 (Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange [DH76]). Both parties agree on a
(publicly known) cyclic group 𝐺 of order 𝑛 generated by 𝑔. Then, Alice chooses
a random integer 𝑎 ∈ {0, … , 𝑛 − 1}, which she keeps secret, and sends 𝐴 = 𝑔𝑎
to Bob. Likewise, Bob chooses a secret 𝑏 ∈ {0, … , 𝑛 − 1} and sends 𝐵 = 𝑔𝑏 to
Alice. After this, Alice computes the shared secret 𝐵𝑎, whereas Bob computes 𝐴𝑏 .
Clearly, both of these are equal to 𝑔𝑎𝑏 .
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange is secure if and only if the Diffie-Hellman
problem is hard in the group 𝐺, that is, given the elements 𝑔, 𝑔𝑎 and 𝑔𝑏 of 𝐺,
one cannot realistically compute 𝑔𝑎𝑏 . An obvious requirement for this is the in-
tractability of the discrete logarithm problem (DLP):
Problem 1.2 (Discrete Logarithm Problem). Given a group 𝐺 and two elements
𝑔, ℎ ∈ 𝐺 with ℎ ∈ ⟨𝑔⟩, determine an integer 𝑎 such that 𝑔𝑎 = ℎ.
Examples for groups where these problems are thought to be difficult in gen-
eral are the multiplicative group of a finite field and the additive group of points
on an elliptic curve.
It should be noted that the Diffie-Hellman protocol is not authenticated, and
an active attacker (call her Mallory) who can intercept and insert her own mes-
sages into the channel between Alice and Bob can perform a man-in-the-middle
attack. This works as follows: Mallory chooses her own secret 𝑚 ∈ {0, … , 𝑛 − 1}
and public element 𝑔𝑚. When Alice and Bob exchange their public elements 𝑔𝑎
and 𝑔𝑏 , Mallory replaces both with 𝑔𝑚. Alice then ends up with the secret 𝑔𝑎𝑚 and
Bob with 𝑔𝑏𝑚, both of which Mallory can compute since she knows 𝑔𝑎, 𝑔𝑏 and 𝑚.
At this point, Mallory shares a secret key with each of Alice and Bob. When Alice
now sends a message encrypted with the secret 𝑔𝑎𝑚 to Bob,1 Mallory intercepts
and decrypts it, reencrypts it with 𝑔𝑏𝑚, and sends the result to Bob. She proceeds
analogously if Bob sends a message to Alice. In this way, Mallory can read and
1More precisely, encrypted with a secret key derived deterministically from 𝑔𝑎𝑚 , to which both
Alice and Mallory have access.
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even modify all communication between Alice and Bob without them noticing
the intrusion.
A large part of my dissertation is concerned with key exchange protocols for
groups of more than two users. While it is possible to simply use multiple itera-
tions of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange in this larger setting, we are interested
in creating more efficient and dynamic protocols.
1.2 Background on Natural Density
Aquestion that occasionally comes up in number theory is the following: Suppose
we are given a set of integers 𝐴 ⊆ ℤ. What proportion of all integers lie in 𝐴? Or
written probabilistically, what is the probability that a randomly selected integer
lies in 𝐴?
For example, the probability that a random integer is even should intuitively
be 12 . Likewise, a random integer should be a primewith probability 0 by the primenumber theorem. How can we formulate such a question rigorously? Clearly, by
cardinality, the sets of even or prime integers have the same size as ℤ itself, so
this is not a useful approach. Furthermore, it is well known that there exists no
uniform probability distribution on the set of integers, so a probability theoretical
approach is also impossible.
However, we can do the following: If we consider only integers bounded by
some constant 𝐵, we get a finite set, and we can compute the proportion of them
that lie in 𝐴: |𝐴 ∩ [−𝐵, 𝐵[|/2𝐵. If we now take the limit as 𝐵 goes to infinity, and
it happens to converge, we call the result the natural density of 𝐴.
We are primarily interested in the density of sets of tuples of integers 𝐴 ⊆ ℤ𝑑 .
The definition of this is a straightforward generalization.
Definition 1.3. For any subset 𝐴 ⊆ ℤ𝑑 , we define
𝔻(𝐴) ≔ lim sup
𝐵→∞
|𝐴 ∩ [−𝐵, 𝐵[𝑑 |
(2𝐵)𝑑 ,
𝔻(𝐴) ≔ lim inf𝐵→∞
|𝐴 ∩ [−𝐵, 𝐵[𝑑 |
(2𝐵)𝑑 .
If these coincide, we denote their value by 𝔻(𝐴) and call it the natural density of
𝐴:
𝔻(𝐴) ≔ lim𝐵→∞
|𝐴 ∩ [−𝐵, 𝐵[𝑑 |
(2𝐵)𝑑 .
Remark 1.4. It is certainly possible that the limit above does not converge. For an
example, take the set 𝐴 ⊆ ℤ of integers whose decimal expansion starts with the
digit 1. It can be easily seen that 𝔻(𝐴) = 1/9 and 𝔻(𝐴) = 5/9. Hence, the set 𝐴
does not possess a natural density [TI95, p. 261].
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As an example, consider the following question, which has first been answered
by Cesàro and Sylvester [Ces83; Syl83]: What is the density of the set of coprime
pairs of integers, 𝐴 ≔ {(𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ ℤ2 | gcd(𝑎, 𝑏) = 1}? It turns out that this density is
exactly 𝜁 (2)−1 = 6/𝜋2, where 𝜁 is the Riemann zeta function.
This can be seen informally as follows: For each prime 𝑝, the probability that
both 𝑎 and 𝑏 are multiples of 𝑝 is 𝑝−2. Hence, the probability that 𝑝 is not a
common divisor of 𝑎 and 𝑏 is 1 − 𝑝−2. Now, 𝑎 and 𝑏 are coprime if and only if this
is the case for all primes, so
𝔻(𝐴) = ∏
𝑝 prime
(1 − 𝑝−2) = 𝜁 (2)−1.
See e.g. [Nym72] for a real proof. This result can easily be extended to coprime
𝑚-tuples of integers, where the density ends up being 𝜁 (𝑚)−1.
1.3 Overview of the Dissertation
For my dissertation, I chose to work in the areas of cryptography and number
theory. In cryptography, my focus was on public key cryptography. This led to
the study of group key exchanges, wheremultiple users try to share a common key
in an ad-hoc setting. My research in algebra and number theory was also largely
inspired by concerns from public key cryptography. In particular, multiple of
my papers concern irreducible polynomials, which are important for constructing
finite fields of non-prime cardinality.
I will now give a short overview ofmy dissertation, giving a small introduction
to each chapter. Each chapter also possesses its own introduction section, where
I will go into more detail.
In Chapter 2, the focus is on an extension of the notion of natural density to
holomorphy rings in function fields. In particular, we consider an analogue of
Cesàro’s theorem, which says that that the density of coprime 𝑚-tuples of inte-
gers is 𝜁 (𝑚)−1, where 𝜁 is the Riemann zeta function [Nym72]. This theorem has
already been extended to rings of polynomials over finite fields by [ST07; GY13].
Our goal then is to further generalize this case to not just polynomial rings, but
arbitrary holomorphy rings of function fields over finite fields.
Going with the notations and definitions of [Sti09], a function field (of one
variable) 𝐹 is defined as the field of rational functions defined on a smooth pro-
jective algebraic curve over a field 𝐾 . Equivalently, it is a finitely generated field
extension of 𝐾 of transcendence degree one. A valuation ring of 𝐹 is a subring
𝐾 ⊊ 𝒪 ⊊ 𝐹 such that for each element 𝑧 ∈ 𝐹 , at least one of 𝑧 and 𝑧−1 lies in 𝒪 .
These rings are local, and the maximal ideal of such a valuation ring is called a
place of the function field 𝐹 . We call the set of all places 𝒫 . Such a place 𝑃 cor-
responds to a point on the curve, and its valuation ring 𝒪𝑃 consists of all rational
functions on the curve that are defined at that point. A holomorphy ring is then
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given by an arbitrary intersection
𝐻 = ⋂
𝑃∈𝒮
𝒪𝑃 ,
for some subset ∅ ≠ 𝒮 ⊊ 𝒫 . It consists of all rational functions on the curve
that are defined at all points in 𝒮 . For a concrete example, on the projective line
ℙ1, we have 𝐹 = 𝐾(𝑥), and the holomorphy ring of 𝒮 = 𝒫 ⧵ {∞} is exactly the
polynomial ring 𝐾[𝑥].
Our task was now to define an appropriate notion of density in holomorphy
rings over finite fields, and to find the density of 𝑚-tuples over such rings that
are coprime. We further generalize this question to the density of 𝑘 ×𝑚-matrices
which can be extended to unimodular matrices, and we are able to answer it when
2𝑘 − 1 ≤ 𝑚. This chapter is based on joint work with Giacomo Micheli that has
been published in [MS16a] and [MS16c].
In Chapter 3, we consider a different question relating densities and polyno-
mials: What is the density of integer polynomials of a fixed degree, considered as
tuples, for which the Eisenstein criterion [Eis50] applies? The Eisenstein criterion
says that for an integer polynomial 𝑓 (𝑥) = 𝑎𝑛𝑥𝑛+⋯+𝑎0, if there is a prime 𝑝 that di-
vides 𝑎𝑖 for 𝑖 < 𝑛 but not 𝑎𝑛, and 𝑝2 does not divide 𝑎0, then 𝑓 (𝑥) is irreducible over
the rationals. The density of such polynomials was computed exactly by [Dub03]
and [HS13]. In [HS14], the question was extended to polynomials 𝑓 (𝑥) ∈ ℤ[𝑥]
for which some linear shift 𝑓 (𝑥 + 𝑎) satisfies the Eisenstein criterion. That paper
however only gave very rough bounds on this density. In our work, we were
able to give the exact density of such shifted Eisenstein polynomials, as well as
the more general affine Eisenstein polynomials. For this, we use a local to global
principle for densities given in [PS99, Lemma 20]. This chapter is based on the
paper [MS16b], which is joint work with Giacomo Micheli.
In Chapter 4, we have studied the irreducibility of compositions of polynomi-
als. A polynomial over a finite field 𝔽𝑞 is called stable if composing it with itself
any number times results in an irreducible polynomial. These polynomials have
been studied by a variety of authors. For example, in [JB12], a criterion is given
to determine whether a quadratic polynomial is stable with only a finite amount
of computation. In this chapter, we extend this question to sets 𝒮 of multiple
monic quadratic polynomials: We determine with a finite amount of computa-
tion whether all possible compositions of copies of elements of 𝒮 are irreducible.
In other words, we consider the compositional monoid generated by 𝒮 and ask
whether it consists only of irreducible polynomials. Even if this isn’t the case, we
then show how to use the theory of finite state automata to give a precise descrip-
tion of which elements of this monoid are irreducible. We do this by showing that
they have the structure of a regular language. This chapter is based on the work
I did with Andrea Ferraguti and Giacomo Micheli that is published in [FMS16]
and [FMS17].
Finally, Chapter 5 concerns cryptographic group key exchange protocols. Sup-
pose you have a group of users or other entities {𝒰1, … ,𝒰𝑛} who have never
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communicated before, and they wish to establish a secure communication chan-
nel. Such scenarios are becoming increasingly common with the rise of the so
called Internet of things, in which a variety of small sensors and devices need to
connect and communicate with one another. This may take place on the scale of
a household, a city, or even beyond. However, such networks also pose a new
challenge to security: For example, an unauthorized party being able to read the
communication between such devices may threaten the privacy of a household.
If that party can even inject their own messages into the network, direct physi-
cal damage can be done: If, for example, the heating in a household is controlled
by sensors throughout the apartment which are connected wirelessly to a ther-
mostat, a hostile party could fake sensor data to cause overheating, damaging
not only material goods but potentially the health of the inhabitants. This makes
it necessary for the communication channels between the nodes to be encrypted
and authenticated. Furthermore, these devices often only possess very weak com-
putational power, so it is important that the protocols involved be as efficient as
possible.
We only concern ourselves with unauthenticated exchanges here, assuming
that it is not feasible for the parties to share previous authentication information.
After establishing the initial shared key, it should be possible for users to join
and leave the group later on, for which the key needs to be updated. There are
a multitude of protocols that aim to achieve this, but the ones we focus on are
primarily based on the works of Steiner et al. in [STW96; STW00], which extend
the traditional Diffie-Hellman protocol. In this chapter, we first extend these pro-
tocols to the setting of general semigroup actions, and then introduce our own
variants which aim to improve either security or efficiency of those protocols.
Some of those make use of additional linear structure of the semigroup actions.
Afterwards, we present two active attacks, one on a protocol of [STW96] and one
on the Burmester-Desmedt protocol of [BD94]. These attacks are in some ways
more powerful than a basic man-in-the-middle attack.
Our protocols were published in [Lóp+15] and [Lóp+16], and the first attack
in [Sch+16]. These papers were written in collaboration with Juan Antonio López-
Ramos, Joachim Rosenthal and Davide Schipani. The second attack is joint work
with Mohamed Baouch, Juan Antonio López-Ramos and Blas Torrecillas, and is
published in [Bao+16].
Chapter 2
Densities over Holomorphy
Rings
2.1 Introduction
A classical result by Ernest Cesàro and James Joseph Sylvester [Ces81; Ces83;
Ces84; Syl83] in number theory concerns the “probability” that a random pair of
integers is coprime. Formally, as we discussed in Section 1.2, the natural density
of the set of coprime pairs of integers is 1𝜁 (2) , where 𝜁 is the Riemann zeta function.
Furthermore, this has been generalized to coprime 𝑚-tuples, which have density
1
𝜁 (𝑚) [Nym72]. Similar results also hold in the rings of integers of arbitrary number
fields [FM15; Sit10].
Our goal is to extended this result to holomorphy rings of function fields over
finite fields. Additionally, we generalize the question and consider the density of
𝑘 ×𝑚-matrices which can be extended to unimodular𝑚×𝑚-matrices. Our results
on these two questions were published in [MS16a] and [MS16c] respectively, on
which this chapter of my thesis is based.
Let 𝔽𝑞 be a finite field with 𝑞 elements and let 𝐹 be an algebraic function
field1 having full constant field 𝔽𝑞 . Let 𝒞 be the set of places of 𝐹 and 𝒮 ⊊ 𝒞 be
a nonempty proper subset. The holomorphy ring of 𝒮 is
𝐻 ≔ ⋂
𝑃∈𝒮
𝒪𝑃 ,
where 𝒪𝑃 is the valuation ring of the place 𝑃 . As is well known, these rings are
integrally closed and all integrally closed subrings of 𝐹 are of this form. We say
that an 𝑚-tuple of elements of 𝐻 is coprime if its components generate the unit
ideal in 𝐻 , in analogy to the case of the ring of integers in [FM15].
In Section 2.2, we provide a short introduction on the basics of algebraic func-
tion fields, concentrating on the definitions we require for the rest of the chapter.
1In this chapter, we will mostly use the language and notation of [Sti09].
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In Section 2.3, we define an appropriate notion of density for subsets of 𝐻𝑚,
using Moore-Smith convergence for nets [Kel55, Chapter 2]. Then, in Section 2.4,
we study the density of the set of coprime 𝑚-tuples in 𝐻 , considered as a subset
of 𝐻𝑚. We are able to show that this density exists and is equal to 1𝜁𝐻 (𝑚) , where𝜁𝐻 is the zeta function of the holomorphy ring.
In Section 2.4.1, we provide an example in the case of the affine ring of coordi-
nates of an elliptic curve to show a concrete application of the main result. Then,
in Section 2.4.2, we consider the special case 𝐹 = 𝔽𝑞(𝑥) and 𝐻 = ⋂𝑃≠𝑃∞𝒪𝑃 = 𝔽𝑞[𝑥],which has been studied for 𝑚 = 2 in [ST07] and more generally in [GY13]. We
will explain how to interpret the densities presented in these papers as particular
cases of our general framework.
After this, we turn to the density of 𝑘 × 𝑚-matrices that can be extended to
unimodular𝑚×𝑚-matrices. This generalizes to an extent the work of [GY13]. We
will state our result in Section 2.5. In Section 2.5.1, we will give an upper bound
that works for all 𝑘 < 𝑚, and in Section 2.5.2, we will prove that bound exact
when 2𝑘 − 1 ≤ 𝑚.
2.2 Algebraic Function Fields
We will now give a short introduction on the basics of algebraic function fields in
one variable. See [Sti09] for more details.
Let 𝐾 be a field. A function field (of one variable) over 𝐾 is a finite algebraic
field extension 𝐹 ⊇ 𝐾(𝑥). Here, 𝐾(𝑥) is the rational function field over 𝐾 , which
means that 𝑥 is transcendental over𝐾 . The field of constants ?̃? of 𝐹 is the algebraic
closure of 𝐾 in 𝐹 , that is, ?̃? ≔ {𝑧 ∈ 𝐹 | 𝑧 is algebraic over 𝐾}. We say that 𝐹 has
full constant field 𝐾 if ?̃? = 𝐾 .
In this chapter, we will only be considering the case where 𝐾 is a finite field
and 𝐹 has full constant field 𝐾 .
A valuation ring 𝒪 of the function field 𝐹 over 𝐾 is a subring 𝐾 ⊊ 𝒪 ⊊ 𝐹 such
that for each 𝑧 ∈ 𝐹 , either 𝑧 or 𝑧−1 lies in 𝒪 . Valuation rings are local rings, and
we call their maximal ideals places. There is a one to one correspondence between
valuation rings and places: Places are principal ideals, and if the maximal ideal 𝑃
of𝒪𝑃 is generated by the element 𝑡 , we define the discrete valuation at 𝑃 as themap
𝑣𝑃 ∶ 𝐹 ∗ → ℤ where 𝑣𝑃 (𝑧) is the unique integer 𝑛 such that 𝑡−𝑛𝑧 ∈ 𝒪∗𝑃 . Given just
the place 𝑃 , its valuation ring can now be recovered as 𝒪𝑃 = {𝑧 ∈ 𝐹 | 𝑣𝑃 (𝑧) ≥ 0}.
We write 𝒞 for the set of all places of 𝐹 . A divisor of 𝐹 over 𝐾 is a finite
linear combination of places in 𝒞 with coefficients in ℤ. The divisors form an
abelian group, which we denote by Div(𝐹 ). The degree of a divisor 𝐷 = ∑𝑃∈𝒞 𝑛𝑃𝑃is defined as deg(𝐷) ≔ ∑𝑃∈𝒞 𝑛𝑃 deg(𝑃), where deg(𝑃) ≔ dim𝐾 (𝒪𝑃/𝑃). The supportof 𝐷 is supp(𝐷) ≔ {𝑃 ∈ 𝒞 | 𝑛𝑃 ≠ 0}. We also define a partial order on Div(𝐹 ) by
defining 𝐷 ≤ 𝐸 whenever 𝐸 − 𝐷 has only nonnegative coefficients.
To an element 𝑧 ∈ 𝐹 ∗, we can now assign the divisor (𝑧) ≔ ∑𝑃∈𝒞 𝑣𝑃 (𝑧)𝑃 . Itcan be uniquely decomposed as (𝑧) = (𝑧)0 − (𝑧)∞, where (𝑧)0 and (𝑧)∞ have disjoint
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support and each has only nonnegative coefficients. These divisors are called the
zero divisor and the pole divisor of 𝑧, respectively.
It is important to note the geometric point of view of all this: An algebraic
function field 𝐹 corresponds to the field of rational functions of some smooth
projective algebraic curve 𝐶 over 𝐾 . The places of 𝐹 correspond to the points of
this curve over 𝐾 , and the valuation ring of a place corresponds to those functions
which are defined at that point. The discrete valuation of a place tells us to what
degree a function vanishes or has a pole at the corresponding point. The divisor of
a rational function then consists of all its zeroes minus all its poles, each counted
with multiplicity.
The Riemann-Roch space of a divisor 𝐷 ∈ Div(𝐹 ) is defined by
ℒ(𝐷) ≔ {𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 ∗ | (𝑓 ) + 𝐷 ≥ 0} ∪ {0},
and we denote by 𝓁(𝐷) its dimension as a 𝐾 -vector space. If 𝐷 = ∑𝑃∈𝒞 𝑛𝑃𝑃 , theelements ofℒ(𝐷) are the functions which have zeroes of order at least −𝑛𝑃 at all
points 𝑃 with 𝑛𝑃 < 0, and are only allowed to have poles at points 𝑃 with 𝑛𝑃 > 0,
of order at most 𝑛𝑃 .
The genus of the function field 𝐹 is defined as 𝑔 ≔ max{deg(𝐷)−𝓁(𝐷)+1 | 𝐷 ∈
Div(𝐹 )}. It is the same as the genus of the corresponding algebraic curve. The
following famous theorem about the dimension of the Riemann-Roch space is
essential to this chapter:
Theorem 2.1 (Riemann-Roch). Let 𝑔 be the genus of 𝐹 , and let 𝐷 ∈ Div(𝐹 ) be a
divisor. Then,
deg(𝐷) + 1 − 𝑔 ≤ 𝓁(𝐷) ≤ deg(𝐷) + 1,
and the lower bound 𝓁(𝐷) = deg(𝐷) + 1 − 𝑔 is achieved whenever deg(𝐷) ≥ 2𝑔 − 1.
Recall that we defined the holomorphy ring of a nonempty set of places 𝒮 ⊊ 𝒞
as
𝐻 ≔ ⋂
𝑃∈𝒮
𝒪𝑃 .
In the point of view of curves,𝐻 is the ring of all rational functions that are defined
on 𝒮 . We have a bijection between the set of places 𝒮 and the maximal ideals of
𝐻 given by 𝑃 ↦ 𝑃 ∩ 𝐻 ≕ 𝑃𝐻 .
When the base field 𝐾 = 𝔽𝑞 is finite, we can define the zeta function of the
function field 𝐹 as
𝜁𝐹 (𝑠) ≔∏
𝑃∈𝒞(
1 − 1𝑞𝑠 deg(𝑃))
−1
,
for 𝑠 > 1. Analogously, we define the zeta function of the holomorphy ring 𝐻
corresponding to the set of places 𝒮 as
𝜁𝐻 (𝑠) ≔∏
𝑃∈𝒮(
1 − 1𝑞𝑠 deg(𝑃))
−1
.
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2.3 Density in Holomorphy Rings
We require a definition of density in holomorphy rings that is analogous to the
definition for integers in Definition 1.3. Intuitively, the density of a set 𝐿 ⊆ 𝐻𝑚
should give the probability that a randomly selected𝑚-tuple over 𝐻 lies in 𝐿. For
this, we first need to cover 𝐻 with a suitable increasing sequence — or net — of
finite subsets, for each of which the proportion of elements lying in 𝐿 is well-
defined. The overall density of 𝐿 is then the limit of these proportions over the
net of subsets. Apparently, the most natural such cover is a net of Riemann-Roch
spaces, which we will describe now.
First, let us give the definition ofMoore-Smith convergence of nets (see [Kel55,
Chapter 2]). A directed set is a set ℐ , endowed with a relation ≤ that is reflexive,
transitive, and such that for each pair of elements 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ ℐ , there is a common
upper bound 𝑐 ≥ 𝑎, 𝑏. A net is then a map 𝑓 ∶ ℐ → 𝑋 from a directed set to a
topological space. We define its limit as follows: lim𝑎∈ℐ 𝑓 (𝑎) = 𝑥 if and only if
for each neighbourhood 𝑈 of 𝑥 , there exists a 𝑏 ∈ ℐ such that 𝑓 (𝑎) ∈ 𝑈 for all
𝑎 ≥ 𝑏. We also define the limit superior as lim sup𝑎∈ℐ 𝑓 (𝑎) ≔ lim𝑎∈ℐ sup𝑏≥𝑎 𝑓 (𝑏),and likewise the limit inferior. Note that in the case ℐ = ℕ, we get the usual
definition of limits of sequences.
Recall that 𝐻 is the holomorphy ring of the set 𝒮 ⊊ 𝒞 . Define
𝒟 ≔ {𝐷 ∈ Div(𝐹 ) | 𝐷 ≥ 0 ∧ supp(𝐷) ⊆ 𝒞 ⧵ 𝒮 },
the set of positive divisors supported away from 𝒮 . This is a directed set with
the usual partial order on divisors. Note now that the elements of the Riemann-
Roch spaceℒ(𝐷) are allowed to have poles only outside of 𝒮 , which means that
ℒ(𝐷) ⊆ 𝐻 . Conversely, for any 𝑓 ∈ 𝐻 , its pole divisor 𝐷 = (𝑓 )∞ lies in 𝒟 , and
since 𝑓 ∈ ℒ(𝐷) we get
𝐻 = ⋃
𝐷∈𝒟
ℒ(𝐷).
This is a suitable covering for our definition. We can now define the superior
density of a subset 𝐿 ⊆ 𝐻𝑚 as
𝔻(𝐿) ≔ lim sup
𝐷∈𝒟
|𝐿 ∩ ℒ(𝐷)𝑚|
|ℒ(𝐷)𝑚|
, (2.1)
and the inferior density as
𝔻(𝐿) ≔ lim inf
𝐷∈𝒟
|𝐿 ∩ ℒ(𝐷)𝑚|
|ℒ(𝐷)𝑚|
.
Moreover, whenever 𝔻(𝐿) = 𝔻(𝐿), we call this value the density of 𝐿 and denote it
by
𝔻(𝐿) ≔ lim
𝐷∈𝒟
|𝐿 ∩ ℒ(𝐷)𝑚|
|ℒ(𝐷)𝑚|
.
In the case where 𝒞 ⧵ 𝒮 is finite, an analogous definition of density can also be
found in [Poo03, Section 8].
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2.4 The Density of Coprime Tuples
For a fixed positive integer 𝑚, we wish to study the set of coprime 𝑚-tuples of
elements of the ring 𝐻 . Let us denote this set by 𝑈 :
𝑈 ≔ {𝑓 = (𝑓1, … , 𝑓𝑚) ∈ 𝐻𝑚 | 𝐼𝑓 = 𝐻},
where 𝐼𝑓 denotes the ideal of 𝐻 generated by the set {𝑓1, … , 𝑓𝑚}. Our first main
result gives the density of this set:
Theorem 2.2. The density of the set of coprime tuples of length 𝑚 ≥ 2 of the holo-
morphy ring 𝐻 is 𝒟(𝑈 ) = 1𝜁𝐻 (𝑚) .
Proof. The proof of this can be found in [MS16a]. We will not repeat it here, since
it is a special case of Theorem 2.8 and the ideas for the proofs are similar.
The reader should observe that inTheorem 2.2, both 𝒮 and 𝒞 ⧵𝒮 could possi-
bly be infinite and the result will still hold. Nevertheless, the density depends on
the zeta function of the holomorphy ring, which may be hard to compute. First
of all, notice that this is not the case when 𝒮 is finite since under this condition
𝜁𝐻 is a finite product. The following immediate corollary covers the case in which
𝒞 ⧵ 𝒮 is finite.
Corollary 2.3. Let 𝐹 be a function field,𝒮 a set of places of 𝐹 and𝐻 the holomorphy
ring of 𝒮 . Let 𝐿𝐹 (𝑇 ) be the 𝐿-polynomial of 𝐹 . Then
𝜁𝐻 (𝑚) =
𝐿𝐹 (𝑞−𝑚)
(1 − 𝑞−𝑚)(1 − 𝑞−𝑚+1) ∏𝑃∈𝒞⧵𝒮(
1 − 1𝑞deg(𝑃)𝑚).
Proof. The corollary follows from Theorem 2.2, the definition of 𝜁𝐻 and the ex-
pression of the zeta function of 𝐹 in terms of the 𝐿-polynomial.
Remark 2.4. Observe now that in the case where 𝒞 ⧵ 𝒮 is finite, the density of
coprime 𝑚-tuples of 𝐻 depends only on the following finite data: The degrees of
the places in 𝒞 ⧵ 𝒮 and the 𝐿-polynomial of the function field, which again only
depends on the 𝔽𝑞𝑖 -rational points of the curve associated to the function field for
𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑔} (see for example [Sti09, Corollary 5.1.17]).
2.4.1 An example
Let char(𝔽𝑞) ≠ 2, 3 for simplicity. Let 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝔽𝑞 and 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑦2 − 𝑥3 − 𝑎𝑥 − 𝑏 be a
polynomial defining an elliptic curve 𝐸 over 𝔽𝑞 . Let us define
𝐴(𝐸) ≔ 𝔽𝑞[𝑥, 𝑦]/(𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)).
Let 𝐸(𝔽𝑞) denote the set of (projective) 𝔽𝑞-rational points of 𝐸 (i.e. the places of
degree one of the function field of 𝐸).
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Corollary 2.5. The density of 𝑚-tuples of coprime elements of 𝐴(𝐸) is
𝔻(𝑈 ) = 1 − 𝑞
−𝑚+1
1 + 𝑎𝑞𝑞−𝑚 + 𝑞−2𝑚+1
, (2.2)
where 𝑎𝑞 = 𝑞 + 1 − |𝐸(𝔽𝑞)|.
Proof. Observe that the zeta function of an elliptic curve is
𝜁𝐸(𝑠) =
1 + 𝑎𝑞𝑞−𝑠 + 𝑞−2𝑠+1
(1 − 𝑞−𝑠)(1 − 𝑞−𝑠+1) .
The holomorpy ring of 𝐸 is 𝐴(𝐸) = ⋂𝑃≠𝑃∞𝒪𝑃 , where 𝑃∞ is the place at infinity of𝐸. The result then follows fromTheorem 2.2.
Remark 2.6. The reader should notice that (2.2) depends only on the number of
𝔽𝑞-rational points of 𝐸, since the genus of 𝐸 equals one (see Remark 2.4). The
probabilistic interpretation of Corollary 2.5 is the following: Select uniformly at
random 𝑚 elements of 𝐴(𝐸) of degree at most 𝑁 , then the probability that they
generate the unit ideal in 𝐴(𝐸) approaches 1−𝑞−𝑚+11+𝑎𝑞𝑞−𝑚+𝑞−2𝑚+1 as 𝑁 → ∞.
2.4.2 The case 𝑭 = 𝔽𝒒(𝒙)
Wewill now show how the results [ST07,Theorem 1] and [GY13, Remark 4] about
coprime 𝑚-tuples over 𝔽𝑞[𝑥] fit in our framework.
Denote by 𝑃∞ the place at infinity of the function field 𝔽𝑞(𝑥). It is easy to see
that the definition of density for 𝔽𝑞[𝑥] given in [GY13; ST07] agrees with ours
for 𝐻 = 𝔽𝑞[𝑥] = ⋂𝑃≠𝑃∞𝒪𝑃 . Hence, we get [GY13, Remark 4] as a corollary toTheorem 2.2, while [ST07, Theorem 1] is simply the special case 𝑚 = 2:
Corollary 2.7. Let𝑚 > 1 be an integer. The density of coprime𝑚-tuples over 𝔽𝑞[𝑥]
is
𝔻(𝑈 ) = 1 − 1𝑞𝑚−1 .
Proof. It is enough to notice that the zeta function of the function field 𝔽𝑞(𝑥) (i.e.
the zeta function of the projective line) is
𝜁𝔽𝑞 (𝑥)(𝑠) =
1
(1 − 𝑞−𝑠)(1 − 𝑞−𝑠+1) ,
and then the zeta function of the holomorphy ring 𝔽𝑞[𝑥] = ⋂𝑃≠𝑃∞𝒪𝑃 is
𝜁𝔽𝑞[𝑥](𝑠) =
1
1 − 𝑞−𝑠+1 .
The claim follows by inverting the expression above and evaluating at 𝑚.
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2.5 The Density of Unimodular Matrices
We now wish to study the 𝑘 ×𝑚-matrices over the holomorphy ring 𝐻 which can
be extended to 𝑚 × 𝑚 unimodular matrices, for some positive integers 𝑘 < 𝑚. In
other words, our goal is to compute the density of the set
𝑈 ≔ {𝐴 ∈ 𝐻 𝑘×𝑚 | ∃𝐴′ ∈ 𝐻 (𝑚−𝑘)×𝑚 ∶ ( 𝐴𝐴′) ∈ GL𝑚(𝐻 )}.
Our main result gives the density of 𝑈 in the case 2𝑘 − 1 ≤ 𝑚.
Theorem 2.8. Let 2𝑘 − 1 ≤ 𝑚, then
𝔻(𝑈 ) =
𝑚
∏
𝑗=𝑚−𝑘+1
1
𝜁𝐻 (𝑗)
.
Here, the density of 𝑘×𝑚-matrices is defined like in Section 2.3 by considering
them as 𝑘𝑚-tuples. Note that for 𝑘 = 1, the 1 ×𝑚-matrix 𝐴 lies in 𝑈 if and only if
its entries are coprime. Hence, this theorem is a generalization of Theorem 2.2.
The basic ingredients for the proof are the Riemann-Roch theorem and the
Hasse-Weil bound. In any case, the main difficulty we will encounter is giving
an estimate for the number of matrices having entries in ℒ(𝐷) whose reduction
modulo a place 𝑃 is not of full rank. This is provided in Lemma 2.12.
2.5.1 An Unconditional Upper Bound
On the way to our proof of Theorem 2.8, we first give an upper bound to the
superior density 𝔻(𝑈 ). This bound does not require the condition 2𝑘 − 1 ≤ 𝑚, but
holds whenever 𝑘 ≤ 𝑚.
Note first that the set 𝑈 of 𝑘 × 𝑚-matrices which can be extended to unimod-
ular matrices is exactly
𝑈 = {𝐴 ∈ 𝐻 𝑘×𝑚 | 𝐼𝐴 = 𝐻},
where 𝐼𝐴 is the ideal generated by the 𝑘×𝑘 minors of𝐴 (see for example [GMR81]).
The condition 𝐼𝐴 = 𝐻 holds if and only if 𝐼𝐴+𝑄𝐻 = 𝐻 for every place𝑄 ∈ 𝒮 , where
𝑄𝐻 = 𝑄 ∩ 𝐻 , since these 𝑄𝐻 range over all maximal ideals of 𝐻 .
In order to study the density of 𝑈 , we proceed by first restricting our attention
to only finitely many places. Hence, for a finite subset 𝒬 ⊆ 𝒮 , we define
𝑈𝒬 ≔ {𝐴 ∈ 𝐻 𝑘×𝑚 | 𝐼𝐴 + 𝑄𝐻 = 𝐻 for all 𝑄 ∈ 𝒬}.
As discussed above, 𝑈 is the intersection of the 𝑈𝒬 , with 𝒬 ranging over all finite
subsets of 𝒮 . The following lemma gives the density of 𝑈𝒬 . It is very similar to a
part of the main proof in [MS16a].
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Lemma 2.9. Let 𝒬 = {𝑄1, … , 𝑄𝑛} ⊆ 𝒮 be a finite subset of places. The set 𝑈𝒬 ⊆
𝐻 𝑘×𝑚 has density
𝔻(𝑈𝒬) =
𝑛
∏
𝑖=1
𝑘−1
∏
𝑗=0
(1 − 𝑞(𝑗−𝑚) deg𝑄𝑖 ).
Proof. A matrix 𝐴 ∈ 𝐻 𝑘×𝑚 lies in 𝑈𝒬 if and only if for each 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}, the ideal
𝐼𝐴 is not contained in 𝑄𝐻𝑖 , which is to say that the image of 𝐴 in (𝐻/𝑄𝐻𝑖 )𝑘×𝑚 ≅
𝔽𝑘×𝑚𝑞deg𝑄𝑖 has some nonzero 𝑘 × 𝑘 minors, i.e. has full rank.
Consider now the projection
𝜙∶ 𝐻 → 𝐻/(𝑄𝐻1 ⋯𝑄𝐻𝑛 ) ≅
𝑛
∏
𝑖=1
𝐻/𝑄𝐻𝑖 ≅
𝑛
∏
𝑖=1
𝔽𝑞deg𝑄𝑖 ,
where the first isomorphism is by the Chinese remainder theorem. The number
of matrices in∏𝑛𝑖=1 𝔽𝑘×𝑚𝑞deg𝑄𝑖 with full rank in each component is
𝑛
∏
𝑖=1
𝑘−1
∏
𝑗=0
(𝑞𝑚deg𝑄𝑖 − 𝑞𝑗 deg𝑄𝑖 ) (2.3)
by a simple counting argument. These form exactly the image of 𝑈𝒬 under 𝜙𝑘×𝑚.
Consider now a divisor 𝐷 ∈ 𝒟 . We wish to count the number of matrices in
𝑈𝒬∩ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚. First, wewill show that 𝜙mapsℒ(𝐷) surjectively onto∏𝑛𝑖=1 𝔽𝑞deg𝑄𝑖if deg𝐷 is large enough.
For this, note that the image of ℒ(𝐷) under 𝜙 is ℒ(𝐷)/(ℒ(𝐷) ∩ (𝑄𝐻1 ⋯𝑄𝐻𝑛 )).
The space
ℒ(𝐷) ∩ (𝑄𝐻1 ⋯𝑄𝐻𝑛 ) = ℒ(𝐷) ∩ 𝑄1 ∩ ⋯ ∩ 𝑄𝑛
consists of all elements in ℒ(𝐷) with a root at each 𝑄𝑖 , so it is equal to ℒ(𝐷 −
∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑄𝑖). Hence, its dimension as an 𝔽𝑞-vector space is 𝓁(𝐷 − ∑
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑄𝑖), which by
the Riemann-Roch theorem is equal to deg𝐷 −∑𝑛𝑖=1 deg𝑄𝑖 + 1 − 𝑔 if deg𝐷 is largeenough. On the other hand, the dimension ofℒ(𝐷) is then𝓁(𝐷) = deg𝐷+1−𝑔, and
so the image ofℒ(𝐷) under 𝜙 has dimension∑𝑛𝑖=1 deg𝑄𝑖 , the same as∏
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝔽𝑞deg𝑄𝑖 .This argument also gives us the dimension of the kernel of 𝜙 restricted to
ℒ(𝐷), which is 𝓁(𝐷 − ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑄𝑖).From this together with (2.3), we can count the number of matrices in 𝑈𝒬 ∩
ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚, and we get that
|𝑈𝒬 ∩ ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚|
|ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚|
= 𝑞𝑘𝑚(𝓁(𝐷−∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑄𝑖 )−𝓁(𝐷)) ⋅
𝑛
∏
𝑖=1
𝑘−1
∏
𝑗=0
(𝑞𝑚deg𝑄𝑖 − 𝑞𝑗 deg𝑄𝑖 )
=
𝑛
∏
𝑖=1
𝑘−1
∏
𝑗=0
(1 − 𝑞(𝑗−𝑚) deg𝑄𝑖 )
if deg𝐷 is large enough. Taking the limit over all 𝐷 ∈ 𝒟 , we get the claim.
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Proposition 2.10. We have an upper bound for the superior density of 𝑈 given by
𝔻(𝑈 ) ≤
𝑘−1
∏
𝑗=0
∏
𝑄∈𝒮
(1 − 𝑞(𝑗−𝑚) deg𝑄).
Proof. For each finite subset𝒬 ⊆ 𝒮 , we have that𝑈 ⊆ 𝑈𝒬 , and hence by Lemma 2.9
𝔻(𝑈 ) ≤ 𝔻(𝑈𝒬) =
𝑘−1
∏
𝑗=0
∏
𝑄∈𝒬
(1 − 𝑞(𝑗−𝑚) deg𝑄).
By taking the Moore-Smith limit over all such finite sets 𝒬, we get our claim.
Remark 2.11. Thepossibly infinite product∏𝑄∈𝒮 (1−𝑞(𝑗−𝑚) deg𝑄) in Proposition 2.10converges absolutely if 𝑗 < 𝑚 − 1, since it is a subproduct of the reciprocal of the
zeta function of 𝐹 . If 𝑘 = 𝑚, we get the term∏𝑄∈𝒮 (1−𝑞− deg𝑄), which correspondsto the pole of the zeta function. Nevertheless, since each term is strictly between
0 and 1, the product makes sense, though it may diverge to zero.
2.5.2 The Case 𝟐𝒌 − 𝟏 ≤ 𝒎
In the case where 2𝑘 − 1 ≤ 𝑚, we can prove that the upper bound of Proposi-
tion 2.10 is in fact exact. For this, we will need the following lemma.
Lemma 2.12. Let 𝑛 be an integer and 𝑆 be a nonempty subset of 𝔽𝑞𝑛 . Let 𝑁 be the
set of 𝑘 × 𝑚 full rank matrices having entries in 𝑆. Then, independently of 𝑛, we
have that
|𝑁 | ≥
𝑘−1
∏
𝑖=0
(|𝑆|𝑚 − |𝑆|𝑖).
Under these assumptions, this bound is the best possible.
Proof. Let us bound |𝑁 | by progressively counting the rows which can occur for
a matrix in 𝑁 . The first row (𝑣1,1, … , 𝑣1,𝑚) of a matrix 𝐴 in 𝑁 can be fixed in at
least |𝑆|𝑚 − 1 ways: Everything but the zero row can be extended to be invertible.
The second row can be fixed in |𝑆|𝑚 − |𝐵1| ways, where 𝐵1 are the 𝔽𝑞𝑛 -multiples
of the first row which have all entries in 𝑆. Since the first row is nonzero, there
exists 𝑣1,𝑗 different from zero. By the obvious inclusion of sets, we can now bound
|𝐵1| from above with the number of 𝔽𝑞𝑛 -multiples of the first row which have the
𝑗-th component in 𝑆. These are in bijection with the 𝑎 ∈ 𝔽𝑞𝑛 for which 𝑎𝑣1,𝑗 ∈ 𝑆,
of which there are exactly |𝑆|. Hence, |𝐵1| ≤ |𝑆|.
We can iterate this procedure as follows: The 𝑖-th row (𝑣𝑖,1, … , 𝑣𝑖,𝑚) can be
chosen in |𝑆|𝑚 − |𝐵𝑖−1|ways, where 𝐵𝑖−1 are the rows in 𝑆𝑚 which are 𝔽𝑞𝑛 -linearly
dependent on the first 𝑖 − 1 rows. By construction, the first 𝑖 − 1 rows are linearly
independent, which implies that there exists a full rank (𝑖 −1)× (𝑖 −1) submatrix 𝐾 .
Let 𝑗1, … , 𝑗𝑖−1 ∈ {1, … ,𝑚} be the indices corresponding to the columns of the full
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rank submatrix. As in the simpler case before, 𝐵𝑖−1 is contained in the set of rows
which are 𝔽𝑞𝑛 -linearly dependent on the first 𝑖 − 1 and for which the components
at indices 𝑗1, … , 𝑗𝑖−1 lie in 𝑆. It is easily seen that the rows satisfying this weaker
condition are in bijection with the vectors 𝑤 ∈ 𝔽𝑖−1𝑞𝑛 such that 𝑤𝐾 ∈ 𝑆𝑖−1, so there
are exactly |𝐾−1𝑆𝑖−1| = |𝑆|𝑖−1 of them, and |𝐵𝑖−1| ≤ |𝑆|𝑖−1.
This gives us the bound of the lemma. The reader should now observe that
this bound is uniform in 𝑛 and also that it is the best possible general bound, since
it is attained when 𝑆 is a subfield of 𝔽𝑞𝑛 .
With this, we can compute the inferior density of 𝑈 .
Proposition 2.13. If 2𝑘 − 1 ≤ 𝑚, we have for the inferior density of 𝑈
𝔻(𝑈 ) =
𝑘−1
∏
𝑗=0
∏
𝑄∈𝒮
(1 − 𝑞(𝑗−𝑚) deg𝑄).
Proof. Fix a finite set of places 𝒬 ⊆ 𝒮 . Having 𝑈 ⊆ 𝑈𝒬 , it is easily seen that (see
also [DM16, Lemma 4])
𝔻(𝑈 ) = 𝔻(𝑈𝒬) − 𝔻(𝑈𝒬 ⧵ 𝑈 ).
If we prove that 𝔻(𝑈𝒬 ⧵ 𝑈 ) tends to zero, the claim follows from Lemma 2.9 by
taking the limit over all finite subsets 𝒬 ⊆ 𝒮 .
To show this, we first fix the set of places 𝒬, then a divisor 𝐷 ∈ 𝒟 depending
on 𝒬. We can now write:
(𝑈𝒬 ⧵ 𝑈 ) ∩ ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚 ⊆ {𝐴 ∈ ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚 | 𝐼𝐴 ⊆ 𝑃𝐻 for some 𝑃 ∈ 𝒮 ⧵ 𝒬}
= ⋃
𝑃∈𝒮⧵𝒬
{𝐴 ∈ ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚 | 𝐼𝐴 ⊆ 𝑃𝐻}.
In this union, we can limit ourselves to 𝑃 of degree at most 𝑘 deg𝐷: Indeed, sup-
pose we have deg 𝑃 ≥ 𝑘 deg𝐷 and 𝐴 ∈ ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚 with 𝐼𝐴 ⊆ 𝑃𝐻 . Since all entries
of 𝐴 are inℒ(𝐷) and the 𝑘 × 𝑘 minors are degree 𝑘 polynomials in these, we see
that each such minor lies in ℒ(𝑘𝐷). Because 𝐼𝐴 ⊆ 𝑃𝐻 , they furthermore lie in
ℒ(𝑘𝐷 − 𝑃), which is trivial when deg(𝑘𝐷 − 𝑃) = 𝑘 deg𝐷 − deg 𝑃 < 0. The ideal 𝐼𝐴
is generated by these minors and is hence (0). It follows that 𝐼𝐴 ⊆ 𝑃 ′𝐻 for every
place 𝑃 ′, and so 𝐴 is already contained in the following restricted union (assum-
ing 𝐷 is chosen large enough that there is at least one 𝑃 ′ ∈ 𝒮 ⧵ 𝒬 of degree less
than 𝑘 deg𝐷):
(𝑈𝒬 ⧵ 𝑈 ) ∩ ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚 ⊆ ⋃
𝑃∈𝒮⧵𝒬
deg 𝑃≤𝑘 deg𝐷
{𝐴 ∈ ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚 | 𝐼𝐴 ⊆ 𝑃𝐻}.
We write 𝑆𝑃 ≔ {𝐴 ∈ ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚 | 𝐼𝐴 ⊆ 𝑃𝐻}.
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With this, we can now give the following estimate:
|(𝑈𝒬 ⧵ 𝑈 ) ∩ ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚|
|ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚|
≤ ∑
𝑃∈𝒮⧵𝒬
deg 𝑃≤𝑘 deg𝐷
|𝑆𝑃 |
|ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚|
.
We concentrate on the individual summands. Consider as in Lemma 2.9 the
projection
𝜙∶ 𝐻 → 𝐻/𝑃𝐻 ≅ 𝔽𝑞deg 𝑃
and its restriction to ℒ(𝐷), as an 𝔽𝑞-linear map. Let 𝑑 be the dimension of
𝜙(ℒ(𝐷)). We easily see that 𝜙𝑘×𝑚(𝑆𝑃 ) is the set of matrices with entries in 𝜙(ℒ(𝐷))
not of full rank, which by Lemma 2.12 has cardinality
|𝜙𝑘×𝑚(𝑆𝑃 )| ≤ 𝑞𝑚𝑘𝑑 −
𝑘−1
∏
𝑖=0
(𝑞𝑚𝑑 − 𝑞𝑖𝑑 ).
Furthermore, the kernel of 𝜙|ℒ(𝐷) isℒ(𝐷 − 𝑃), so we get
|𝑆𝑃 | ≤ 𝑞𝑚𝑘𝓁(𝐷−𝑃) ⋅ (𝑞
𝑚𝑘𝑑 −
𝑘−1
∏
𝑖=0
(𝑞𝑚𝑑 − 𝑞𝑖𝑑 ))
≤ 𝑞𝑚𝑘𝓁(𝐷−𝑃) ⋅ 𝐶𝑞(𝑘−1)(𝑚+1)𝑑 ,
where 𝐶 is a constant depending only on 𝑘 (𝐶 = 2𝑘 works). We have 𝑑 = 𝓁(𝐷) −
𝓁(𝐷 − 𝑃) by the rank-nullity theorem, so we can write
|𝑆𝑃 |
|ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚|
≤ 𝑞𝑚𝑘(𝓁(𝐷−𝑃)−𝓁(𝐷)) ⋅ 𝐶𝑞(𝑘−1)(𝑚+1)𝑑
= 𝑞−𝑚𝑘𝑑 ⋅ 𝐶𝑞(𝑘−1)(𝑚+1)𝑑
= 𝐶𝑞(𝑘−𝑚−1)𝑑
≤ 𝐶𝑞−𝑘𝑑 ,
(2.4)
the last following from the assumption 2𝑘 − 1 ≤ 𝑚. We now look at two cases
separately.
Case 1: deg𝐷 < deg 𝑃 ≤ 𝑘 deg𝐷. In this case, we see that 𝓁(𝐷 − 𝑃) = 0 and
𝑑 = 𝓁(𝐷). The Hasse-Weil bound says that the number of places of 𝐹 of degree at
most 𝑟 is asymptotically equal to 𝑞+1𝑞 𝑞
𝑟
𝑟 . With this and (2.4), we can estimate for
large 𝐷 the sum
∑
𝑃∈𝒮⧵𝒬
deg𝐷<deg 𝑃≤𝑘 deg𝐷
|𝑆𝑃 |
|ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚|
≤ 𝐶′ ⋅ 𝑞
𝑘 deg𝐷
𝑘 deg𝐷 ⋅ 𝑞
−𝑘𝓁(𝐷),
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for some new constant 𝐶′ = 𝐶 ⋅ ( 𝑞+1𝑞 + 1). Since 𝓁(𝐷) = deg𝐷 + 1 − 𝑔 for large 𝐷,
we can rewrite the above to
𝐶′
𝑘 deg𝐷 ⋅ 𝑞
−𝑘(1−𝑔)
which goes to zero upon taking the limit in 𝐷.
Case 2: deg 𝑃 ≤ deg𝐷. In this case, we note that 𝓁(𝐷) ≥ deg𝐷 + 1 − 𝑔 and
𝓁(𝐷−𝑃) ≤ deg(𝐷−𝑃)+1 by Riemann-Roch, and so 𝑑 = 𝓁(𝐷)−𝓁(𝐷−𝑃) ≥ deg 𝑃 −𝑔.
Using this with (2.4), we can estimate the sum
∑
𝑃∈𝒮⧵𝒬
deg 𝑃≤deg𝐷
|𝑆𝑃 |
|ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚|
≤ ∑
𝑃∈𝒮⧵𝒬
deg 𝑃≤deg𝐷
𝐶′ ⋅ 𝑞−𝑘 deg 𝑃 ,
for 𝐶′ = 𝐶𝑞𝑘𝑔 . Taking the limit in 𝐷, we get
∑
𝑃∈𝒮⧵𝒬
𝐶′ ⋅ 𝑞−𝑘 deg 𝑃 .
Up to the factor 𝐶′, this is the tail of a subseries of the zeta function of 𝐹 evaluated
at 𝑘, which converges absolutely for 𝑘 > 1. For 𝑘 = 1,𝑚 > 1, note that the inequal-
ity 2𝑘 − 1 ≤ 𝑚 is not sharp, so the proof still works with a slight modification to
the estimate (2.4).
Putting together all we have done so far, we see that
𝔻(𝑈𝒬 ⧵ 𝑈 ) = lim sup
𝐷∈𝒟
|(𝑈𝒬 ⧵ 𝑈 ) ∩ ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚|
|ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚|
≤ lim sup
𝐷∈𝒟 (
∑
𝑃∈𝒮⧵𝒬
deg𝐷<deg 𝑃≤𝑘 deg𝐷
|𝑆𝑃 |
|ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚|
+ ∑
𝑃∈𝒮⧵𝒬
deg 𝑃≤deg𝐷
|𝑆𝑃 |
|ℒ(𝐷)𝑘×𝑚|)
≤ 0 + ∑
𝑃∈𝒮⧵𝒬
𝐶′ ⋅ 𝑞−𝑘 deg 𝑃 .
This final sum can be seen as the tail of an absolutely convergent series, and hence
it converges to zero as 𝒬 grows. We conclude that
lim
finite 𝒬⊆𝒮
𝔻(𝑈𝒬 ⧵ 𝑈 ) = 0,
from which the proposition follows.
Themain result,Theorem 2.8, now follows immediately fromPropositions 2.10
and 2.13.
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Remark 2.14. We tried to keep the tools used as elementary as possible. Neverthe-
less, the reader who is willing to pursue a more sophisticated approach (based on
𝑝-adic analysis) can refer to a function field version of [PS99, Lemma 20]. Still, a
part of Lemma 2.9 will be needed and Lemma 2.12 will still be entirely necessary
to satisfy the condition of [PS99, Lemma 20].
Remark 2.15. It is worth observing that in [GY13], this result has been presented
for the special case of polynomial rings, which can be regarded as holomorphy
rings of the rational function field, as in Section 2.4.2. Unfortunately, the proof
of [GY13] is not correct as it is presented (see the exchange of lim sup and an
infinite sum in the proof of [GY13, Theorem 1]) and needs a fix, which we were
able to perform in the case 2𝑘 − 1 ≤ 𝑚. It would be of great interest if one could
adjust this proof towork in themost general case (i.e. 𝑘 < 𝑚), whichwe conjecture
to be true at least in the case of the polynomial ring.
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Chapter 3
Density of Shifted Eisenstein
Polynomials
3.1 Introduction
The Eisenstein irreducibility criterion [Eis50; Sch46] is a very convenient tool to
establish that a polynomial in ℤ[𝑥] is irreducible.1
Definition 3.1. Let 𝑅 be an integral domain and 𝑅[𝑥] be the ring of polynomials
with coefficients in 𝑅. We say that 𝑓 (𝑥) = ∑𝑛𝑖=0 𝛼𝑖𝑥 𝑖 ∈ 𝑅[𝑥] of degree 𝑛 is Eisensteinwith respect to a prime ideal 𝑃 or 𝑃-Eisenstein if
• 𝛼𝑛 ∉ 𝑃 ,
• 𝛼𝑖 ∈ 𝑃 for all 𝑖 ∈ {0, … , 𝑛 − 1},
• 𝛼0 ∉ 𝑃2.
We say that 𝑓 (𝑥) is Eisenstein if it is Eisenstein with respect to some prime ideal
𝑃 .
The Eisenstein criterion now says that any Eisenstein polynomial is irreducible
in 𝐹[𝑥], where 𝐹 is the field of fractions of 𝑅. In this chapter, we will only consider
the case of the ring of integers 𝑅 = ℤ and the rings of 𝑝-adic integers 𝑅 = ℤ𝑝 .
It is a well understood fact that the density of irreducible polynomials of fixed
degree 𝑛 among all the polynomials of degree 𝑛 is equal to one. The question
which naturally arises is the following:
Question 3.2. What is the natural density of degree 𝑛 polynomials which are Eisen-
stein?
1In this chapter, when we say that a polynomial in ℤ[𝑥] is irreducible, we mean that it is irre-
ducible as an element of ℚ[𝑥].
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More informally, how likely is it that checking whether a random polynomial
is irreducible using only the Eisenstein irreducibility criterion leads to success?
In [Dub03; HS13], the authors deal with Eisenstein polynomials of fixed degree
with coefficients overℤ. They provide a complete answer to the above question in
the case of monic (see [Dub03,Theorem 1] and [HS13,Theorem 1]) and non-monic
(see [HS13, Theorem 2]) Eisenstein polynomials.
We will specialize to the case of non-monic Eisenstein polynomials, since the
proofs and methods can be easily adapted from one case to the other. In [HS13],
the authors consider the set of polynomials of degree at most 𝑛 having integer
coefficients bounded in absolute value by 𝐵 (the height of a polynomial) and give
a sharp estimate for the number 𝜌(𝐵) of polynomials which are irreducible by the
Eisenstein criterion. The natural density of degree 𝑛 Eisenstein polynomials is
then the limit of the sequence 𝜌(𝐵)/(2𝐵)𝑛+1, which turns out to be
1 −∏
𝑝 prime(
1 − (𝑝 − 1)
2
𝑝𝑛+2 ).
This fully answers Question 3.2.
Clearly, a polynomial 𝑓 (𝑥) is irreducible if and only if 𝑓 (𝑥 + 𝑖) is irreducible
for any and hence all 𝑖 ∈ ℤ. Using this simple observation, one could check
irreducibility by trying to use the Eisenstein criterion for many 𝑖. How likely is it
that this procedure works? More formally,
Question 3.3. What is the natural density of degree 𝑛 polynomials 𝑓 (𝑥) for which
𝑓 (𝑥 + 𝑖) is irreducible by the Eisenstein criterion for some integer shift 𝑖?
In [HS14], Heyman and Shparlinski address this question, and give a lower
bound on this density. Nevertheless, the question regarding the exact density
remained open. We managed to give an exact solution to this question in our
paper [MS16b], which is the basis of this chapter.
In Section 3.2, we give the complete solution to Question 3.3 using a local
to global principle for densities [PS99, Lemma 20]. Using similar methods, we
also provide a solution to the question appearing in [HS14, Section 7] about affine
Eisenstein polynomials in Section 3.3.
Our proofs are also supported by Monte Carlo experiments which we provide
in Section 3.4.
3.2 Shifted Eisenstein Polynomials
In this section, we determine the density of degree 𝑛 polynomials 𝑓 (𝑥) ∈ ℤ[𝑥]
such that 𝑓 (𝑥 + 𝑖) is Eisenstein for some shift 𝑖 ∈ ℤ.
First, we need to define what density even means for subsets of ℤ[𝑥]≤𝑛, i.e. of
the set of polynomials of degree at most 𝑛. We do this by simply identifying the
module 𝑅[𝑥]≤𝑛 with 𝑅𝑛+1 via the standard basis {1, 𝑥, … , 𝑥𝑛}, for any ring 𝑅. Then,
we can apply Definition 1.3.
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Let 𝜎 be the shift map defined by
𝜎 ∶ ℤ𝑛+1 ⟶ℤ𝑛+1
𝑓 (𝑥)⟼ 𝑓 (𝑥 + 1).
It is easy to see that 𝜎 is a linear map with determinant one. Similarly, we get a
determinant one map over ℤ𝑝 for any 𝑝, which we will also denote by 𝜎 .
Definition 3.4. Let 𝐸 ⊆ ℤ𝑛+1 be the set of degree 𝑛 Eisenstein polynomials over
the integers. Let 𝐸𝑝 be the set of degree 𝑛 Eisenstein polynomials over ℤ𝑝 .
Definition 3.5. Let 𝐸 ⊆ ℤ𝑛+1 be the set of degree 𝑛 polynomials which are Eisen-
stein after applying some shift 𝑖 ∈ ℤ:
𝐸 ≔ {𝑓 (𝑥) ∈ ℤ𝑛+1 | 𝑓 (𝑥 + 𝑖) ∈ 𝐸 for some 𝑖 ∈ ℤ}.
We call these polynomials shifted Eisenstein.
Remark 3.6. When we consider the set 𝐸 ⊆ ℤ𝑛+1, we are computing the density of
shifted (and later affine) Eisenstein polynomials of degree exactly 𝑛 among poly-
nomials of degree at most 𝑛. Nevertheless it is easy to see that the density of
shifted (and also affine, see Remark 3.16) Eisenstein polynomials of degree less or
equal than 𝑛 is the same.
In order to compute the density of 𝐸, we need to consider each prime 𝑝 sepa-
rately. We do this by working over the 𝑝-adic integers.
Definition 3.7. Let 𝐸𝑝 ⊆ ℤ𝑛+1𝑝 be the set of degree 𝑛 polynomials of ℤ𝑝[𝑥] which
are Eisenstein after applying some shift 𝑖 ∈ ℤ𝑝 :
𝐸𝑝 ≔ {𝑓 (𝑥) ∈ ℤ𝑛+1𝑝 | 𝑓 (𝑥 + 𝑖) ∈ 𝐸𝑝 for some 𝑖 ∈ ℤ𝑝}.
We also call these polynomials shifted Eisenstein, since it will always be clear from
the context to which set we are referring.
Notice that 𝐸𝑝 ∩ ℤ𝑛+1 are exactly the polynomials of ℤ[𝑥] of degree 𝑛 which
are shifted 𝑝-Eisenstein.
Lemma 3.8. If 𝑛 ≥ 2 and 𝑓 (𝑥) ∈ ℤ𝑛+1𝑝 is shifted Eisenstein, then it is so with respect
to exactly one rational integer shift 𝑖 ∈ {0, … , 𝑝 − 1}. In other words,
𝐸𝑝 =
𝑝−1
⨆
𝑖=0
𝜎−𝑖𝐸𝑝 .
Proof. We clearly have
𝑝−1
⋃
𝑖=0
𝜎−𝑖𝐸𝑝 ⊆ 𝐸𝑝 .
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The other inclusion is easy but not completely trivial.
Let 𝑓 (𝑥) = ∑𝑛𝑖=0 𝛼𝑖𝑥 𝑖 ∈ 𝐸𝑝 and 𝑘 ∈ ℤ𝑝 . We first show that 𝑓 (𝑥 + 𝑘𝑝) is alsoEisenstein: Clearly 𝑓 (𝑥) = 𝑓 (𝑥 + 𝑘𝑝) in ℤ𝑝/𝑝ℤ𝑝 , so the only condition which one
has to check is that the coefficient of the term of degree zero of 𝑓 (𝑥 + 𝑘𝑝) is not
in 𝑝2ℤ𝑝 . This coefficient is in fact 𝑓 (𝑘𝑝) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑘𝑝 + ∑𝑛𝑖=2 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑖𝑝𝑖 . Modulo 𝑝2ℤ𝑝we have that
• 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑖𝑝𝑖 is congruent to zero for 𝑖 ≥ 2,
• 𝛼1𝑘𝑝 is congruent to zero since 𝛼1 is in 𝑝ℤ𝑝 ,
• 𝛼0 is not congruent to zero since the polynomial 𝑓 (𝑥) is Eisenstein,
from which it follows that the polynomial 𝑓 (𝑥 + 𝑘𝑝) is Eisenstein in ℤ𝑝[𝑥].
Let now 𝑓 (𝑥) ∈ 𝐸𝑝 , then 𝑓 (𝑥 + 𝑢) is Eisenstein for some 𝑢 ∈ ℤ𝑝 . The inclusion
𝐸𝑝 ⊆
𝑝−1
⋃
𝑖=0
𝜎−𝑖𝐸𝑝
will follow if we show that we can select 𝑢 in {0, … , 𝑝 − 1}. Write 𝑢 = 𝑘𝑝 + 𝑖
with 𝑖 ∈ {0, … , 𝑝 − 1} and 𝑘 ∈ ℤ𝑝 . Using what we proved above, we see that
𝑓 (𝑥 + 𝑢 − 𝑘𝑝) = 𝑓 (𝑥 + 𝑖) is Eisenstein, and the inclusion follows.
We now show that the union is disjoint, i.e. 𝜎−𝑖𝐸𝑝 ∩ 𝜎−𝑗𝐸𝑝 = ∅ for any 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈
{0, … , 𝑝 − 1} and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. Without loss of generality, we can assume 𝑖 > 𝑗. Then
𝜎−𝑖𝐸𝑝 ∩ 𝜎−𝑗𝐸𝑝 = ∅ ⟺ 𝐸𝑝 ∩ 𝜎 𝑖−𝑗𝐸𝑝 = ∅.
Let 𝑡 ≔ 𝑗 − 𝑖 and ∑𝑛𝑖=0 𝛼𝑘𝑥𝑘 = 𝑓 (𝑥) ∈ 𝐸𝑝 , then the coefficient of the degree zero
term of 𝑓 (𝑥 + 𝑡) is 𝑓 (𝑡) = 𝛼𝑛𝑡𝑛 + ∑𝑛−1𝑘=0 𝛼𝑘𝑡𝑘 . Now, the reduction of 𝛼𝑘 modulo 𝑝is zero for any 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 1 and 𝛼𝑛 and 𝑡 are invertible modulo 𝑝, so 𝑓 (𝑥 + 𝑡) is not
Eisenstein.
Let 𝜇𝑝 be the Haar measure on ℤ𝑛+1𝑝 normalized to have total mass 1, and 𝜇∞
the Lebesgue measure on ℝ𝑛+1. (For basics on the Haar measure on the 𝑝-adic
numbers, we refer to [Rob00].)
Lemma 3.9. In the above notation we have for 𝑛 ≥ 2
𝜇𝑝(𝐸𝑝) =
(𝑝 − 1)2
𝑝𝑛+1 .
Proof. Since 𝜎−1 has determinant one, it does not change the 𝑝-adic volumes.
Therefore, by Lemma 3.8, one has 𝜇𝑝(𝐸𝑝) = 𝑝 ⋅ 𝜇𝑝(𝐸𝑝). It is easy to compute the
measure 𝜇𝑝(𝐸𝑝) by writing 𝐸𝑝 = (𝑝ℤ𝑝 ⧵ 𝑝2ℤ𝑝) × (𝑝ℤ𝑝)𝑛−1 × (ℤ𝑝 ⧵ 𝑝ℤ𝑝).
In order to obtain the density 𝔻(𝐸) from the local data {𝜇𝑝(𝐸𝑝)}𝑝 , we will use
the following lemma [PS99, Lemma 20].
3.2. Shifted Eisenstein Polynomials 25
Lemma 3.10. Suppose 𝑈∞ ⊆ ℝ𝑑 is such that ℝ+ ⋅ 𝑈∞ = 𝑈∞, 𝜇∞(𝜕𝑈∞) = 0. Let
𝑈 1∞ = 𝑈∞ ∩ [−1, 1]𝑑 and 𝑠∞ = 𝜇∞(𝑈 1∞). Let 𝑈𝑝 ⊆ ℤ𝑑𝑝 , 𝜇𝑝(𝜕𝑈𝑝) = 0 and 𝑠𝑝 = 𝜇𝑝(𝑈𝑝) for
each prime 𝑝. Let 𝑀ℚ be the set of places of ℚ. Moreover, suppose that
lim𝑀→∞𝔻({𝑎 ∈ ℤ
𝑑 | 𝑎 ∈ 𝑈𝑝 for some finite prime 𝑝 greater than 𝑀}) = 0. (3.1)
Let 𝑃 ∶ ℤ𝑑 → 2𝑀ℚ be defined as 𝑃(𝑎) = {𝑣 ∈ 𝑀ℚ | 𝑎 ∈ 𝑈𝑣}. Then we have:
(a) ∑𝑣 𝑠𝑣 converges.
(b) For any 𝑇 ⊆ 2𝑀ℚ , 𝜈(𝑇 ) ≔ 𝔻(𝑃−1(𝑇 )) exists and defines a measure on 2𝑀ℚ ,
which is concentrated at the finite subsets of 𝑀ℚ.
(c) Let 𝑆 be a finite subset of 𝑀ℚ, then
𝜈({𝑆}) = ∏
𝑣∈𝑆
𝑠𝑣 ∏
𝑣∉𝑆
(1 − 𝑠𝑣 ).
Proof. For the proof, see [PS99, Lemma 20].
After showing that condition (3.1) applies, we can use Lemma 3.10 to deter-
mine the density of shifted Eisenstein polynomials over the integers.
Theorem 3.11. Let 𝑛 ≥ 3. The density of shifted Eisenstein polynomials of degree 𝑛
is
𝔻(𝐸) = 1 −∏
𝑝 prime(
1 − (𝑝 − 1)
2
𝑝𝑛+1 ). (3.2)
Proof. Set 𝑈𝑝 = 𝐸𝑝 for all 𝑝 and 𝑈∞ = ∅. The conditions 𝜇𝑝(𝜕𝑈𝑝) = 0 hold since 𝑈𝑝
is both closed and open. Notice that in the notation of Lemma 3.10 we have that
𝑃−1({∅}) equals the complement of 𝐸. Therefore, if condition (3.1) is verified, we
get the claim:
𝔻(𝐸) = 1 −∏
𝑝 prime
(1 − 𝑠𝑝) = 1 −∏
𝑝 prime(
1 − (𝑝 − 1)
2
𝑝𝑛+1 ).
Let us now show that the condition indeed holds:
lim𝑀→∞𝔻({𝑎 ∈ ℤ
𝑛+1 | 𝑎 ∈ 𝐸𝑝 for some finite prime 𝑝 greater than 𝑀})
= lim
𝑀→∞
lim sup
𝐵→∞
|⋃𝑝>𝑀 𝐸𝑝 ∩ [−𝐵, 𝐵[𝑛+1|
(2𝐵)𝑛+1 .
(3.3)
We have 𝐸𝑝 ∩ [−𝐵, 𝐵[𝑛+1 = ∅ for 𝑝 > 𝐶𝐵2, where 𝐶 is a constant depending only
on the degree 𝑛. One can see that using the following argument: Let 𝑓 (𝑥) be a
polynomial in [−𝐵, 𝐵[𝑛+1 for which 𝑓 (𝑥 + 𝑖) is Eisenstein, then [HS14, Lemma 3.1]
𝑝𝑛−1 ∣ disc(𝑓 (𝑥 + 𝑖)) = disc(𝑓 (𝑥)) ≠ 0.
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Now, the discriminant of 𝑓 (𝑥) is a polynomial of degree 2𝑛 − 2 in the coefficients,
whence
𝑝𝑛−1 ≤ disc(𝑓 (𝑥)) ≤ 𝐷𝐵2𝑛−2
for some constant 𝐷 depending only on 𝑛. Therefore, for 𝐶 = 𝐷1/(𝑛−1), we have
𝑝 ≤ 𝐶𝐵2. Thus, we have just shown that for fixed 𝐵, the union in (3.3) is finite,
and we can bound it by
lim
𝑀→∞
limsup
𝐵→∞
|⋃𝐶𝐵2>𝑝>𝑀 𝐸𝑝 ∩ [−𝐵, 𝐵[𝑛+1|
(2𝐵)𝑛+1
≤ lim
𝑀→∞
lim sup
𝐵→∞
∑
𝐶𝐵2>𝑝>𝑀
|𝐸𝑝 ∩ [−𝐵, 𝐵[𝑛+1|
(2𝐵)𝑛+1 .
(3.4)
Given the order of the limits, we can fix the following setting: 𝑀 > 𝑛 and 𝐵 > 𝑀 .
Now let us bound |𝐸𝑝 ∩ [−𝐵, 𝐵[𝑛+1| in the following two cases:
(a) 2𝐵 < 𝑝: In this case, we can consider [−𝐵, 𝐵[𝑛+1 as a subset of 𝔽𝑛+1𝑝 without
losing any information. The reader should notice that modulo 𝑝, the ele-
ments of 𝐸𝑝 have a multiple root of order 𝑛 at some 𝑖 ∈ 𝔽𝑝 . Now, the key
observation is the following: The reduction modulo 𝑝 of the polynomials in
[−𝐵, 𝐵[𝑛+1 ∩ 𝐸𝑝 is contained in the set
𝑆𝑝 ≔ {𝑎(𝑥 − 𝑖)𝑛 | 𝑎 ∈ [−𝐵, 𝐵[ ⧵ {0} and −𝑛𝑎𝑖 ∈ [−𝐵, 𝐵[}.
This represents the condition that the degree 𝑛 and 𝑛 − 1 coefficients live in
[−𝐵, 𝐵[:
[−𝐵, 𝐵[𝑛+1 ∩ 𝐸𝑝 ⊆ 𝑆𝑝 .
Observe now that |𝑆𝑝| = (2𝐵 − 1)2𝐵 ≤ (2𝐵)2, since 𝑛 and 𝑎 are invertible
modulo 𝑝 (recall 𝑝 > 𝑀 > 𝑛). We conclude that
|[−𝐵, 𝐵[𝑛+1 ∩ 𝐸𝑝| ≤ |𝑆𝑝| ≤ (2𝐵)2.
Notice that this bound is uniform in 𝑝.
(b) 2𝐵 ≥ 𝑝: In this case, the bound is more natural. Consider the projection
map
𝜋 ∶ ℤ𝑛+1 ⟶𝔽𝑛+1𝑝
and the shift map modulo 𝑝
𝜎−1∶ 𝔽𝑛+1𝑝 ⟶𝔽𝑛+1𝑝
𝑓 (𝑥)⟼ 𝑓 (𝑥 − 1).
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Consider the sets of polynomials 𝐿𝑝 ≔ {𝑎𝑥𝑛 | 𝑎 ∈ 𝔽∗𝑝} and
𝐿𝑝 =
𝑝−1
⋃
𝑖=0
𝜎−𝑖𝐿𝑝 . (3.5)
We have |𝐿𝑝| ≤ 𝑝2.
Notice that
𝜋([−𝐵, 𝐵[𝑛+1 ∩ 𝐸𝑝) ⊆ 𝐿𝑝 . (3.6)
At this step, we observe that the projection is at most ⌈2𝐵/𝑝⌉𝑛+1 to one,
therefore we can bound |[−𝐵, 𝐵[𝑛+1 ∩ 𝐸𝑝| using the projection map and con-
dition (3.6):
|[−𝐵, 𝐵[𝑛+1 ∩ 𝐸𝑝| ≤ |𝐿𝑝| ⋅ ⌈2𝐵/𝑝⌉𝑛+1 ≤ 𝑝2(
2𝐵
𝑝 + 1)
𝑛+1
≤ 𝑝2(
4𝐵
𝑝 )
𝑛+1
,
where the last inequality follows from 2𝐵 ≥ 𝑝. At the end of the day, the
bound we have is of the form
|[−𝐵, 𝐵[𝑛+1 ∩ 𝐸𝑝| ≤ 4𝑛+1
𝐵𝑛+1
𝑝𝑛−1 .
Let us now come back to the sum in (3.4), which we can split according to the
two cases above:
∑
𝐶𝐵2>𝑝>𝑀
|𝐸𝑝 ∩ [−𝐵, 𝐵[𝑛+1|
(2𝐵)𝑛+1 ≤ ∑𝐶𝐵2>𝑝>2𝐵
(2𝐵)2
(2𝐵)𝑛+1 + ∑2𝐵≥𝑝>𝑀
2𝑛+1
𝑝𝑛−1 . (3.7)
Using the limit in 𝐵, the first sum goes to zero by the prime number theorem since
𝑛 ≥ 3. As 𝐵 goes to infinity, the other sum becomes a converging series (again
𝑛 ≥ 3) starting at the index 𝑀 . Letting 𝑀 go to infinity, this too goes to zero.
Hence we have shown that condition (3.1) holds, and the theorem follows.
In degree 2, the above proof does not work: Indeed, it is easily seen that∑𝑝 𝑠𝑝diverges for 𝑛 = 2, so by the first claim of Lemma 3.10, the proof we gave in
degree greater or equal than 3 is doomed to fail in degree 2. However, we have
a much simpler application of the lemma which shows that the density of shifted
Eisenstein polynomials of degree 2 is indeed one, as Theorem 3.11 suggests.
Proposition 3.12. The density of shifted Eisenstein polynomials of degree 𝑛 = 2 is
one.
Proof. Let again 𝑈∞ = ∅. We now apply Lemma 3.10 to a truncated sequence of
sets. For this, let 𝑀 be a positive integer and
𝑈𝑝 ={
𝐸𝑝 if 𝑝 ≤ 𝑀
∅ if 𝑝 > 𝑀.
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This truncated sequence now automatically satisfies condition (3.1), and we get
the density
𝔻(𝐸) ≥ 𝔻(⋃
𝑝≤𝑀
𝐸𝑝 ∩ ℤ3) = 1 −∏𝑝≤𝑀(
1 − (𝑝 − 1)
2
𝑝3 ).
Letting 𝑀 tend to infinity gives 𝔻(𝐸) = 1, as the product diverges to zero.
Remark 3.13. Even though the density of shifted Eisenstein polynomials of degree
2 is one, not all irreducible polynomials are Eisenstein for some shift (or even affine
transformation): Take for example the polynomial 𝑓 (𝑥) = 𝑥2 + 8𝑥 − 16, which is
irreducible over ℤ. Its discriminant is 27, so it could only be shifted Eisenstein
with respect to 2. But neither 𝑓 (𝑥) nor 𝑓 (𝑥 + 1) = 𝑥2 + 10𝑥 − 7 is 2-Eisenstein.
3.3 Affine Eisenstein Polynomials
In [HS14, Section 7], the questionwas also raised about the density of polynomials
that become Eisenstein after an arbitrary affine transformation, instead of only
considering shifts. We can address this question as well, using the same methods
as in Section 3.2.
Definition 3.14. For 𝑓 (𝑥) ∈ 𝑅𝑛+1 and 𝐴 = ( 𝑎 𝑏𝑐 𝑑 ) ∈ 𝑅2×2, we define the affine
transformation of 𝑓 by 𝐴 as
𝑓 ∗ 𝐴 ≔ (𝑐𝑥 + 𝑑)𝑛 ⋅ 𝑓 (
𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏
𝑐𝑥 + 𝑑 ).
It is easy to see that, when restricted to GL2(𝑅), this is a right group action.
Like in Section 3.2, we consider the set of polynomials with integer coefficients
that become Eisenstein after some affine transformation.
Definition 3.15. Let ̃𝐸 ⊆ ℤ𝑛+1 be the set of degree 𝑛 polynomials which become
Eisenstein of degree 𝑛 after some affine transformation:
̃𝐸 ≔ {𝑓 (𝑥) ∈ ℤ𝑛+1 | 𝑓 ∗ 𝐴 ∈ 𝐸 for some 𝐴 ∈ ℤ2×2}.
We call these polynomials affine Eisenstein.
It is easy to see that if both 𝑓 and 𝑓 ∗𝐴 have degree 𝑛, and 𝑓 ∗𝐴 is irreducible,
then so is 𝑓 . Hence, an affine Eisenstein polynomial is irreducible.
Remark 3.16. The reader should notice that also in this case, we only consider
affine Eisenstein polynomials of degree exactly 𝑛. Here, a further observation is
required: It could happen that a degree 𝑛 polynomial becomes Eisenstein of lower
degree after some affine transformation. We don’t consider such polynomials to
be affine Eisenstein, since it can be seen that they are never irreducible. Like-
wise, a polynomial of degree less than 𝑛 cannot become Eisenstein of degree 𝑛
after an affine transformation, since any transformation that increases the degree
introduces factors 𝑐𝑥 + 𝑑 .
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We again consider each prime separately by working over the 𝑝-adic integers.
Definition 3.17. Let ̃𝐸𝑝 ⊆ ℤ𝑛+1𝑝 be the set of degree 𝑛 polynomials ofℤ𝑝[𝑥]which
become Eisenstein of degree 𝑛 after some affine transformation 𝐴 ∈ ℤ2×2𝑝 :
̃𝐸𝑝 ≔ {𝑓 (𝑥) ∈ ℤ𝑛+1𝑝 | 𝑓 ∗ 𝐴 ∈ 𝐸𝑝 for some 𝐴 ∈ ℤ2×2𝑝 }.
We also call these polynomials affine Eisenstein, since it will always be clear from
the context to which set we are referring.
In what follows, we compute the measure 𝜇𝑝( ̃𝐸𝑝). For this, we need to write
̃𝐸𝑝 as a disjoint union of transformed copies of 𝐸𝑝 as in Lemma 3.8. The following
lemma is essential for this.
Lemma 3.18. Assume 𝑓 (𝑥) ∈ ℤ𝑛+1𝑝 is Eisenstein of degree 𝑛 ≥ 2, and let𝐴 = ( 𝑎 𝑏𝑐 𝑑 ) ∈
ℤ2×2𝑝 . Then, 𝑓 ∗ 𝐴 is Eisenstein of degree 𝑛 if and only if 𝑝 ∣ 𝑏, 𝑝 ∤ 𝑎, 𝑝 ∤ 𝑑 .
Proof. If we write 𝑓 (𝑥) = ∑𝑛𝑖=0 𝛼𝑖𝑥 𝑖 and 𝑓 ∗𝐴 = ∑
𝑛
𝑙=0 𝛽𝑙𝑥 𝑙 , then a simple calculationgives
𝛽𝑙 =
𝑙
∑
𝑗=0
𝑛
∑
𝑠=𝑙
(
𝑛 + 𝑗 − 𝑠
𝑗 )(
𝑠 − 𝑗
𝑙 − 𝑗)𝛼𝑠−𝑗𝑑
𝑛−𝑠𝑏𝑠−𝑙𝑎𝑙−𝑗𝑐𝑗 . (3.8)
Assume now that 𝑓 ∗ 𝐴 is Eisenstein, so 𝑝 ∣ 𝛽𝑙 for 0 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 − 1, 𝑝2 ∤ 𝛽0, 𝑝 ∤ 𝛽𝑛.
Consider first 𝛽0. Reducing modulo 𝑝 and using that 𝑝 ∣ 𝛼𝑖 for 𝑖 < 𝑛, we see that
𝛽0 ≡ 𝛼𝑛𝑏𝑛 (mod 𝑝).
Since 𝑝 ∤ 𝛼𝑛, we get that 𝑝 ∣ 𝑏. Knowing this, we reduce 𝛽0 modulo 𝑝2 and get
𝛽0 ≡ 𝛼0𝑑𝑛 + 𝛼1𝑑𝑛−1𝑏 ≡ 𝛼0𝑑𝑛 (mod 𝑝2),
since 𝑝2 ∣ 𝛼1𝑏. From this, we see that 𝑝2 ∤ 𝛽0 if and only if 𝑝 ∤ 𝑑 . Finally, we reduce
𝛽𝑛 modulo 𝑝 and get
𝛽𝑛 ≡ 𝛼𝑛𝑎𝑛 (mod 𝑝),
from which we conclude that 𝑝 ∤ 𝑎.
Vice versa, if we assume that 𝑝 ∣ 𝑏, 𝑝 ∤ 𝑎, 𝑝 ∤ 𝑑 , the same computations as
above show that 𝑝 ∤ 𝛽𝑛, 𝑝 ∣ 𝛽0, 𝑝2 ∤ 𝛽0, and we easily see from (3.8) that 𝑝 ∣ 𝛽𝑙 for
0 < 𝑙 < 𝑛. Hence, 𝑓 ∗ 𝐴 is Eisenstein.
We denote by 𝑆 = {( 𝑎 𝑏𝑐 𝑑 ) ∈ ℤ2×2𝑝 | 𝑝 ∣ 𝑏, 𝑝 ∤ 𝑎, 𝑝 ∤ 𝑑} the set of matrices from
Lemma 3.18. This is a subgroup of GL2(ℤ𝑝). We can obtain the disjoint union
decomposition of ̃𝐸𝑝 by considering the left cosets of 𝑆, but first, we need to deal
with the noninvertible matrices. It turns out that they don’t matter.
Lemma 3.19. Let 𝑛 ≥ 2 and 𝑓 (𝑥) ∈ ℤ𝑛+1𝑝 . If 𝐴 = ( 𝑎 𝑏𝑐 𝑑 ) ∈ ℤ2×2𝑝 is not invertible,
then 𝑓 ∗ 𝐴 is not Eisenstein of degree 𝑛.
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Proof. Assume for contradiction that 𝑓 ∗ 𝐴 is Eisenstein of degree 𝑛. We write
again 𝑓 (𝑥) = ∑𝑛𝑖=0 𝛼𝑖𝑥 𝑖 and 𝑓 ∗ 𝐴 = ∑
𝑛
𝑙=0 𝛽𝑙𝑥 𝑙 . We reduce modulo 𝑝:
̄𝐴 = (
̄𝑎 ?̄?
̄𝑐 ̄𝑑) ∈ 𝔽
2×2𝑝 .
Since det ̄𝐴 = 0, there are two cases: Either ̄𝑐 = ̄𝑑 = 0, or there is a 𝜆 ∈ 𝔽𝑝 such
that ̄𝑎 = 𝜆 ̄𝑐 and ?̄? = 𝜆 ̄𝑑 .
We consider the second case. Since 𝑓 ∗ 𝐴 is Eisenstein, we see that ̄𝑓 ∗ ̄𝐴 =
̄𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛 ∈ 𝔽𝑝[𝑥] with ̄𝛽𝑛 ≠ 0. On the other hand,
̄𝑓 ∗ ̄𝐴 = ( ̄𝑐𝑥 + ̄𝑑)𝑛 ⋅ ̄𝑓 (
𝜆 ̄𝑐𝑥 + 𝜆 ̄𝑑
̄𝑐𝑥 + ̄𝑑 ) = ( ̄𝑐𝑥 +
̄𝑑)𝑛 ⋅ ̄𝑓 (𝜆).
From this, we see that ̄𝑓 (𝜆) ≠ 0, ̄𝑐 ≠ 0 and ̄𝑑 = 0. This means that 𝑝 ∣ 𝑑 and 𝑝 ∣ 𝑏,
from which it follows by (3.8) that 𝑝2 ∣ 𝛽0. This contradicts the assumption that
𝑓 ∗ 𝐴 is Eisenstein.
The case ̄𝑐 = ̄𝑑 = 0 is similar.
Hence, we only need to consider the action of GL2(ℤ𝑝) on ℤ𝑛+1𝑝 . According to
Lemma 3.18, the action of elements of 𝑆 does not change whether a polynomial is
Eisenstein. Therefore, to see if a polynomial 𝑓 (𝑥) ∈ ℤ𝑛+1𝑝 is affine Eisenstein, it is
enough to check one representative of each left coset of 𝑆 ⊂ GL2(ℤ𝑝). We can list
these cosets explicitly.
Lemma 3.20. The subgroup 𝑆 ⊂ GL2(ℤ𝑝) has 𝑝 + 1 left cosets, which are the follow-
ing:
• (
1 𝑖
0 1) 𝑆 for 𝑖 ∈ {0, … , 𝑝 − 1} (corresponding to shifts), and
• (
0 1
1 0) 𝑆 (corresponding to the reciprocal).
Proof. It is easy to see that these 𝑝 + 1 left cosets are distinct. We need to show
that every 𝐴 = ( 𝑠 𝑡𝑢 𝑣 ) ∈ GL2(ℤ𝑝) lies in one of them.
Consider first the case 𝑝 ∣ 𝑣 . Then,
(
𝑠 𝑡
𝑢 𝑣) = (
0 1
1 0)(
𝑢 𝑣
𝑠 𝑡) ,
with ( 𝑢 𝑣𝑠 𝑡 ) ∈ 𝑆. We have 𝑝 ∤ 𝑡 and 𝑝 ∤ 𝑢 because 𝐴 is invertible.
If instead 𝑝 ∤ 𝑣 , let 𝑖 ≡ 𝑡/𝑣 (mod 𝑝), 𝑖 ∈ {0, … , 𝑝 − 1}. Then,
(
𝑠 𝑡
𝑢 𝑣) = (
1 𝑖
0 1)(
𝑠 − 𝑖𝑢 𝑡 − 𝑖𝑣
𝑢 𝑣 ) ,
with 𝑝 ∣ 𝑡 − 𝑖𝑣 by choice of 𝑖, and 𝑝 ∤ 𝑠 − 𝑖𝑢 since the matrix is invertible.
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Together, Lemmata 3.18 and 3.20 say that 𝑓 (𝑥) is affine Eisenstein with respect
to some𝐴 if and only if it is shifted Eisensteinwith respect to some 𝑖 ∈ {0, … , 𝑝−1},
or if its reciprocal 𝑥𝑛 ⋅ 𝑓 (1/𝑥) is Eisenstein; and these possibilities are exclusive.
In other words,
̃𝐸𝑝 = reciprocal(𝐸𝑝) ⊔
𝑝−1
⨆
𝑖=0
𝜎−𝑖𝐸𝑝 .
Since shifting and taking the reciprocal are linear maps with determinant ±1, they
preserve the Haar measure, and we see that
𝜇𝑝( ̃𝐸𝑝) = (𝑝 + 1)𝜇𝑝(𝐸𝑝) =
(𝑝 + 1)(𝑝 − 1)2
𝑝𝑛+2 .
With this, we can now show the analogue of Theorem 3.11 for affine transforma-
tions.
Theorem 3.21. Let 𝑛 ≥ 3. The density of affine Eisenstein polynomials of degree 𝑛
is
𝔻( ̃𝐸) = 1 −∏
𝑝 prime(
1 − (𝑝 + 1)(𝑝 − 1)
2
𝑝𝑛+2 ).
Proof. The proof is mostly the same as for Theorem 3.11. For the verification of
condition (3.1), note that the case 2𝐵 < 𝑝 is unchanged from the proof of Theo-
rem 3.11, since the reciprocal polynomial cannot be 𝑝-Eisenstein for 𝑝 > 𝐵. For
the case 2𝐵 ≥ 𝑝, we simply get an additional term in the union (3.5), and so the
estimate changes to |𝐿𝑝| ≤ 𝑝(𝑝 + 1). However, this doesn’t affect the convergence
of the sum in (3.7).
Remark 3.22. Clearly, the density of affine Eisenstein polynomials of degree 𝑛 = 2
is one. After all, we are considering a superset of the shifted Eisenstein polyno-
mials of Proposition 3.12.
3.4 Monte Carlo Simulations
As in [HS14, Section 6], we ran some Monte Carlo simulations to verify how near
our results are to the actual probability of finding a shifted (or affine) Eisenstein
polynomial among all the polynomials of a given height. For degrees 𝑛 = 3 and
4, we tested 20 000 random polynomials of height at most 1 000 000. The results
are shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. The first column contains the number of poly-
nomials which were actually found by the Monte Carlo experiment, while the
second column contains the expected number given by [HS13, Theorem 2] and
Theorems 3.11 and 3.21. All the experiments seem to agree with our theoretical
results.
The simulations were done using the Sage computer algebra system [Ste+14],
and the code is available upon request.
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Table 3.1: Simulations for degree 𝑛 = 3.
found expected
irreducible 20 000 20 000
Eisenstein 1112 1112
shifted Eisenstein 3416 3353
affine Eisenstein 4360 4328
Table 3.2: Simulations for degree 𝑛 = 4.
found expected
irreducible 20 000 20 000
Eisenstein 432 449
shifted Eisenstein 1096 1112
affine Eisenstein 1570 1547
Chapter 4
Irreducible Compositions of
Polynomials
4.1 Introduction
Since irreducible polynomials play a fundamental role in applications and in the
whole theory of finite fields (see for example [LN97; MP13; Rab+81; Bar+14; OS10;
Ahm+12]), related questions have a long history (see for example [GHP99; GP97;
Sho90; Jon12; JB12; And+14; Zur03]). In this chapter of my thesis, we specialize
on irreducibility questions regarding compositions of polynomials. This kind of
question has been addressed in the specific case of stable qudaratic polynomials,
for which any repeated composition is irreducible, see for example in [Ahm09;
GN10; Ahm+12; OS10; JB12; Jon12]. For analogous results related to additive
polynomials, see [BM94a; BM94b].
In what follows, 𝑞 will be an odd prime power, 𝔽𝑞[𝑥] the univariate polyno-
mial ring over the finite field 𝔽𝑞 and Irr(𝔽𝑞[𝑥]) the set of irreducible polynomials
in 𝔽𝑞[𝑥].
The direct inspiration for this chapter is the paper by Jones and Boston [JB12],
who give a criterion to decide whether a quadratic polynomial over 𝔽𝑞 is stable,
requiring only a finite amount of computation. The question then naturally arises
whether this result can be extended to sets of multiple polynomials. We have the
followingmotivating example. Let 𝑞 = 13, and consider the quadratic polynomials
𝑓 = (𝑥 − 5)2 + 5 and 𝑔 = (𝑥 − 6)2 + 5. One can experimentally check that any
possible composition of copies of 𝑓 and 𝑔 is irreducible. How can we prove that
this is indeed the case?
More generally, let 𝒮 ⊂ 𝔽𝑞[𝑥] be a set of monic quadratic polynomials, and
let us denote by 𝐶𝒮 the set of all compositions of copies of polynomials in 𝒮 . In
other words, 𝐶𝒮 is the monoid generated by 𝒮 with the operation of composition.
A couple of observations are now necessary:
• In principle, it is unclear whether a finite number of irreducibility checks
will ensure that 𝐶𝒮 is a subset of Irr(𝔽𝑞[𝑥]).
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• It is unlikely that 𝐶𝒮 ⊆ Irr(𝔽𝑞[𝑥]) by chance, as the density of degree 2𝑛
monic irreducible polynomials over 𝔽𝑞 is roughly 1/2𝑛. Thus, if 𝐶𝒮 satisfies
this property, one reasonably expects that there must be an algebraic reason
for that.
In the first half of this chapter, which is based on our paper [FMS16], we
address these issues by giving a necessary and sufficient condition for the monoid
𝐶𝒮 ⊂ 𝔽𝑞[𝑥] to be contained in Irr(𝔽𝑞[𝑥]). This condition is algebraic and can be
checked by performing only a finite amount of computation over 𝔽𝑞 , answering
both points above.
Since it is quite rare that all compositions of a set of quadratic polynomials
are irreducible, we ask in the second half whether we can describe exactly which
compositions are irreducible in a general case. We accomplish this by applying
the theory of finite automata, and show that the set of compositions which are ir-
reducible correspond to a regular language, for which we can explicitly construct
a finite state automaton. This second half is based on [FMS17].
We start off by giving some basic tools needed to establish our results in Sec-
tion 4.2. Then, in Section 4.3, we describe the condition under which the composi-
tional monoid consists only of irreducible polynomials and provide two nontrivial
examples. In Section 4.3.1, we show the non-existence of such 𝐶𝒮 whenever 𝑞 is
a prime congruent to 3 modulo 4 and there are two generating polynomials with
no linear term (Proposition 4.11).
In Section 4.4, we give a short introduction to automata theory. Section 4.5
is concerned with the question of whether the compositional monoid generated
by a set of quadratic polynomials is free. We then show in Section 4.6 that the
irreducible elements of this monoid correspond to a regular language, and give a
automaton that accepts it.
Finally, we show in Section 4.7 that the entire theory lifts to local fields under
the assumption that the set of polynomials is finite and none of its elements have
discriminant in the maximal ideal of the local field.
4.2 Capelli’s Lemma
In this section, we describe the basic tools needed to establish themain results. We
start with a well known result by Capelli, which gives a necessary and sufficient
criterion to control the irreducibility of the composition of two polynomials.
Lemma 4.1 (Capelli’s Lemma). Let 𝐾 be a field and 𝑓 , 𝑔 ∈ 𝐾[𝑥] polynomials. Let
𝛽 ∈ 𝐾 be a root of 𝑔. Then, 𝑔 ∘ 𝑓 is irreducible over 𝐾 if and only if 𝑔 is irreducible
over 𝐾 and 𝑓 − 𝛽 is irreducible over 𝐾(𝛽).
See for example [FS96, Lemma 0.1] for a proof. We now use Capelli’s Lemma
to produce a simple ancillary result which will help us in what follows.
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Lemma 4.2. Let 𝑔 ∈ 𝔽𝑞[𝑥] be monic and irreducible of even degree, and let 𝑓 =
(𝑥 − 𝑎𝑓 )2 − 𝑏𝑓 ∈ 𝔽𝑞[𝑥]. Then, 𝑔 ∘ 𝑓 is irreducible if and only if 𝑔(−𝑏𝑓 ) is not a square
in 𝔽𝑞 .
Proof. Let 𝑑 = deg(𝑔), and let 𝛽 ∈ 𝔽𝑞𝑑 be a root of 𝑔. According to Lemma 4.1,
𝑔 ∘ 𝑓 is irreducible over 𝔽𝑞 if and only if 𝑓 − 𝛽 is irreducible over 𝔽𝑞𝑑 . Writing
𝑓 − 𝛽 = (𝑥 − 𝑎𝑓 )2 − (𝑏𝑓 + 𝛽), this is equivalent to 𝑏𝑓 + 𝛽 not being a square in 𝔽𝑞𝑑 .
Let 𝑁 ∶ 𝔽𝑞𝑑 → 𝔽𝑞 be the norm map. If 𝛽1, … , 𝛽𝑑 are the roots of 𝑔, we have
𝑁(𝑏𝑓 + 𝛽) =
𝑑
∏
𝑖=1
(𝑏𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖) = (−1)𝑑
𝑑
∏
𝑖=1
((−𝑏𝑓 ) − 𝛽𝑖) = 𝑔(−𝑏𝑓 ),
since 𝑑 is even. Now we can conclude, since 𝑏𝑓 + 𝛽 is a nonsquare in 𝔽𝑞𝑑 if and
only if 𝑁(𝑏𝑓 + 𝛽) = 𝑔(−𝑏𝑓 ) is a nonsquare in 𝔽𝑞 .
We are now ready to state one of the basic ingredients of the proof of the main
theorem, which will allow us to consider irreducibility questions for compositions
of degree two polynomials on a finite level.
Proposition 4.3. Let 𝑓1, … , 𝑓𝑘 ∈ 𝔽𝑞[𝑥] be monic polynomials of degree two. Write
𝑓𝑖 = (𝑥 − 𝑎𝑖)2 − 𝑏𝑖 for all 𝑖. Then, 𝑓1 ∘ ⋯ ∘ 𝑓𝑘 is irreducible if and only if all of the
following are nonsquares in 𝔽𝑞 :
• 𝑏1
• 𝑓1(−𝑏2)
⋮
• (𝑓1 ∘ ⋯ ∘ 𝑓𝑘−1)(−𝑏𝑘).
Proof. Clearly, 𝑓1 is irreducible if and only if 𝑏1 is a nonsquare. The rest follows
by inductive application of Lemma 4.2.
4.3 Irreducibility of the Entire Monoid
In this section, we give a criterion to determinewhether the compositionalmonoid
𝐶𝒮 generated by 𝒮 consists only of irreducible polynomials. In order to state our
result, we first need the following definition, which describes how to build a fi-
nite graph encoding only the useful (to our purposes) information contained in
the generating set of the monoid.
Definition 4.4. Let 𝑞 be an odd prime power, 𝔽𝑞 the finite field of order 𝑞 and 𝒮
a subset of 𝔽𝑞[𝑥]. We denote by 𝐺𝒮 the directed multigraph defined as follows:
• the set of nodes of 𝐺𝒮 is 𝔽𝑞 ;
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• for any node 𝑎 ∈ 𝔽𝑞 and any polynomial 𝑓 ∈ 𝒮 , there is a directed edge
𝑎 → 𝑓 (𝑎). We label that edge with 𝑓 .
Before stating the next definition, we recall that for any monic polynomial 𝑓
of degree 2 there exists a unique pair (𝑎𝑓 , 𝑏𝑓 ) ∈ 𝔽2𝑞 such that 𝑓 = (𝑥 − 𝑎𝑓 )2 − 𝑏𝑓 .
Definition 4.5. Let 𝒮 be a subset of 𝔽𝑞[𝑥] consisting of monic polynomials of
degree 2. We call the set 𝐷𝒮 ≔ {−𝑏𝑓 | 𝑓 ∈ 𝒮 } ⊆ 𝔽𝑞 , the 𝒮 -distinguished set of 𝔽𝑞 .
We are now ready to state and prove the main theorem.
Theorem 4.6. Let 𝒮 be a set of generators for a compositional monoid 𝐶𝒮 ⊆ 𝔽𝑞[𝑥].
Suppose that 𝒮 consists of monic polynomials of degree 2. Then we have that 𝐶𝒮 ⊆
Irr(𝔽𝑞[𝑥]) if and only if no element of −𝐷𝒮 = {𝑏𝑓 | 𝑓 ∈ 𝒮 } ⊆ 𝔽𝑞 is a square and in
𝐺𝒮 there is no path of positive length from a node of 𝐷𝒮 to a square of 𝔽𝑞 .
Proof. Suppose there is a reducible composition 𝑓1 ∘ ⋯ ∘ 𝑓𝑘 ∈ 𝐶𝒮 , for 𝑘 ≥ 1 and
𝑓𝑖 ∈ 𝒮 for all 𝑖. Then, by Proposition 4.3, either 𝑏1 or some (𝑓1 ∘ ⋯ ∘ 𝑓𝑙−1)(−𝑏𝑙 ) with
2 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑘 is a square in 𝔽𝑞 . The former is an element of −𝐷𝒮 , and the latter can be
reached from the node −𝑏𝑙 ∈ 𝐷𝒮 via the path with arrows labelled (𝑓𝑙−1, … , 𝑓1), so
either case contradicts the condition in the theorem.
Vice versa, if some 𝑏𝑓 ∈ −𝐷𝒮 is a square, then 𝑓 ∈ 𝐶𝒮 is reducible; and if there
is a positive path with arrows labelled (𝑓𝑘−1, … , 𝑓1) from −𝑏𝑘 ∈ 𝐷𝒮 to a square,
then 𝑓1 ∘ ⋯ ∘ 𝑓𝑘 is reducible by Proposition 4.3.
The reader should observe that this theorem is a generalization [JB12, Proposi-
tion 2.3], as the stability condition there is the same as the one given by our graph
whenever the monoid we are considering has only one generator. It is useful to
mention the following corollary, which is immediate.
Corollary 4.7. Let 𝒮 be a set of monic irreducible degree two polynomials and 𝐶𝒮
defined as in Theorem 4.6. Then 𝐶𝒮 ⊆ Irr(𝔽𝑞[𝑥]) if and only if there is no path of
positive length from a node of 𝐷𝒮 to a square of 𝔽𝑞 .
Proof. It is enough to observe that whenever 𝒮 ⊆ Irr(𝔽𝑞[𝑥]) then −𝐷𝒮 consists of
nonsquares.
In the following examples, we show two infinite families of such monoids
generated by two polynomials when −1 is a square in 𝔽𝑞 . See [GU82,Theorem 1.8]
for a proof that these families are infinite.
Example 4.8. Assume that −1 is a square in 𝔽𝑞 , and let 𝑎 ∈ 𝔽𝑞 such that both 𝑎
and 𝑏 = 𝑎 + 1 are nonsquares. Define 𝑓 = (𝑥 − 𝑎)2 + 𝑎 and 𝑔 = (𝑥 − 𝑏)2 + 𝑎. In this
situation, we have 𝐷𝒮 = {𝑎}, and by assumption, −𝑎, 𝑎 and 𝑏 are all nonsquares.
Since 𝑓 (𝑎) = 𝑔(𝑏) = 𝑎 and 𝑓 (𝑏) = 𝑔(𝑎) = 𝑏, all paths in 𝐺𝒮 starting from 𝑎 end in a
nonsquare, and the conditions of Theorem 4.6 are satisfied. Figure 4.1 shows the
relevant part of the graph 𝐺𝒮 .
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𝑎 𝑏
𝑔
𝑔𝑓 𝑓
Figure 4.1: The nodes of 𝐺𝒮 reachable from 𝐷𝒮 .
Example 4.9. Assume that −1 is a square in 𝔽𝑞 , and let 𝑎 ∈ 𝔽𝑞 such that 𝑎, 𝑏 = 𝑎+1
and 𝑐 = 𝑎 − 1 are all nonsquares. Define 𝑓 = (𝑥 − 𝑎)2 + 𝑎 and 𝑔 = (𝑥 − 𝑎)2 + 𝑐.
In this situation, we have 𝐷𝒮 = {𝑎, 𝑐}, and by assumption, ±𝑎, ±𝑏 and ±𝑐 are all
nonsquares. Again, Figure 4.2 shows the relevant part of the graph 𝐺𝒮 , and it is
evident that the condition of Theorem 4.6 is satisfied.
𝑎
𝑏
𝑐
𝑔
𝑔
𝑓
𝑓
𝑔 𝑓
Figure 4.2: The nodes of 𝐺𝒮 reachable from 𝐷𝒮 .
4.3.1 Non-Existence Results for 𝒑 ≡ 𝟑 𝐦𝐨𝐝 𝟒
Whenever 𝑞 = 𝑝 is a prime congruent to 3 modulo 4, we have the following non-
existence results for polynomials without linear terms.
Proposition 4.10. Let 𝑝 ≡ −1 mod 8 be a prime, and let 𝑓 = 𝑥2 − 𝑏 be a polyno-
mial in 𝔽𝑝[𝑥]. Let 𝐶𝑓 be the monoid generated by 𝑓 . Then 𝐶𝑓 contains a reducible
polynomial, i.e. 𝑓 is not stable.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that 𝐶𝑓 ⊂ Irr(𝔽𝑝[𝑥]). First note that if 𝑏 is a
square, then 𝑓 is reducible, so we can assume that 𝑏 is not a square, and thus
−𝑏 is a square. Consider the set of iterates 𝑇 = {𝑓 (−𝑏), 𝑓 2(−𝑏), …} ⊆ 𝔽𝑝 . By
Corollary 4.7, 𝐶𝑓 contains only irreducible polynomials if and only if 𝑇 contains
only nonsquares. So assume that this condition holds. Since 𝑇 is finite, there exist
𝑘 < 𝑚 ∈ ℕ>0 such that 𝑓𝑚(−𝑏) = 𝑓 𝑘(−𝑏). Choose 𝑘 to be minimal. Now there
are two cases: If 𝑘 > 1, then there exist two distinct elements 𝑢, 𝑣 ∈ 𝑇 such that
𝑢2 − 𝑏 = 𝑣2 − 𝑏. Thus, 𝑢 = −𝑣 , which implies that one between 𝑢 and 𝑣 is a square,
a contradiction. If on the other hand 𝑘 = 1, then we have 𝑓𝑚(−𝑏) = 𝑓 (−𝑏) = 𝑏2 −𝑏,
and so 𝑓𝑚−1(−𝑏) is either −𝑏 or 𝑏. It can’t be −𝑏, since that is a square, so we must
have 𝑓𝑚−1(−𝑏) = 𝑏 ∈ 𝑇 . Setting 𝑢 = 𝑓𝑚−2(−𝑏), we get that 𝑢2 − 𝑏 = 𝑏 and so
𝑢2 = 2𝑏, which is a contradiction because 2 is a square in 𝔽𝑝 and consequently 2𝑏
is not.
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Proposition 4.11. Let 𝑝 ≡ 3 mod 4 be a prime. Let 𝑓 = 𝑥2 − 𝑏𝑓 and 𝑔 = 𝑥2 − 𝑏𝑔
be polynomials in 𝔽𝑝[𝑥] with 𝑏𝑓 , 𝑏𝑔 distinct nonsquares. Let 𝒮 = {𝑓 , 𝑔} and let 𝐶𝒮
be the monoid generated by 𝒮 . Then 𝐶𝒮 contains a reducible polynomial.
Proof. Let 𝐺𝒮 be the graph attached to 𝒮 as in Definition 4.4. Let 𝐺′𝒮 be the
induced subgraph consisting of all nodes of 𝐺𝒮 that are reachable by some path
of positive length starting from −𝑏𝑓 or −𝑏𝑔 . That is, the edges of 𝐺′𝒮 are just the
edges of 𝐺𝒮 starting and ending at a node in 𝐺′𝒮 . From now on, when we speak of
nodes and edges, we will always be referring to nodes and edges in𝐺′𝒮 . We call an
edge from 𝑢 to 𝑣 an 𝑓 -edge if it comes from the relation 𝑓 (𝑢) = 𝑣 , while we call it a
𝑔-edge if it comes from 𝑔(𝑢) = 𝑣 . Since 𝑏𝑓 and 𝑏𝑔 are assumed nonsquare, we have
by Corollary 4.7 that 𝐶𝒮 contains a reducible polynomial if and only if at least one
of the nodes of 𝐺′𝒮 is a square. In the following, we assume for contradiction that
𝐺′𝒮 consists only of nonsquares.
Let us observe the following: Suppose that there exists a node 𝑣 of𝐺′𝒮 which is
the target of two 𝑓 -edges. By definition, this means that there exist two distinct
nodes 𝑢, 𝑢′ ∈ 𝐺′𝒮 such that 𝑢2 − 𝑏𝑓 = 𝑢′2 − 𝑏𝑓 = 𝑣 . This implies that 𝑢′ = −𝑢,
and thus one between 𝑢 and 𝑢′ is a square, since −1 is not a square in 𝔽𝑝 . This
contradicts our assumption. By symmetry, the same applies to 𝑔-edges.
By the argument above, we see that every node is the target of at most one
𝑓 -edge and one 𝑔-edge, and by counting edges that it is indeed exactly one of
each.
Now, consider the sum
∑
𝑣∈𝐺′𝒮
(𝑓 (𝑣) − 𝑔(𝑣)).
On one hand, each node 𝑢 ∈ 𝐺′𝒮 appears exactly once as 𝑓 (𝑣) and once as 𝑔(𝑣′)
for some 𝑣 , 𝑣′ ∈ 𝐺′𝒮 , so the sum is zero. On the other hand, it clearly holds that
𝑓 (𝑣) − 𝑔(𝑣) = 𝑏𝑔 − 𝑏𝑓 for all 𝑣 . Letting 𝑛 be the number of nodes in 𝐺′𝒮 , we get the
equation
0 = 𝑛(𝑏𝑔 − 𝑏𝑓 ) in 𝔽𝑝 .
Since 𝑏𝑓 ≠ 𝑏𝑔 by hypothesis, we must have 𝑝 ∣ 𝑛. This is impossible however,
since 𝐺′𝒮 is not empty and consists only of nonsquares, so 1 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 𝑝−12 .
The fact that the polynomials of Proposition 4.11 don’t have a linear term is of
crucial importance. Let us see why by giving an explicit example of a monoid of
irreducible polynomials in 𝔽𝑝[𝑥] for which Proposition 4.11 does not apply (but
𝑝 ≡ 3 mod 4).
Example 4.12. Let us fix 𝑝 = 7 and
𝑓 = (𝑥 − 1)2 − 5 = 𝑥2 + 5𝑥 + 3 ∈ 𝔽7[𝑥],
𝑔 = (𝑥 − 4)2 − 5 = 𝑥2 + 6𝑥 + 4 ∈ 𝔽7[𝑥].
The set 𝒮 = {𝑓 , 𝑔} has distinguished set 𝐷𝒮 = {−5} and graph as in Figure 4.3.
Since 5 is not a square, and we only look at paths of positive length, the final claim
follows by checking that 3 and −1 are not squares modulo 7.
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𝑔
Figure 4.3: The nodes of 𝐺𝒮 reachable from −5.
It is worth noting that this is one of only two examples we found with 𝑝 ≡ 3
mod 4, the other having 𝑝 = 103.
4.4 Interlude on Automata Theory
Wegive a brief introduction to the basic definitions and results of automata theory,
limiting ourselves to what we will use below. For a more extensive introduction,
consult for example [HMU01].
We define an alphabet 𝛴 as simply a finite set of symbols. A word over 𝛴 is
then a finite sequence of such symbols. We write 𝛴∗ for the set of all words over
𝛴; so 𝛴∗ is the free monoid generated by 𝛴. A language is then an arbitrary subset
ℒ ⊆ 𝛴∗.
We now define a nondeterministic finite state automaton1 (NFA) ℳ over the
alphabet 𝛴 as a directed multigraph whose nodes are called states and whose ar-
rows are called transitions and are labelled by symbols of 𝛴. Furthermore, a subset
of states are designated as start states, and another as accepting states.
Consider now a word 𝑤 = 𝑎1⋯𝑎𝑡 ∈ 𝛴∗. We say that the automaton ℳ
accepts 𝑤 if there is a path in ℳ from a start state to an accepting state whose
arrows are labelled in order 𝑎1 to 𝑎𝑡 . The language accepted byℳ consists of just
those words it accepts. We say that a language is regular if there exists some NFA
which accepts it. Regular languages have a particularly simple structure, and it is
possible to completely describe one with what is called a regular expression.
A special case of an NFA is a deterministic finite state automaton (DFA). It has
the additional restrictions that there exists exactly one start state, and for each
pair of a state ofℳ and a symbol in 𝛴, there exists at most one transition starting
at that state and labelled by that symbol. The main benefit of a DFA is that it is
easier to decide whether a particular word is accepted by it, since there is at most
one path from the start state along any particular word.
1This is not the usual definition of an automaton in terms of a set of states and a transition
function, but it is equivalent and serves our purposes better.
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The following theorem is fundamental to automata theory, and is important
for our construction below.
Theorem 4.13. For any regular language, there exists a deterministic finite state
automaton which accepts it.
In other words, NFA are no more powerful than DFA. The proof of Theo-
rem 4.13 involves the so called subset construction: From an NFAℳ, we construct
a DFAℳdet as follows:
• The states ofℳdet are the subsets of states ofℳ.
• For each such state 𝑆 ofℳdet and each symbol 𝑎 ∈ 𝛴, we have a transition
𝑆 𝑎−→ {𝑠 state ofℳ | there is a transition 𝑡 𝑎−→ 𝑠 for some 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆}.
• The start state ofℳdet is the set of start states ofℳ.
• The accepting states ofℳdet are all states which contain an accepting state
ofℳ.
One can now show that the automataℳ andℳdet accept the same language.
Anotherway to look at regular languages is the following: Denote by ⋅ the con-
catenation operation of 𝛴∗. We define the Kleene star ∗ as the operator which as-
sociates to a languageℒ another languageℒ ∗, which is the smallest submonoid
of 𝛴∗ containingℒ . Then, a language is regular if and only if it is finite or can be
expressed recursively starting from finite sets using the operations ∪, ⋅, ∗.
4.5 Freedom of the Compositional Monoid
Let 𝔽𝑞 again be a finite field of odd characteristic and let 𝒮 ⊂ 𝔽𝑞[𝑥] be a set
of monic degree two polynomials. Recall that 𝐶𝒮 ⊆ 𝔽𝑞[𝑥] is the compositional
monoid generated by 𝒮 . We consider the set 𝒮 to be an alphabet, and 𝒮 ∗ is the
set of words over the alphabet 𝒮 , i.e. the free monoid generated by the symbols
in 𝒮 . A word 𝑓1⋯𝑓𝑘 ∈ 𝒮 ∗ corresponds to the composition 𝑓1 ∘ ⋯ ∘ 𝑓𝑘 ∈ 𝔽𝑞[𝑥]
via the natural surjective morphism of monoids 𝜋 ∶ 𝒮 ∗ → 𝐶𝒮 . The empty word
naturally corresponds to 𝑥 . Let ℐ ⊂ 𝒮 ∗ be the language of words whose corre-
sponding compositions are irreducible. Our goal is to show that ℐ is a regular
language by providing an automaton that accepts it.
As before, we write each polynomial 𝑓 ∈ 𝒮 as 𝑓 = (𝑥 − 𝑎𝑓 )2 − 𝑏𝑓 for some 𝑎𝑓 ,
𝑏𝑓 ∈ 𝔽𝑞 , and the set 𝐷𝒮 ≔ {−𝑏𝑓 | 𝑓 ∈ 𝒮 } ⊆ 𝔽𝑞 is called the 𝒮 -distinguished set of
𝔽𝑞 .
We include in this section some elementary facts concerning the freedom of
the monoid 𝐶𝒮 generated by a finite set of irreducible degree two polynomials.
These results will be needed in Section 4.6. For 𝑏 ∈ 𝐷𝒮 , we define 𝐴𝑏 as the subset
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of all 𝑎 in 𝔽𝑞 such that there exists 𝑓 ∈ 𝒮 with 𝑓 = (𝑥 − 𝑎)2 − 𝑏. For any of the 𝐴𝑏 ,
we define the difference set
𝐴𝑏 − 𝐴𝑏 = {𝑎 − 𝑎′ | 𝑎, 𝑎′ ∈ 𝐴𝑏}.
We can define a relation ∼ on 𝒮 ∗ by setting 𝑢 ∼ 𝑤 if there exists 𝑙 ∈ ⋃𝑏∈𝐷𝒮 (𝐴𝑏 −𝐴𝑏) for which 𝜋(𝑢) + 𝑙 = 𝜋(𝑤). This relation is symmetric and reflexive but not
transitive, unless ⋃𝑏∈𝐷𝒮 (𝐴𝑏 − 𝐴𝑏) is an additive subgroup of 𝔽𝑞 .In this section, we provide a computable condition to establish whether 𝐶𝒮 is
a free monoid, which will be needed later on.
Proposition 4.14. Let 𝑢, 𝑣 be words of 𝒮 ∗ of equal length 𝑛 ≥ 1. Let 𝑢′, 𝑣′ be the
(𝑛 − 1)-suffixes of 𝑢 and 𝑣 respectively. Then
(i) 𝜋(𝑢) = 𝜋(𝑣) implies 𝑢′ ∼ 𝑣′,
(ii) 𝑢 ∼ 𝑣 if and only if 𝜋(𝑓 𝑢) = 𝜋(𝑔𝑣) for some 𝑓 , 𝑔 ∈ 𝒮 .
Proof. Let us first prove (i). Suppose 𝜋(𝑢) = 𝜋(𝑣) and let us write
𝜋(𝑢) = (ℎ1 − 𝑎)2 − 𝑏 = (ℎ2 − 𝑎′)2 − 𝑏′ = 𝜋(𝑣)
for ℎ1 = 𝜋(𝑢′), ℎ2 = 𝜋(𝑣′). Then we have (ℎ1 − 𝑎 − ℎ2 + 𝑎′)(ℎ1 + ℎ2 − 𝑎 − 𝑎′) = 𝑏 − 𝑏′.
Since ℎ1 +ℎ2 − 𝑎 − 𝑎′ has positive degree, this forces 𝑏 = 𝑏′ and ℎ1 − 𝑎 −ℎ2 + 𝑎′ = 0.
Now it is clear that 𝑎, 𝑎′ ∈ 𝐴𝑏 , which implies 𝑎′ − 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑏 − 𝐴𝑏 , and then 𝑢′ ∼ 𝑣′.
Let us now prove (ii). If 𝑢 ∼ 𝑣 , by definition we have 𝜋(𝑢) − 𝑎 = 𝜋(𝑣) − 𝑎′ for
𝑎 − 𝑎′ ∈ 𝐴𝑏 − 𝐴𝑏 for some 𝑏. Now, by squaring and subtracting 𝑏 on both sides of
the equality we get 𝑓 (𝜋(𝑢)) = 𝑔(𝜋(𝑣)) for some 𝑓 , 𝑔 ∈ 𝒮 , and hence 𝜋(𝑓 𝑢) = 𝜋(𝑔𝑣).
Vice versa, if there exists 𝑓 , 𝑔 ∈ 𝒮 such that 𝜋(𝑓 𝑢) = 𝜋(𝑔𝑣), then (i) applies.
Lemma 4.15. Let 𝑢, 𝑣 be words of 𝒮 ∗ of equal length 𝑛 ≥ 1. If |𝐷𝒮 | = |𝒮 | or
|𝐷𝒮 | = 1, then we have that 𝑢 ∼ 𝑣 if and only if 𝜋(𝑢) = 𝜋(𝑣).
Proof. One direction is trivial: If 𝜋(𝑢) = 𝜋(𝑣) then 𝑢 ∼ 𝑣 . For the other direction,
we look at the two cases separately.
In the case |𝐷𝒮 | = |𝒮 |, it follows from 𝑢 ∼ 𝑣 that 𝜋(𝑢) − 𝜋(𝑣) = 𝑐 ∈ 𝐴𝑏 − 𝐴𝑏
for some 𝑏 ∈ 𝐷𝒮 . However, 𝐴𝑏 consists of only one element, so 𝑐 = 0.
For the case |𝐷𝒮 | = 1, assume that 𝑢 ∼ 𝑣 , so 𝜋(𝑢) = 𝜋(𝑣) + 𝑐 for some 𝑐 ∈ 𝔽𝑞 .
Let 𝑢′, 𝑣′ be the (𝑛 − 1)-suffixes of 𝑢 and 𝑣 . Then, since |𝐷𝒮 | = 1, we have that
(𝜋(𝑢′) − 𝑎1)2 − (𝜋(𝑣′) − 𝑎2)2 = 𝑐 for some 𝑎1, 𝑎2 ∈ 𝔽𝑞 . As 𝑐 is constant, this forces
(𝜋(𝑢′)−𝑎1)−(𝜋(𝑣′)−𝑎2) = 0, which in turn forces 𝑐 = 0 and hence 𝜋(𝑢) = 𝜋(𝑣).
The following proposition shows that the freedom of the monoid is ensured
whenever 𝐷𝒮 is either maximal or minimal.
Proposition 4.16. If |𝐷𝒮 | = |𝒮 | or |𝐷𝒮 | = 1, then 𝐶𝒮 ≅ 𝒮 ∗.
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Proof. Clearly, a polynomial of degree two in 𝐶𝒮 cannot have two distinct writ-
ings in terms of compositions. Let 𝐹 be a polynomial in 𝐶𝒮 of minimal degree
with two different writings, i.e. such that 𝐹 = 𝜋(𝑓 𝑢) = 𝜋(𝑔𝑣) for 𝑓 , 𝑔 ∈ 𝒮 and 𝑢,
𝑣 ∈ 𝒮 ∗ of positive length. From 𝜋(𝑓 𝑢) = 𝜋(𝑔𝑣), one deduces by Proposition 4.14
that 𝑢 ∼ 𝑣 . Lemma 4.15 now gives 𝜋(𝑢) = 𝜋(𝑣), which implies 𝑢 = 𝑣 by the
minimality of 𝐹 .
Corollary 4.17. If |𝒮 | = 2 then 𝐶𝒮 ≅ 𝒮 ∗.
Proof. Immediate by observing that |𝐷𝒮 | = 1 or |𝐷𝒮 | = |𝒮 | = 2.
4.6 An Automaton for Irreducible Compositions
Weare now ready to prove that the languageℐ ofwords over𝒮 which correspond
to irreducible polynomials is regular. We do this by constructing an automaton
accepting it. First, however, we define a different DFA 𝒩 = 𝒩 (𝒮 ) which checks
the conditions of Proposition 4.3.
Definition 4.18. The states of the automaton 𝒩 are given by the following:
• A special start state ℑ. It is accepting.
• For each 𝑎 ∈ 𝔽𝑞 , we have a distinguished state [𝑎]. It is accepting if −𝑎 is a
nonsquare.
• For each 𝑎 ∈ 𝔽𝑞 , we have a state {𝑎}. It is accepting if 𝑎 is a nonsquare.
The transitions are as follows:
• For each 𝑓 ∈ 𝒮 , we have a transition ℑ 𝑓−→ [−𝑏𝑓 ].
• For each 𝑓 ∈ 𝒮 and each 𝑎 ∈ 𝔽𝑞 , we have a transition [𝑎]
𝑓−→ {𝑓 (𝑎)}.
• For each 𝑓 ∈ 𝒮 and each 𝑎 ∈ 𝔽𝑞 , we have a transition {𝑎}
𝑓−→ {𝑓 (𝑎)}.
Remark 4.19. The reason we distinguish between the states {𝑎} and [𝑎] is that
they may be accepting at different times: {𝑎} accepts if 𝑎 is nonsquare, [𝑎] if −𝑎
is nonsquare. In the case that −1 is a square in 𝔽𝑞 , the two are equivalent and we
can identify the two types of states.
Theorem 4.20. The language ℐ of irreducible compositions is regular.
Proof. Letℒ be the regular language over the alphabet 𝒮 that is accepted by the
automaton 𝒩 reading from right to left. It is easy to see that a single letter 𝑓 is
inℒ if and only if 𝑏𝑓 is nonsquare. Furthermore, a word 𝑓1⋯𝑓𝑘 , 𝑘 ≥ 2, is inℒ if
and only if (𝑓1 ∘… ∘ 𝑓𝑘−1)(−𝑏𝑓𝑘 ) is nonsquare. By Proposition 4.3, it follows that theword 𝑓1⋯𝑓𝑘 corresponds to an irreducible polynomial if and only if each prefix
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𝑓1⋯𝑓𝑙 , 𝑙 ≤ 𝑘, lies in ℒ . In other words, ℐ is the language of all words whose
every prefix is inℒ .
Let 𝒩𝐿 now be a deterministic automaton that accepts ℒ reading from the
left. We obtain the automaton ℳ accepting ℐ from this by simply removing all
non-accepting states; and it follows that ℐ is regular.
In order to actually construct the automatonℳ, we note that we can obtain a
nondeterministic automaton acceptingℒ from the left by reversing the direction
of all transitions and swapping start and accept states of𝒩 . From this, we obtain
𝒩𝐿 by the subset construction. We now provide an example to see the theorem in
action.
Example 4.21. Consider the case 𝑞 = 5 and 𝒮 = {𝑓 , 𝑔} with 𝑓 = 𝑥2 − 2 and
𝑔 = (𝑥 − 1)2 − 3.
We first construct the automaton 𝒩 . Since 𝑝 ≡ 1 mod 4, we can identify
the nodes [𝑎] and {𝑎}. Note that we have removed the node {0} since it is not
reachable from ℑ. The result is seen in Figure 4.4.
ℑ
{2}{3}
{1} {4}
𝑓 𝑔
𝑓𝑔
𝑓
𝑔
𝑓
𝑔
𝑓
𝑔
Figure 4.4: The automaton 𝒩 for Example 4.21. Boxed states are accepting.
After performing the transformation described in the proof of Theorem 4.20
and cutting out all unreachable states, we end up with the simple deterministic
automaton ℳ in Figure 4.5. This shows that the irreducible compositions of 𝑓
and 𝑔 are precisely those of the form 𝑓 𝑛, 𝑓 𝑛𝑔, 𝑓 𝑛𝑔2 and 𝑓 𝑛𝑔2𝑓 for 𝑛 ≥ 0. Here,
multiplication means composition.
𝑆 1 2 3
𝑓
𝑔 𝑔 𝑓
Figure 4.5: The automatonℳ acceptingℐ for Example 4.21. All states are accept-
ing.
Using the machinery we developed in the rest of this chapter, we describe an
infinite set of primes of 𝔽𝑞[𝑥] having a finite regular structure.
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Theorem 4.22. Let 𝔽𝑞 be a finite field of characteristic different from 2. The set
of monic irreducible polynomials having coefficients in 𝔽𝑞 which can be written as
a nonempty composition of degree 2 polynomials can be partitioned into a finite
disjoint union ⨆𝑎∈𝔽𝑞 ℒ𝑎 in such a way that each ℒ𝑎 is in natural bijection with
the words of a regular language ℒ , which is independent of 𝑎. In particular, the
set of such irreducible polynomials has a finite regular expression in terms of the
elementary operations ∪, ⋅, ∗.
Proof. Let 𝐷 be the set of monic irreducible polynomials in 𝔽𝑞[𝑥] that can be
written as nonempty composition of degree 2 polynomials. Let 𝒮 = {𝑥2 − 𝑏 | 𝑏 ∈
𝔽𝑞}. By Proposition 4.16, 𝐶𝒮 is isomorphic to 𝒮 ∗, so it is naturally embedded
in 𝔽𝑞[𝑥]. Apply now Theorem 4.20 to obtain the regular language of irreducible
polynomialsℐ generated by 𝒮 , and letℒ = ℐ ⧵{𝑥}. Let 𝜓𝑎∶ ℒ → 𝔽𝑞[𝑥] be the
shift map defined by 𝑓 (𝑥) ↦ 𝑓 (𝑥 + 𝑎). Letℒ𝑎 = 𝜓𝑎(ℒ). It is easy to observe that
for any polynomial 𝑓 ∈ 𝐷, there exists 𝑎 ∈ 𝔽𝑞 such that 𝑓 (𝑥 − 𝑎) can be written as
an element of 𝐶𝒮 . This shows that
𝐷 = ⋃
𝑎∈𝔽𝑞
ℒ𝑎.
It remains to show that ℒ𝑎 ∩ ℒ𝑏 = ∅ if 𝑎 ≠ 𝑏, the final result will follow imme-
diately. We argue by induction on the length of the words in ℒ (i.e. the degree
of the polynomials). Let 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝔽𝑞 with 𝑎 ≠ 𝑏 such that there exist two words
𝑣 , 𝑤 ∈ ℒ of minimal length 𝑙 such that 𝜓𝑎(𝑣) = 𝜓𝑏(𝑤). If 𝑙 = 1, this is clearly
impossible, so let us assume 𝑙 > 1. We can write 𝑓 (𝑣′(𝑥 + 𝑎)) = 𝑔(𝑤′(𝑥 + 𝑏)) for
some 𝑓 , 𝑔 ∈ 𝒮 and 𝑣′, 𝑤′ suffixes of 𝑣 and 𝑤 respectively. Therefore, for some 𝑘,
𝑗 ∈ 𝔽𝑞 we have
𝑣′(𝑥 + 𝑎)2 − 𝑤′(𝑥 + 𝑏)2 = (𝑣′(𝑥 + 𝑎) − 𝑤′(𝑥 + 𝑏))(𝑣′(𝑥 + 𝑎) + 𝑤′(𝑥 + 𝑏))
= 𝑘 − 𝑗.
Since 𝑣′, 𝑤′ are monic and the characteristic of 𝔽𝑞 is different from 2, then the
degree of the polynomial (𝑣′(𝑥 + 𝑎) + 𝑤′(𝑥 + 𝑏)) is greater than or equal to 2. This
forces both 𝑘 = 𝑗 and (𝑣′(𝑥 + 𝑎) −𝑤′(𝑥 + 𝑏)) = 0, which contradicts the minimality
of 𝑙.
Example 4.23. For an example demonstrating Theorem 4.22, take 𝑞 = 3 and 𝒮 =
{𝑓 , 𝑔, ℎ} with 𝑓 = 𝑥2, 𝑔 = 𝑥2 − 1, ℎ = 𝑥2 − 2. From Proposition 4.16, 𝐶𝒮 is free
and isomorphic to 𝒮 ∗. Applying the construction, we get the automaton shown
in Figure 4.6. We see that the irreducible polynomials in 𝐶𝒮 are exactly 𝑥 , ℎ,
ℎ𝑔𝑓 𝑛 for 𝑛 ≥ 0, and ℎ2𝑘 for 𝑘 ∈ 𝐶𝒮 arbitrary (possibly the identity). Applying
Theorem 4.22, it follows that the set of irreducible polynomials in 𝔽3[𝑥] that can
be written as a nonempty composition of degree 2 polynomials is precisely
⋃
𝑎∈𝔽3
({ℎ(𝑥 + 𝑎)} ∪ {ℎ𝑔𝑓 𝑛(𝑥 + 𝑎) | 𝑛 ≥ 0} ∪ {ℎ2𝑘(𝑥 + 𝑎) | 𝑘 ∈ 𝐶𝒮 }).
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ℎ
Figure 4.6: The automatonℳ acceptingℐ for Example 4.23. All states are accept-
ing.
4.7 Irreducible Compositions over Local Fields
In this final section, we will show how the results of the previous sections can be
lifted, under some additional hypothesis, to polynomials over local fields. Let 𝐾
be a non-archimedean local field with finite residue field 𝔽𝑞 of odd characteristic.
Let 𝒪𝐾 be its ring of integers and 𝜛 be a uniformizer. We will denote by ̃⋅ the
reduction map 𝒪𝐾 [𝑥] → 𝔽𝑞[𝑥]. Let us start by recalling the following lemma,
which we state in a weaker form, sufficient for our purposes.
Lemma 4.24. Let 𝐿 be any field and 𝑓 , 𝑔 ∈ 𝐿[𝑥] be monic polynomials of degree 𝑑𝑓 ,
𝑑𝑔 , respectively. Suppose that 𝑓 = (𝑥 − 𝑎𝑓 )2 − 𝑏𝑓 for some 𝑎𝑓 , 𝑏𝑓 ∈ 𝐿. Then we have:
disc(𝑔 ∘ 𝑓 ) = ± disc(𝑔)𝑑𝑓 ⋅ 𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑑𝑓𝑓 ⋅ 𝑔(−𝑏𝑓 ).
Proof. See [Jon08, Lemma 2.6].
Theorem 4.25. Let 𝑓1, … , 𝑓𝑘 ∈ 𝒪𝐾 [𝑥] be monic polynomials of degree 2 such that
𝜛 ∤ disc(𝑓1). Then 𝑓1 ∘ ⋯ ∘ 𝑓𝑘 is irreducible in 𝐾[𝑥] if and only if ̃𝑓1 ∘ ⋯ ∘ ̃𝑓𝑘 is
irreducible in 𝔽𝑞[𝑥].
Proof. One direction is obvious, so let us assume that 𝑓1 ∘⋯ ∘ 𝑓𝑘 is irreducible. For
every 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑘, let 𝑓𝑖 = (𝑥 − 𝑎𝑖)2 − 𝑏𝑖 for some 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 ∈ 𝒪𝐾 . By Proposition 4.3, we
need to show that the following elements are not squares:
• 𝑐1 ≔ ?̃?1
• 𝑐2 ≔ ̃𝑓1(−?̃?2)
⋮
• 𝑐𝑘 ≔ ( ̃𝑓1 ∘ ⋯ ∘ ̃𝑓𝑘−1)(−?̃?𝑘).
First, suppose that 𝑐𝑡 = 0 for some 𝑡 ∈ {1, … , 𝑘}. This implies that ̃𝑓1 has a root,
and since by hypothesis the discriminant of ̃𝑓1 is nonzero, by Hensel’s Lemma we
can lift such a root to a root of 𝑓1. But then 𝑓1 ∘ ⋯ ∘ 𝑓𝑘 is clearly reducible, which
is a contradiction. Thus we can assume that 𝑐𝑖 ≠ 0 for all 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑘}. Now let
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𝑡 ∈ {1, … , 𝑘} be such that 𝑐𝑡 is a nonzero square. By Proposition 4.3, this implies
that ̃𝑓1 ∘ ⋯ ∘ ̃𝑓𝑡 is reducible. On the other hand, applying Lemma 4.24 recursively
and using the definition of the 𝑐𝑖 we get that
disc( ̃𝑓1 ∘ ⋯ ∘ ̃𝑓𝑡 ) = 𝑢 ⋅
𝑡
∏
𝑖=1
𝑐2𝑡−𝑖𝑖 ≠ 0,
where 𝑢 is an appropriate power of 2 (up to sign). This proves that𝜛 ∤ disc(𝑓1∘⋯∘𝑓𝑡 )
and since 𝑓1 ∘⋯∘𝑓𝑡 is irreducible by hypothesis, it defines an unramified extension
of 𝐾 . It follows that ̃𝑓1 ∘ ⋯ ∘ ̃𝑓𝑡 is irreducible (see for example [Cas86, Chapter 7]),
giving a contradiction.
It is clear that the hypothesis that𝜛 ∤ disc(𝑓1) is necessary for the claim to hold,
since for example 𝑥2 − 𝜛 is irreducible in 𝐾[𝑥], while its reduction is reducible in
𝔽𝑞[𝑥].
Given a finite set 𝒮 ⊆ 𝒪𝐾 [𝑥] of monic polynomials of degree two with unitary
discriminant,Theorem 4.25 shows that irreducible compositions of the elements of
𝒮 correspond bijectively to irreducible compositions of the elements of𝒮 ⊆ 𝔽𝑞[𝑥].
Therefore, if we consider 𝒮 as an alphabet and ℐ is the language of irreducible
compositions of the elements of 𝒮 , we deduce immediately the following corol-
lary.
Corollary 4.26. The language ℐ is regular.
Proof. It is enough to apply Theorem 4.20 to the language of irreducible composi-
tions of the elements of 𝒮 .
The above corollary essentially states that the theory we developed in the rest
of the paper lifts entirely to local fields, at least in the case inwhich the elements in
𝒮 have unitary discriminant. It would be interesting to understand what happens
when this condition is not satisfied.
4.8 Open Questions
One of the natural questions arising from our investigation is whether our results
can be generalised to higher degree polynomials. In fact any lift of such results to
polynomials of degree three ormorewould be of great interest, as most of the liter-
ature is focused only on degree two, and in particular the necessary and sufficient
criterion by Boston and Jones [JB12] (and the subsequent results on the subject
such as [HM16; Ahm+12; Ahm09; GN10; FMS16]) only exists in degree two. In
the context of local fields, another interesting issue arising from Theorem 4.25
of this paper is the following: How can one include singular polynomials in the
generating set 𝒮 ? In fact, the condition on the discriminant seems to be essential.
Chapter 5
Group Key Exchange
5.1 Introduction
Traditional cryptographic tools for key exchange may not be useful when the
communication process is carried out in a group of nodes or users. There exist
several approaches for group key management, which may be divided into three
main classes [RH03]:
• centralized protocols, where a single entity is in charge of controlling the
whole group, minimizing storage requirements and computational power
on both the client and server side as well as communication overheads,
• decentralized, where a large group is divided into subgroups in order to
avoid concentrating the workload in a single point,
• distributed, where key generation is carried out in a distributed and collab-
orative way.
This last class of approaches has become particularly important since the emer-
gence of ad hoc networks, where a set of nodes, possibly consisting of light and
mobile devices, create, operate and manage a network, which is therefore solely
dependent on the cooperative and trusting nature of the nodes. Moreover the lim-
ited capacity of the involved devices imposes both key storage and computational
requirements. Such a network is commonly created tomeet an immediate demand
and specific goal, and nodes are continuously joining or leaving it. Thus, group
key management based on distributed and collaborative schemes has proved to
be of great interest (see for instance [MDM07; LLY06] and their references).
Some efficient solutionswere introduced by Burmester andDesmedt in [BD94]
and [BD05], and by Steiner et al. in [STW96] and [STW00]. These protocols nat-
urally extend the classical Diffie-Hellman protocol [DH76]. Both solutions were
shown to be secure against a passive adversary if the Diffie-Hellman problem is
intractable. The approach by Burmester and Desmedt is very efficient in the initial
key agreement, using only two rounds. However, if the key has to be refreshed
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or the group of users changes, the entire protocol needs to be rerun. On the other
hand, the protocols by Steiner et al. require more rounds initially, but feature
rekeying procedures that are more efficient than rerunning the protocol.
In [MMR07], the authors generalize the classical Diffie-Hellman key exchange
to an arbitrary semigroup action 𝛷∶ 𝐺 × 𝑆 → 𝑆 of an abelian semigroup 𝐺 on
a set 𝑆. To simplify notation, we will write 𝑔 ⋅ 𝑠 ≔ 𝛷(𝑔, 𝑠) for 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺 and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆
throughout.
Protocol 5.1 (Semigroup Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange). Let 𝑆 be a finite set, 𝐺
an abelian semigroup, and 𝛷∶ 𝐺 × 𝑆 → 𝑆 a 𝐺-action on 𝑆. The semigroup Diffie-
Hellman key exchange in (𝐺, 𝑆, 𝛷) is the following protocol:
(1) Alice and Bob publicly agree on an element 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆.
(2) Alice chooses 𝑎 ∈ 𝐺 and computes 𝑎 ⋅ 𝑠. Alice’s private key is 𝑎, her public
key is 𝑎 ⋅ 𝑠.
(3) Bob chooses 𝑏 ∈ 𝐺 and computes 𝑏 ⋅ 𝑠. Bob’s private key is 𝑏, his public key
is 𝑏 ⋅ 𝑠.
(4) Their common secret key is then
𝑎 ⋅ (𝑏 ⋅ 𝑠) = 𝑎𝑏 ⋅ 𝑠 = 𝑏𝑎 ⋅ 𝑠 = 𝑏 ⋅ (𝑎 ⋅ 𝑠).
In the original Diffie-Hellman proposal, if an adversary is able to solve the
so-called Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), then she is able to break the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange. In this setting we can analogously consider the following
more general problem:
Problem 5.2 (Semigroup Action Problem, SAP). Given a semigroup 𝐺 acting on
a set 𝑆 and elements 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑆, find 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺 such that 𝑔 ⋅ 𝑥 = 𝑦 .
It is clear that if an adversary finds a 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺 such that 𝑔 ⋅ 𝑠 = 𝑎 ⋅ 𝑠, then she can
find the shared secret by computing 𝑔 ⋅ (𝑏 ⋅ 𝑠) = 𝑔𝑏 ⋅ 𝑠 = 𝑏𝑔 ⋅ 𝑠 = 𝑏 ⋅ (𝑎 ⋅ 𝑠).
We can say that the security of the preceding protocol is equivalent to the
following problem.
Problem 5.3 (Diffie-Hellman Semigroup Action Problem, DHSAP). Given a finite
abelian semigroup 𝐺 acting on a finite set 𝑆 and elements 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑆 with 𝑦 = 𝑔 ⋅ 𝑥
and 𝑧 = ℎ ⋅ 𝑥 for some 𝑔, ℎ ∈ 𝐺, find 𝑔ℎ ⋅ 𝑥 .
Although, as noted above, solving the SAP implies solving the DHSAP, we do
not know if both problems are (in general) equivalent, just like in the traditional
setting of Diffie-Hellman, where however some equivalence results for particular
scenarios are known [MW99].
Motivated by the above, our idea is now to define extensions of the semigroup
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol to 𝑛 users, by first generalizing those intro-
duced in [STW96] and [STW00], and then considering other settings, which can
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feature more favorable characteristics compared to the original protocol. Since
the capability of devices is often limited and authentication processes may be
difficult to implement in a distributed network, we focus our attention on confi-
dentiality under passive attacks. As in [MMR07], some nonstandard settings are
introduced asmore general examples, although the hardness of the SAP theremay
not be proven yet, so the security of the protocols in those cases is conditional on
that.
The first half of this chapter is based on [Lóp+15], and is structured as follows:
In Section 5.2, we consider a suite of three protocols for group key management
based on one-sided actions. While these naturally extend the results of [STW96]
and [STW00], we consider different settings for a general semigroup action. Sec-
tion 5.3 considers the security of the preceding protocols against passive attacks,
including forward and backward secrecy. Then, in Section 5.4, we introduce two
protocols based on linear actions, i.e. semigroup actions on other groups satisfy-
ing a certain distributivity property. We give two different group key protocols in
this setting, one of which runs very efficiently in only two rounds, independently
of the number of members in the communicating group.
After this, in Section 5.5, we describe two more protocols based on linear ac-
tions, which are variants of the second one above and were published in [Lóp+16].
Section 5.6, which is based on [Sch+16], describes an active attack on the GSAP-3
protocol of [STW96; STW00] and our variant thereof. This attack is in some ways
more powerful than a traditional man-in-the-middle attack. Finally, in Section 5.7,
we recount a similar attack on the protocol of Burmester and Desmedt [BD94;
BD05]. This attack was published in [Bao+16].
5.2 GroupKeyCommunication based onOne-SidedAc-
tions
In this section we consider three different extensions of the semigroup Diffie-
Hellman key exchange with different computing requirements and communica-
tion overheads, but with possible applications in different cases. They are natural
extensions of [STW96] and [STW00]. For completeness we report proofs in ap-
pendix to show soundness of the schemes.
5.2.1 A Sequential Key Agreement
The first approach to extend the key exchange protocol consists of a sequence of
messages, built using pieces of private information, along a chain of users and
an analogous second sequence of messages in the opposite way. Therefore every
user will send and receive two messages except for the user that initiates the
communication and the last user receiving the sequence of messages.
We will consider a group of 𝑛 users, 𝒰1, … ,𝒰𝑛, who would like to share a
secret element of a finite set 𝑆, and 𝐺 will denote a finite abelian semigroup acting
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on 𝑆.
The protocol is defined by the following steps.
Protocol 5.4 (GSAP-1). Users agree on an element 𝑠 in a finite set 𝑆, a finite
abelian semigroup 𝐺, and a 𝐺-action on 𝑆 given by 𝛷. For every 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, the
user 𝒰𝑖 holds a private element 𝑔𝑖 ∈ 𝐺.
(1) For 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 1, user 𝒰𝑖 sends to user 𝒰𝑖+1 the message
{𝐶1, … , 𝐶𝑖} = {𝑔1 ⋅ 𝑠, 𝑔2𝑔1 ⋅ 𝑠, … , (
𝑖
∏
𝑗=1
𝑔𝑗) ⋅ 𝑠}.
(2) User 𝒰𝑛 computes 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−1.
(3) For 𝑘 = 𝑛,… , 2, user𝒰𝑘 sends to user𝒰𝑘−1 themessage {𝑓 𝑘1 , … , 𝑓 𝑘𝑘−1}, where
𝑓 𝑘𝑗 = 𝑔𝑘 ⋅ 𝑓 𝑘+1𝑗 for 2 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 1 and 𝑓 𝑛𝑗 = 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑗−1 for 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 1, with
𝐶0 = 𝑠.
(4) User 𝒰𝑘 computes 𝑔𝑘 ⋅ 𝑓 𝑘+1𝑘 .
5.2.2 A Key Agreement in Broadcast
The following protocol presents a lower communication overhead than GSAP-1.
The idea is again to get a first sequence of messages from user 𝒰1 to user𝒰𝑛, but
now 𝒰𝑛 will broadcast a message that allows the rest of the users to recover the
common key.
Protocol 5.5 (GSAP-2). Users agree on an element 𝑠 in a finite set 𝑆, a finite
abelian semigroup 𝐺, and a 𝐺-action 𝛷 on 𝑆. For every 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, the user 𝒰𝑖
holds a private element 𝑔𝑖 ∈ 𝐺.
(1) For 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 1, user 𝒰𝑖 sends to user 𝒰𝑖+1 the message
{𝐶 𝑖−1𝑖−1 , 𝐶 𝑖1, … , 𝐶 𝑖𝑖 },
where 𝐶00 = 𝑠 and 𝐶11 = 𝑔1 ⋅ 𝑠, and for 𝑖 ≥ 2, 𝐶 𝑖1 = 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝐶 𝑖−2𝑖−2 and 𝐶 𝑖𝑗 = 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝐶 𝑖−1𝑗−1
(with 𝑗 = 2, … , 𝑖).
(2) User 𝒰𝑛 computes 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−1𝑛−1 .
(3) User 𝒰𝑛 broadcasts {𝑓 𝑛1 , … , 𝑓 𝑛𝑛 }, where 𝑓 𝑛𝑖 = 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−1𝑛−1−𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 2
and 𝑓 𝑛𝑛−1 = 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−2𝑛−2 and 𝑓 𝑛𝑛 = 𝐶𝑛−1𝑛−1 .
(4) User 𝒰𝑖 computes 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑓 𝑛𝑖 .
Remark 5.6. It can be observed that the element 𝑓 𝑛𝑛 contained in the broadcast
message in step (3) of Protocol 5.5, is not needed by any of the users 𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 =
1, … , 𝑛 − 1, to recover the shared key. However, the distribution of this value is
required for future rekeying operations, as we will later show.
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5.2.3 Examples
(a) The two previous protocols are extensions of those introduced in [STW96]
and [STW00] for the action of the multiplicative semigroupℕ∗ on a cyclic
group 𝑆 of order 𝑞 generated by 𝑔, given by 𝑥 ⋅ 𝑠 = 𝑠𝑥 . It was pointed out
that the first protocol presents excessive communication overheads due to
the number of rounds and messages to be sent. Because of this, only the
second one, referred to as IKA.1 in [STW00], was recommended. However,
the first protocol could be interesting on its own when applied to a sensor
network whose communications need to be secure and where it should be
assessed whether every node is working properly. After user 𝒰𝑛 receives
the message in step (1), the absence of any of the messages (excepting the
last one) in the descending chain of rounds would alert that the correspond-
ing sender node is not working or the communication was interrupted.
(b) In particular, consider a finite field 𝔽𝑞 and an element 𝑔 of prime order. The
semigroup ℕ∗ acts on the subgroup ⟨𝑔⟩ ⊂ 𝔽∗𝑞 by 𝑥 ⋅ 𝑠 = 𝑠𝑥 for 𝑥 ∈ ℕ∗,
𝑠 ∈ ⟨𝑔⟩.
(c) Let 𝜀 be the set of points in an elliptic curve. Then the action𝛷∶ ℕ∗×𝜀 → 𝜀
given by 𝛷(𝑛, 𝑃) = 𝑛 ⋅ 𝑃 = 𝑛𝑃 for every 𝑛 ∈ ℕ∗ and every 𝑃 ∈ 𝜀 provides
the corresponding versions of the preceding protocols for elliptic curves.
In [Niu14] an implementation of the second protocol can be found.
(d) In [MMR07, Example 5.13], the authors illustrate the use of a semiring of
order 6 to construct an example of a practical SAP. This was later cryptana-
lyzed in [SC11] not due to a general attack, but rather due to the structure of
this ring. However, we can use the semiring of order 20 given in [MMR07,
Example 5.8] to analogously define another SAP and its cryptanalysis is still
an open question. This shows an examplewhere SAP does not coincidewith
a traditional DLP on a semigroup and it is applicable to both preceding pro-
tocols.
(e) In [Gni14, Protocol 80], the author defines a key exchange protocol whose
security is based on the SAP derived from the following semigroup action:
Let 𝑆 be a semiring, 𝑇 a finitely generated additive subsemigroup of 𝑆 and
let End+(𝑇 ) be its (additive) endomorphism semigroup. Then the semigroup
action that defines the security of this protocol is given by 𝛷∶ (𝑆, 𝑇 op) ×
End+(𝑇 ) → End+(𝑇 ), ((𝑠, 𝑡), 𝑓 ) ↦ (𝑥 ↦ 𝑠 ⋅ 𝑓 (𝑥) ⋅ 𝑡).
Remark 5.7. Many examples of semigroup actions suitable to defining a Diffie-
Hellman type key exchange protocol can be found in [Maz03]. The corresponding
SAP is shown to be computationally equivalent to a DLP for some of them.
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5.2.4 A Key Agreement given by a Group Action
The existence of inverses in the semigroup𝐺 acting on the set 𝑆 can provide a way
to agree on a common key with reduced communication overheads. Moreover,
computations can be made more equally distributed among the users. We remark
that in the protocols given in the two previous sections, these requirements are
higher the further away the user is from the one that initialized the protocol.
Thus we assume that 𝐺 is a group. The protocol is given by the following
steps.
Protocol 5.8 (GSAP-3). Users agree on an element 𝐶0 = 𝑠 in a finite set 𝑆, a finite
abelian group 𝐺, and a 𝐺-action 𝛷 on 𝑆. For every 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, the user 𝒰𝑖 holds
a private element 𝑔𝑖 ∈ 𝐺.
(1) For 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 2, user 𝒰𝑖 sends to user 𝒰𝑖+1 the message 𝐶𝑖 = 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝐶𝑖−1.
(2) User 𝒰𝑛−1 computes 𝐶𝑛−1 = 𝑔𝑛−1 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−2 and broadcasts it to the other users
{𝒰1, … ,𝒰𝑛−2, 𝒰𝑛}.
(3) User 𝒰𝑛 computes the element 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−1.
(4) For 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 1, user𝒰𝑖 computes 𝐷𝑖 = 𝑔−1𝑖 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−1 and sends it to user𝒰𝑛.
(5) For 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 1, user 𝒰𝑛 computes 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷𝑖 and sends to the other users
{𝒰1, … ,𝒰𝑛−2, 𝒰𝑛−1} the set of values {𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷1, … , 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷𝑛−1, 𝐶𝑛−1}.
(6) For 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 1, user 𝒰𝑖 computes 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ (𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷𝑖).
It is easy to see that for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 1, we have that
𝐶𝑖 = (
𝑖
∏
𝑗=1
𝑔𝑗) ⋅ 𝑠, 𝐷𝑖 = (
𝑛−1
∏
𝑗=1; 𝑗≠𝑖
𝑔𝑗) ⋅ 𝑠,
and finally
𝐾 = 𝐶𝑛 = (
𝑛
∏
𝑗=1
𝑔𝑗) ⋅ 𝑠.
This follows easily from the commutativity of 𝐺 and the fact that 𝛷 is a group
action.
Remark 5.9. As in Protocol 5.5, we also point out that the element 𝐶𝑛−1, which
is broadcast by 𝒰𝑛 in step (5) of Protocol 5.8, is needed only for future rekeying
purposes.
Remark 5.10. Using the action 𝑥 ⋅ 𝑠 = 𝑠𝑥 for 𝑥 ∈ ℤ∗𝑞 and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, for a cyclic group
𝑆 = ⟨𝑔⟩ of order 𝑞, we get the third protocol introduced in [STW96] and [STW00],
which is referred to as IKA.2 in CLIQUES [STW00]. In this case, user 𝒰𝑖 sends to
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user 𝒰𝑛 the message 𝑔∏
𝑛−1
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖 𝑥𝑗 , which is computed with the element 𝑥−1𝑖 mod 𝑞,
given that the 𝑥𝑖 are selected either to be coprime with 𝑞 or, as the authors suggest,
𝑞 is chosen to be a prime.
An elliptic curve version is clearly also feasible. An implementation in this
sense can be found in [Niu14].
5.2.5 Rekeying Operations
Another important issue in any group key management is rekeying after the ini-
tial key agreement. There exist three different situations that require a rekeying
operation. The first is simply due to key caducity and the group of users remains
the same. In the other two cases, we may find a new user that wishes to join the
group or a user who leaves the group. In both situations it is required that the
new (resp. former) user cannot access the former (resp. new) distributed key. In
the following lines we describe the procedures as well as their security.
Let us start by considering the protocol GSAP-1 described in Section 5.2.1.
In this case, we could simply require that a new initial key agreement is needed.
However, wemay shorten the rekeying process, keeping somehow the spirit of the
protocol. If rekeying is due to key caducity, then user 𝒰𝑛 chooses a new private
element 𝑔′𝑛 ∈ 𝐺 and defines a new sequence 𝑓 𝑛𝑗 = 𝑔′𝑛𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑗−1, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 1, with
𝐶0 = 𝑠, as is done in step (3) of GSAP-1. The rest of the users also proceed as in
step (3) and recover (using their private keys as described in GSAP-1) the new key
(𝑔′𝑛∏𝑛𝑗=1 𝑔𝑗) ⋅ 𝑠.In case some user, say 𝒰𝑖 , leaves the group, then the corresponding value 𝑓 𝑛𝑖
is omitted in the new message made by 𝒰𝑛.
Finally, in case a user 𝒰𝑛+1 joins the group, then user 𝒰𝑛 chooses a new ele-
ment 𝑔′𝑛 and sends the message
{𝑔
′𝑛𝑔1 ⋅ 𝑠, 𝑔′𝑛𝑔2𝑔1 ⋅ 𝑠, … , (𝑔
′𝑛
𝑛
∏
𝑗=1
𝑔𝑗) ⋅ 𝑠}
to user 𝒰𝑛+1. Then this user starts step (3) of GSAP-1.
In the case of the protocols GSAP-2 and GSAP-3, described in Sections 5.2.2
and 5.2.4 respectively, we may use the information that every user holds after the
initial key agreement to rekey very efficiently, as is suggested in [STW00]. In this
case, given that every user remembers the same information, say
{(
𝑛
∏
𝑟=2
𝑔𝑟) ⋅ 𝑠, (
𝑛
∏
𝑟=1;𝑟≠2
𝑔𝑟) ⋅ 𝑠, … ,(
𝑛
∏
𝑟=1;𝑟≠𝑐
𝑔𝑟) ⋅ 𝑠, … ,(
𝑛−1
∏
𝑟=1
𝑔𝑟) ⋅ 𝑠},
the rekeying process may be carried out by any one of them. Let us call this user
𝒰𝑐 . If rekeying is due to key caducity, then he chooses a new 𝑔′𝑐 ∈ 𝐺, changes his
private key to 𝑔′𝑐𝑔𝑐 and sends the following rekeying message:
{(𝑔
′𝑐
𝑛
∏
𝑟=2
𝑔𝑟) ⋅ 𝑠, (𝑔
′𝑐
𝑛
∏
𝑟=1;𝑟≠2
𝑔𝑟) ⋅ 𝑠, … ,(
𝑛
∏
𝑟=1;𝑟≠𝑐
𝑔𝑟) ⋅ 𝑠, … ,(𝑔
′𝑐
𝑛−1
∏
𝑟=1
𝑔𝑟) ⋅ 𝑠},
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Then, every user, using his private information, recovers the new common key
given by (𝑔′𝑐 ∏𝑛𝑟=1 𝑔𝑟) ⋅ 𝑠.In case some user leaves the group, the corresponding position in the rekeying
message is omitted. If a new user joins the group, then 𝒰𝑐 adds the element
(𝑔′𝑐 ∏𝑛𝑟=1 𝑔𝑟) ⋅ 𝑠 and sends the following to the new user 𝒰𝑛+1:
{(𝑔
′𝑐
𝑛
∏
𝑟=2
𝑔𝑟) ⋅ 𝑠, … ,(
𝑛
∏
𝑟=1;𝑟≠𝑐
𝑔𝑟) ⋅ 𝑠, … ,(𝑔
′𝑐
𝑛−1
∏
𝑟=1
𝑔𝑟) ⋅ 𝑠, (𝑔
′𝑐
𝑛
∏
𝑟=1
𝑔𝑟) ⋅ 𝑠},
This user proceeds (in both GSAP-2 and GSAP-3) to step (5) of GSAP-3.
5.3 Security of the Key Agreements and Rekeying Op-
erations
In [MMR07], it was pointed out that if an adversary is able to solve the SAP, then
she will be able to break the two party Diffie-Hellman key exchange, i.e. solve the
DHSAP. It is easy to observe that being able to solve the DHSAP allows getting
the shared key in all the protocols proposed above.
Proposition 5.11. If an adversary is able to solve the DHSAP, then she can get the
shared key in GSAP-1, GSAP-2 and GSAP-3.
Proof. This follows from the fact that the adversary can access the pair of values
• (𝐶1, 𝑓 21 ) = (𝑔1 ⋅ 𝑠, (∏𝑛𝑖=2 𝑔𝑖) ⋅ 𝑠) in GSAP-1;
• (𝐶11 , 𝑓 𝑛1 ) = (𝑔1 ⋅ 𝑠, (∏𝑛𝑖=2 𝑔𝑖) ⋅ 𝑠) in GSAP-2;
• (𝐶1, 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷1) = (𝑔1 ⋅ 𝑠, (∏𝑛𝑖=2 𝑔𝑗) ⋅ 𝑠) in GSAP-3.
The preceding result shows, as could be expected, that the multiparty key ex-
change protocols do not enhance the security that the corresponding two-party
protocol offers. However, as in [STW96] and [STW00], it is possible to show that
increasing the number of messages does not produce any information leakage
whenever the corresponding key exchange based on the SAP for two communi-
cating parties is secure. Here we are referring to security against passive attacks;
a totally different picture would arise if we assume that the attacker can control
communications from and to one or more particular users, see e.g. [Sch+16].
Let 𝑋 = {𝑔1, … , 𝑔𝑛} be a set of elements of the semigroup 𝐺, 𝑠 an element of
a set 𝑆 and 𝛷 a 𝐺-action on 𝑆. Let us define the (ordered) set of elements of 𝑆
𝑉 𝐺𝛷 (𝑠, 𝑛, 𝑋 ) = {(
𝑖𝑚
∏
𝑗=𝑖1
𝑔𝑗) ⋅ 𝑠 | {𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚} ⊊ {1, … , 𝑛}}
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and the value 𝐾𝐺𝛷 (𝑠, 𝑛, 𝑋 ) = (∏𝑛𝑗=1 𝑔𝑗) ⋅ 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆.
We point out that the messages that any adversary observes in any of the
protocols is a subset of 𝑉 𝐺𝛷 (𝑠, 𝑛, 𝑋 ), and the key that the users agree on is precisely
𝐾𝐺𝛷 (𝑠, 𝑛, 𝑋 ). Let us assume now that 𝛷 is a transitive action, i.e. for every pair of
elements 𝑠, 𝑠′ ∈ 𝑆 there always exists a 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺 such that 𝑔 ⋅ 𝑠 = 𝑠′. Thus if 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 is
a public element, given any two elements in 𝑆, 𝑠1, 𝑠2, there always exist 𝑔1, 𝑔2 ∈ 𝐺
such that 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠 = 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2. Let 𝑠3 = 𝑔1 ⋅ (𝑔2 ⋅ 𝑠) = 𝑔1𝑔2 ⋅ 𝑠. If, given 𝑠, 𝑠1 and 𝑠2, it
is not feasible to distinguish 𝑠3 from a random value in polynomial time, then an
induction argument like that given in [STW00, Theorem 1] allows us to show the
following result.
Theorem 5.12. Let 𝛷 be a transitive 𝐺-action on 𝑆. Then the group key that users
derive as a result of any of the protocols GSAP-1, GSAP-2 and GSAP-3 is indistin-
guishable in polynomial time from a random value, given only the values exchanged
between users during the protocol, whenever the corresponding Diffie-Hellman pro-
tocol induced by 𝛷 for two users satisfies this property.
The security of the rekeying operations described in Section 5.2.5 also follows
fromTheorem 5.12.
5.4 Secure Group Communication based on Linear Ac-
tions
As can be observed in the protocols given in the previous section, user 𝒰𝑛 plays
a central role, and in two of them, every user is required to do a different number
of computations and store a different number of values, depending on his prox-
imity to 𝒰𝑛. The aim of this section is twofold: On one hand, we give a similar
approach to that of GSAP-3 in order to get a protocol with the same advantages
that is applicable in situations where the semigroup 𝐺 acting on 𝑆 does not con-
tain inverses. On the other hand, we give a new approach based on linear actions
that in some cases not only significantly decreases communication overheads, but
also reduces the number of rounds to just two, which will significantly enhance
the efficiency.
We say that, given semigroups (𝐺, ⋅) and (𝑆, +), an action 𝛷∶ 𝐺 × 𝑆 → 𝑆 is
linear in case 𝑔 ⋅ (𝑠 + 𝑠′) = 𝑔 ⋅ 𝑠 + 𝑔 ⋅ 𝑠′.
The following protocol is a modification of GSAP-3 for a linear 𝐺-action 𝛷 on
𝑆, but instead of requiring 𝐺 to be a group, we require this of 𝑆. We get a similar
protocol that is also an extension of Diffie-Hellman to the multiparty case.
Protocol 5.13 (GSAP-3′). Users agree on an element 𝑠 in a finite group 𝑆, a finite
abelian semigroup 𝐺, and a linear 𝐺-action 𝛷 on 𝑆. For every 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, the user
𝒰𝑖 holds a private element 𝑔𝑖 ∈ 𝐺.
(1) For 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 2, user 𝒰𝑖 sends to user 𝒰𝑖+1 the message 𝐶𝑖 = 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝐶𝑖−1.
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(2) User 𝒰𝑛−1 computes 𝐶𝑛−1 = 𝑔𝑛−1 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−2 and broadcasts it to the other users
{𝒰1, … ,𝒰𝑛−2, 𝒰𝑛}.
(3) User 𝒰𝑛 computes the element 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−1.
(4) For 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 1, user 𝒰𝑖 computes 𝐷𝑖 = 𝐶𝑛−1 − 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠 and sends it to user
𝒰𝑛.
(5) For 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 1, user 𝒰𝑛 computes 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷𝑖 and sends to the other users
{𝒰1, … ,𝒰𝑛−2, 𝒰𝑛−1} the set of values {𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷1, … , 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷𝑛−1, 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷𝑛} and his
public key 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝑠, where 𝐷𝑛 = 𝐶𝑛−1 − 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝑠.
(6) For 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 1, user 𝒰𝑖 computes 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ (𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝑠) + 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷𝑖 .
Theorem 5.14. After protocol GSAP-3′, the users 𝒰1, … ,𝒰𝑛 share a common key
given by (∏𝑛𝑖=1 𝑔𝑖) ⋅ 𝑠.
Proof. This follows from the linearity of the action 𝛷:
𝑔𝑖 ⋅ (𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝑠) + 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷𝑖 = 𝑔𝑖𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝑠 + 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ ((
𝑛−1
∏
𝑟=1
𝑔𝑟) ⋅ 𝑠 − 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠)
= (
𝑛
∏
𝑟=1
𝑔𝑟) ⋅ 𝑠,
since 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑒 = 𝑒, 𝑒 being the neutral element in 𝑆, and −(𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠) = 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ (−𝑠), again by
the linearity of the action.
Example 5.15. (a) Given a cyclic group (𝑆, ⋅) of order 𝑞 generated by 𝑔, the ac-
tion 𝛷∶ ℕ∗ × 𝑆 → 𝑆 defined by 𝛷(𝑥, 𝑠) = 𝑠𝑥 is clearly linear, so the above
argument applies. 𝐷𝑖 assumes the form 𝑔∏
𝑛−1
𝑗=1 𝑥𝑗𝑔−𝑥𝑖 .
(b) If 𝜀 is the group of points of an elliptic curve, then 𝜀 is a ℤ-module via the
linear action 𝛷(𝑘, 𝑃) = 𝑘𝑃 for every 𝑘 ∈ ℤ and 𝑃 ∈ 𝜀. 𝐷𝑖 assumes the form
(∏𝑛−1𝑖=1 𝑘𝑗)𝑃 − 𝑘𝑖𝑃 .
(c) Let us introduce an example where the preceding protocols can be run over
a module structure. Let us recall from [CNT14] the following ring:
𝐸(𝑚)𝑝 = {[𝑎𝑖𝑗] ∈ Mat𝑚×𝑚(ℤ) | 𝑎𝑖𝑗 ∈ ℤ𝑝𝑖 if 𝑖 ≤ 𝑗, and 𝑎𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑝𝑖−𝑗ℤ𝑝𝑖 if 𝑖 > 𝑗},
with addition and multiplication defined, respectively, as follows
[𝑎𝑖𝑗] + [𝑏𝑖𝑗] = [(𝑎𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏𝑖𝑗 ) mod 𝑝𝑖]
[𝑎𝑖𝑗] ⋅ [𝑏𝑖𝑗] = [(
𝑚
∑
𝑘=1
𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑏𝑘𝑗) mod 𝑝
𝑖
].
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Here, Mat𝑚×𝑚(ℤ) denotes the set of 𝑚 × 𝑚 matrices with entries in ℤ, and
𝑝𝑟ℤ𝑝𝑠 denotes the set {𝑝𝑟𝑢 | 𝑢 ∈ {0, … , 𝑝𝑠 − 1}} ⊂ ℤ for positive integers
𝑟 and 𝑠. This ring is clearly non-commutative and its product defines an
action of the multiplicative semigroup 𝐸(𝑚)𝑝 on the set ℤ𝑝 × ℤ𝑝2 × ⋯ × ℤ𝑝𝑚 .
However, to ensure that the key exchange works, we need that the elements
in the semigroup commute. In this non-commutative setting, this may be
achieved by considering that the selected elements in the semigroup 𝐸(𝑚)𝑝
are of the form∑𝑟𝑖=0 𝐶𝑖𝑀 𝑖 , such that for every 𝑖 = 0, … , 𝑟 , 𝐶𝑖 is in the center
𝑍 of 𝐸(𝑚)𝑝 and 𝑀 ∈ 𝐸(𝑚)𝑝 is a public element such that its set of powers is
large enough. In other words, if we denote the set of elements of this form
by 𝑍[𝑀], then we are using for 𝐺 the multiplicative subsemigroup 𝑍[𝑀] of
𝐸(𝑚)𝑝 .
From [CL16, Theorem 2] we can deduce conditions on the public informa-
tion that will be sent in order to prevent an attacker from solving the SAP
in the subsemigroup of 𝑍[𝑀] given by the center 𝑍 of the ring, with car-
dinality 𝑝𝑚 (cf. [CNT14]). Thus if 𝑀 has high order, i.e. 𝑀 is such that the
least integer 𝑛 satisfying 𝑀𝑘+𝑛 = 𝑀𝑘 for every sufficiently large 𝑘 is high,
we will obtain that 𝑍[𝑀] is big enough.
Note that our aim in this paper is not to prove the hardness of the SAP for
this particular example, but rather to present protocols which rely on the
hardness of the SAP in a particular scenario once it has been established
there. The non-commutative scenario in particular may present hidden vul-
nerabilities, as was shown in recent cryptanalyses, e.g. [KY12; Mic15], al-
though these seem not to directly apply in this setting. For example [KY12]
introduces a cryptanalysis for the case of two users when the ring 𝐸(𝑚)𝑝 acts
on itself, which can be countered by choosing 𝑝 and 𝑚 appropriately in
order to avoid the existence of inverses [CNT14]. In the case of [Mic15],
the cryptanalysis requires building a system of equations, which does not
seem to be straightforward in this new setting of 𝑍[𝑀]. In [Maz03, Proposi-
tion 3.9], it is asserted that if the commutative semigroup has a big number
of invertible elements, then it is possible to develop a square root attack to
the SAP. Again we point out that 𝐸(𝑚)𝑝 could be chosen in order to avoid this
attack.
Given that both (∏𝑛−1𝑖=1 𝑔𝑖) ⋅ 𝑠 and 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝑠 are public we immediately get thefollowing.
Proposition 5.16. If an adversary is able to solve the DHSAP, then she can get the
shared key in GSAP-3′.
Let us recall from [MMR07] that given any 𝐺-action 𝛷 on 𝑆, we can easily
define an ElGamal type of public key cryptosystem. We define the following El-
Gamal type of protocol.
(1) Alice and Bob publicly agree on an element 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆.
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(2) Bob chooses 𝑏 ∈ 𝐺 and computes 𝑏 ⋅ 𝑠. Bob’s private key is 𝑏, his public key
is 𝑏 ⋅ 𝑠.
(3) If Alice wants to send the message𝑚 ∈ 𝑆 to Bob, then she gets Bob’s public
key 𝑏 ⋅ 𝑠.
(4) Alice chooses randomly 𝑎 ∈ 𝐺 and computes 𝑎 ⋅ 𝑠 and 𝑎 ⋅ (𝑏 ⋅ 𝑠).
(5) Alice sends to Bob the pair (𝑐, 𝑑) = (𝑎 ⋅ 𝑠, 𝑚 + 𝑎 ⋅ (𝑏 ⋅ 𝑠)).
(6) Bob recovers𝑚 = 𝑑 −𝑏 ⋅ 𝑐 = 𝑚+𝑎 ⋅ (𝑏 ⋅ 𝑠) − 𝑏 ⋅ (𝑎 ⋅ 𝑠), given that 𝑆 has a group
structure.
It can be easily observed that solving the DHSAP is equivalent to breaking the
preceding algorithm: If given the public information
(𝑠, 𝑎 ⋅ 𝑠, 𝑏 ⋅ 𝑠, 𝑚 + 𝑎𝑏 ⋅ 𝑠)
one is able to get 𝑚, then the input (𝑠, 𝑎 ⋅ 𝑠, 𝑏 ⋅ 𝑠, 𝑒), for 𝑒 ∈ 𝑆 the neutral element,
produces −(𝑎𝑏 ⋅ 𝑠), which solves the DHSAP. Conversely, given Bob’s public key
𝑏 ⋅ 𝑠 and the pair (𝑎 ⋅ 𝑠, 𝑚 + 𝑎 ⋅ (𝑏 ⋅ 𝑠)), one can use 𝑎𝑏 ⋅ 𝑠 from the DHSAP to recover
𝑚.
Now using the above we are able to show the security of GSAP-3′.
Theorem 5.17. The group key that users derive as a result of GSAP-3′ is indis-
tinguishable in polynomial time from a random value whenever the corresponding
Diffie-Hellman protocol induced by 𝛷 for two users also satisfies this property.
Proof. Given that both 𝐶𝑛−1 = (∏𝑛−1𝑖=1 𝑔𝑖) ⋅ 𝑠 and 𝐷𝑖 = 𝐶𝑛−1 − 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠 are public, anadversary is able to get all the public values 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛. Now user 𝒰𝑛 sends
the message {𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷𝑖}𝑛−1𝑖=1 jointly with 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝑠, in other words, due to linearity of 𝛷,
user 𝒰𝑛 sends a “a family of pairs”, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛,
(𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝑠, −𝑔𝑛 ⋅ (𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠) + 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ (
𝑛−1
∏
𝑗=1
𝑔𝑗) ⋅ 𝑠),
which can be seen as a set of ElGamal encryptions of the message
(
𝑛
∏
𝑖=1
𝑔𝑖) ⋅ 𝑠 = 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ (
𝑛−1
∏
𝑖=1
𝑔𝑖) ⋅ 𝑠
using the public keys 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠 for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛. Alternatively, one can consider the pairs
(𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠, −𝑔𝑛 ⋅ (𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠) + 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ (
𝑛−1
∏
𝑗=1
𝑔𝑗) ⋅ 𝑠),
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which can also be seen, given the commutativity in 𝐺, as a set of ElGamal encryp-
tions of the message
(
𝑛
∏
𝑖=1
𝑔𝑖) ⋅ 𝑠 = 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ (
𝑛−1
∏
𝑖=1
𝑔𝑖) ⋅ 𝑠
using the public key 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ (−𝑠), and the 𝑔𝑖 as random numbers, for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛.
Thus, as we pointed out above, given the equivalence of the security of the
ElGamal type of public key cryptosystem and the DHSAP, the result follows.
The rekeying process in this setting is analogous to that described in Sec-
tion 5.2.5 for protocols GSAP-2 and GSAP-3.
We first note that every user remembers the following keying information:
{𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷1, … , 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷𝑛−1, 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷𝑛}.
In case of key caducity, user 𝒰𝑐 for some 𝑐 = 1, … , 𝑛 chooses a new element
𝑔′𝑐 ∈ 𝐺, computes a new key given by (𝑔′𝑐 ∏𝑛𝑖=1 𝑔𝑖) ⋅ 𝑠 and his keying information
(𝑔′𝑐 ∏𝑛𝑖=1 𝑔𝑖) ⋅ 𝑠 − (𝑔′𝑐 )2𝑔𝑐𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝑠 and broadcasts the following message:
{𝑔
′𝑐 ⋅ (𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷1), … , (𝑔
′𝑐
𝑛
∏
𝑖=1
𝑔𝑖) ⋅ 𝑠 − (𝑔
′𝑐 )2𝑔𝑐𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝑠, … ,
𝑔′𝑐 ⋅ (𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷𝑛−1), 𝑔′𝑐 ⋅ (𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷𝑛)},
jointly with the value 𝑔′𝑐 ⋅ (𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝑠). User𝒰𝑐 changes his private information to 𝑔𝑐𝑔′𝑐 .
In case rekeying is due to some user leaving the group, then the corresponding
value is omitted in the above message.
Finally, let us assume that 𝒰𝑛+1 joins the group. The process corresponds in
this case to something similar to a “double rekeying” as above. First, 𝒰𝑐 sends to
𝒰𝑛+1
{𝑔
′𝑐 ⋅ (𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷1), … , 𝑔′𝑐 ⋅ (
𝑛
∏
𝑖=1
𝑔𝑖) ⋅ 𝑠 − (𝑔
′𝑐 )2𝑔𝑐𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝑠, … ,
𝑔′𝑐 ⋅ (𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷𝑛−1), 𝑔′𝑐 ⋅ (𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷𝑛), 𝑔′𝑐 ⋅ (
𝑛
∏
𝑖=1
𝑔𝑖) ⋅ 𝑠}
jointly with the value 𝑔′𝑐 ⋅ (𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝑠). Then,𝒰𝑛+1 broadcasts a rekeying message given
by
{𝑔𝑛+1𝑔
′𝑐 ⋅ (𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷1), … , 𝑔′𝑐 ⋅ (
𝑛+1
∏
𝑖=1
𝑔𝑖) ⋅ 𝑠 − 𝑔𝑛+1(𝑔
′𝑐 )2𝑔𝑐𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝑠, … ,
𝑔𝑛+1𝑔′𝑐 ⋅ (𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷𝑛−1), 𝑔𝑛+1𝑔′𝑐 ⋅ (𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐷𝑛),
𝑔′𝑐 ⋅ (
𝑛+1
∏
𝑖=1
𝑔𝑖) ⋅ 𝑠 − 𝑔
2𝑛+1𝑔′𝑐𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝑠}
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jointly with the value 𝑔𝑛+1𝑔′𝑐𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝑠.
Security of these processes can be shown with a similar argument as in Theo-
rem 5.17.
A more symmetrical use of linear actions is the following protocol, which
decreases the number of rounds to just two, but which is only applicable in some
cases.
Protocol 5.18 (GSAP-4). Users agree on an element 𝑠 in a finite abelian semigroup
𝑆, a finite abelian semigroup𝐺, and a linear𝐺-action𝛷 on 𝑆. For every 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛,
the user 𝒰𝑖 holds a private element 𝑔𝑖 ∈ 𝐺.
(1) For every 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, user 𝒰𝑖 makes public 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠.
(2) For some 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛, user 𝒰𝑗 computes and makes public
𝐷𝑖 = 𝑔𝑗 ⋅ ∑
𝑟≠𝑗,𝑖
(𝑔𝑟 ⋅ 𝑠), 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛.
(3) For every 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, user 𝒰𝑖 computes 𝐷𝑖 + 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ (𝑔𝑗 ⋅ 𝑠). User 𝒰𝑗
computes 𝑔𝑗 ⋅ ∑𝑟≠𝑗 (𝑔𝑟 ⋅ 𝑠).
Theorem 5.19. After protocol GSAP-4, the users 𝒰1, … ,𝒰𝑛 share a common key
given by 𝑔𝑗 ⋅ ∑𝑟≠𝑗 (𝑔𝑟 ⋅ 𝑠).
Proof. For every 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗,
𝐷𝑖 + 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ (𝑔𝑗 ⋅ 𝑠) = 𝑔𝑗 ⋅ ∑
𝑟≠𝑗,𝑖
(𝑔𝑟 ⋅ 𝑠) + 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ (𝑔𝑗 ⋅ 𝑠)
= 𝑔𝑗 ⋅ ∑
𝑟≠𝑗,𝑖
(𝑔𝑟 ⋅ 𝑠) + 𝑔𝑖𝑔𝑗 ⋅ 𝑠
= 𝑔𝑗 ⋅ ∑
𝑟≠𝑗,𝑖
(𝑔𝑟 ⋅ 𝑠) + 𝑔𝑗𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠
= 𝑔𝑗 ⋅ ∑
𝑟≠𝑗,𝑖
(𝑔𝑟 ⋅ 𝑠) + 𝑔𝑗 ⋅ (𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠)
= 𝑔𝑗 ⋅∑
𝑟≠𝑗
(𝑔𝑟 ⋅ 𝑠).
Example 5.20. (a) Let us consider again a cyclic group 𝑆 of order 𝑞 generated
by 𝑔, with the action 𝛷∶ ℕ∗ × 𝑆 → 𝑆 given by 𝛷(𝑥, 𝑠) = 𝑠𝑥 . Then GSAP-4
implies sharing a key of the form 𝐾 = 𝑔𝑘𝑗 ∑𝑛𝑟=1,𝑟≠𝑗 𝑘𝑟 . An adversary can access
the messages
𝐷𝑖 = 𝑔𝑘𝑗 ∑
𝑛
𝑟=1;𝑟≠𝑖,𝑗 𝑘𝑟 , for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗,
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from which she can compute ∏𝑛𝑟=1,𝑟≠𝑗 𝐷𝑟 = 𝐾𝑛−2. In the case where the
order 𝑞 of 𝑆 is known, the adversary can now recover the key 𝐾 from 𝐾𝑛−2
by inverting 𝑛 − 2 modulo 𝑞. This is in particular the case where 𝑆 is a
subgroup of a finite field, or where it is the group of points of an elliptic
curve. However, we can avoid this weakness by adding some authentication
information as is done in [AST00].
(b) Let 𝑚 = 𝑝𝑞 with 𝑝 and 𝑞 two large primes and let 𝐺 = ℤ∗(𝑝−1)(𝑞−1). Then the
action 𝛷∶ 𝐺 ×ℤ𝑚 → ℤ𝑚 given by 𝛷(𝑥, 𝑔) = 𝑔𝑥 mod 𝑚 shows an example
where the above attack cannot be developed unless the adversary is able to
factor 𝑚. The shared key in this case is of the form 𝑔𝑘𝑗 ∑𝑛𝑖=1,𝑖≠𝑗 𝑘𝑖 mod 𝑚.
(c) We recall that a semiring 𝑅 is a semigroup with respect to both addition
and multiplication and the distributive laws hold. It is also understood that
a semiring is commutative with respect to addition and the existence of
neutral elements is not required, although some authors do require it. Then,
given a semiring 𝑅, a left 𝑅-semimodule𝑀 is an abelian semigroup with an
action 𝛷∶ 𝑅 × 𝑀 → 𝑀 , 𝛷(𝑟, 𝑚) = 𝑟𝑚, satisfying 𝑟(𝑠𝑚) = (𝑟𝑠)𝑚, (𝑟 + 𝑠)𝑚 =
𝑟𝑚+𝑠𝑚 and 𝑟(𝑚+𝑛) = 𝑟𝑚+𝑟𝑛 for all 𝑟 , 𝑠 ∈ 𝑅 and𝑚, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑀 . Thus, based on
the previous two examples, we can assert in general that any semimodule
𝑆 over a semiring 𝑅 fits with GSAP-4 and the shared key is of the form
𝑘𝑗(∑𝑛𝑟=1,𝑟≠𝑗 𝑘𝑟)𝑠 for 𝑘𝑖 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 private and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 public.
Remark 5.21. Due to the attack shown in example (a), the hardness of the Diffie-
Hellman problem is not enough to show security in this case. We leave it as an
open question whether the hardness of factoring would be enough to do so for
example (b).
Remark 5.22. We can also give protocols based on two-sided actions. To this end
we recall that given a semiring 𝑆, right 𝑆-semimodules are defined dually to left
ones. Then, given two semirings 𝑅 and 𝑆, an (𝑅, 𝑆)-bisemimodule 𝑀 is both a left
𝑅-semimodule and a right 𝑆-semimodule such that (𝑟𝑚)𝑠 = 𝑟(𝑚𝑠) for every 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅,
𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆.
Now we are able to provide key exchange protocols similar to those given in
the previous sections based on two-sided linear actions over a (𝑅, 𝑆)-bisemimodule
𝑀 . In the case of GSAP-3′, since we need the existence of inverses with respect to
addition in 𝑀 , we may suppose that 𝑀 has an (𝑅, 𝑆)-bimodule structure for some
rings 𝑅 and 𝑆.
5.5 Further Key Agreements based on Linear Actions
We now present two variants of GSAP-4 that avoid the attack described in Exam-
ple 5.20 (a). They were published in [Lóp+16]. These protocols have the follow-
ing two desirable properties: On one hand, the key is obtained in a distributed
key agreement with just two rounds. On the other hand, the rekeying protocol
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is developed by means of a single message. The protocols extend naturally the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange as well and we show that their security is based on
the difficulty of the DDH problem.
Let us start by establishing the general setting for the following protocols. Par-
ticipants in the communication process will again be given by the set {𝒰1, …𝒰𝑛}.
The users agree on an abelian semigroup (𝐺, ⋅), an abelian group (𝑆, +), and a linear
semigroup action 𝛷∶ 𝐺 × 𝑆 → 𝑆. They also agree on a base element 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆.
Every participant 𝒰𝑖 holds two pairs of private-public keys, say (𝑔𝑖 , 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠) and
(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠). One of these users is chosen to be the group controller, whom we will
denote by 𝒰𝑐1 , for some 𝑐1 in the set {1, … , 𝑛}. He will be in charge of sendingthe initial keying information as well as the following rekeying messages in case
we wish to define a centralized protocol. However, as we will see in the following
section, the character of the protocol can change from centralized to distributed
(and vice versa) at any point of the following rekeying stages. The protocol that
describes the initial key agreement is given by the following steps.
Protocol 5.23.
First Round:
(1) Every user 𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑐1, publishes the pair (𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠, 𝑥𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠),
(2) The group controller 𝒰𝑐1 computes the key 𝐾1 = 𝑔𝑐1 ⋅ ∑
𝑛
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑐1 (𝑔𝑗 ⋅ 𝑠).
(3) The group controller takes two new elements 𝑔′𝑐1 , 𝑥′𝑐1 ∈ 𝐺 that become hisnew private information.
Second Round:
(4) Every user𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑐1, computes∑𝑛𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑐1,𝑖(𝑔𝑗 ⋅ 𝑠) and sends this value to𝒰𝑐1 .
(5) The group controller 𝒰𝑐1 broadcasts the keying message
{𝑌1,1, … , 𝑌1,𝑐1 , … , 𝑌1,𝑛, 𝑅1, 𝑆1},
where
𝑌1,𝑖 = (𝑔𝑐1 ⋅
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1;𝑗≠𝑐1,𝑖
(𝑔𝑗 ⋅ 𝑠)) − (𝑥𝑐1 ⋅ (𝑥𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠))
for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑐1, 𝑌1,𝑐1 = 𝐾1 − 𝑔′𝑐1 ⋅ (𝑔𝑐1 ⋅ 𝑠) − 𝑥′𝑐1 ⋅ (𝑥𝑐1 ⋅ 𝑠), and 𝑅1 = 𝑔𝑐1 ⋅ 𝑠and 𝑆1 = 𝑥𝑐1 ⋅ 𝑠.
(6) Every user 𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑐1, computes 𝐾1,𝑖 = 𝑌1,𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖 ⋅ 𝑆1 + 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑅1.
The proof of the following lemma is straightforward and shows the correct-
ness of the protocol.
Lemma 5.24. 𝐾1,𝑖 = 𝐾1 for every 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑐1.
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Remark 5.25. Let us assume that the number of users is 𝑛 = 2 and that 𝑥𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠 = 0
for 𝑖 = 1, 2, where 0 ∈ 𝑆 is the neutral element. Now if 𝒰1 makes public 𝑔1 ⋅ 𝑠
in the first round, 𝒰2 will send the keying message {0, 𝑅1 = 𝑔2 ⋅ 𝑠} in the second
round. Thus our protocol is a natural extension of the semigroup Diffie-Hellman
key exchange (Protocol 5.1).
It can be observed in the preceding protocol that user 𝒰𝑐1 bears most of theworkload. The protocol is designed in such a way that every node publishes just a
pair of public keys, while𝒰𝑐1 computes what is required for the first keying. Thiscould be the case when 𝒰𝑐1 is a server that processes the pieces of informationtransmitted by every user. However, in case every user has similar capabilities,
we can slightly modify the preceding protocol and distribute the computation
requirements. As previously, every user holds a pair of private keys (𝑟𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖).
Protocol 5.26.
First Round:
(1) Every user 𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑐1, publishes his public key 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠,
(2) The group controller 𝒰𝑐1 computes the key 𝐾1 = 𝑔𝑐1 ⋅ ∑
𝑛
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑐1 (𝑔𝑗 ⋅ 𝑠).
(3) The group controller takes two new elements 𝑔′𝑐1 , 𝑥′𝑐1 ∈ 𝐺 that become hisnew private information.
Second Round:
(4) Every user 𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑐1, computes∑𝑛𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑐1,𝑖(𝑔𝑗 ⋅ 𝑠) − 𝑥𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠 and sends this valueto 𝒰𝑐1 .
(5) The group controller 𝒰𝑐1 broadcasts the keying message
{𝑌1,1, … , 𝑌1,𝑐1 , … , 𝑌1,𝑛, 𝑅1},
where
𝑌1,𝑖 = (𝑔𝑐1 ⋅
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1;𝑗≠𝑐1,𝑖
(𝑔𝑗 ⋅ 𝑠)) − (𝑔𝑐1 ⋅ (𝑥𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠))
for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑐1, 𝑌1,𝑐1 = 𝐾1 − 𝑔′𝑐1 ⋅ (𝑔𝑐1 ⋅ 𝑠) − 𝑥′𝑐1 ⋅ (𝑔𝑐1 ⋅ 𝑠), and 𝑅1 = 𝑔𝑐1 ⋅ 𝑠.
(6) Every user 𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑐1, computes 𝐾1,𝑖 = 𝑌1,𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖 ⋅ 𝑅1 + 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑅1.
We will now state the security of the preceding protocols. To this end let us
now recall the following definition.
Definition 5.27. [BD05, Definition 2.2] Let 𝒫 be a group key exchange protocol
and 𝒜 a passive adversary. Assume that 𝒜 has witnessed polynomially-many
instances of 𝒫 and let 𝐾 be the key output by the last instance.
We will say that 𝒫 guarantees secrecy if 𝒜 cannot distinguish 𝐾 from a ran-
dom bit string of the same length with probability better than 1/2 + 𝜀, where 𝜀 is
negligible.
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Theorem 5.28. If the DDH problem is intractable, then Protocols 5.23 and 5.26 pro-
vide secrecy.
Proof. We observe that we can see the broadcast message in Protocol 5.23 as a
multiple ElGamal type of encryption in the following way. For 𝑖 ≠ 𝑐1 we first
encrypt 𝐾1 using the public value 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠 and 𝑔𝑐1 as random parameter, obtaining
(𝑋1,𝑖 , 𝑅1) = ((𝑔𝑐1 ∑𝑗≠𝑐1,𝑖 𝑔𝑗) ⋅ 𝑠, 𝑔𝑐1 ⋅ 𝑠) and then we encrypt 𝑋𝑖 using the public key𝑥𝑖 ⋅ 𝑠 and 𝑥𝑐1 as a random parameter, obtaining the pair (𝑌1,𝑖 , 𝑆1).The case of 𝑌1,𝑐1 is analogous using the elements 𝑔′𝑐1 ⋅𝑠 and 𝑥′𝑐1 ⋅𝑠, that, althoughunknown to a passive adversary, could also be made public.
Now using Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 of [BBS02], we can deduce the claim.
The security of Protocol 5.26 follows similarly.
5.5.1 Rekeying
The following protocol shows the rekeying operation after 𝑡 − 1 rekeying rounds
have already occurred. We denote by 𝐾𝑡 the last common key shared by the group.
The user in charge of the 𝑡-th rekeyingwill be user𝒰𝑐𝑡 , distinct from the precedingcontroller, and thus, rekeying information of this will be needed. Without loss of
generality, we may assume that the precedent controller was user 𝒰𝑐1 and thatthe last rekeying message is given by
{𝑌𝑡−1,1, … , 𝑌𝑡−1,𝑐1 , … , 𝑌𝑡−1,𝑛, 𝑅𝑡−1, 𝑆𝑡−1},
where 𝑌𝑡−1,𝑐1 = 𝐾𝑡−1 − 𝑔′𝑐1 ⋅ (𝑔𝑐1 ⋅ 𝑠) − 𝑥′𝑐1 ⋅ (𝑥𝑐1 ⋅ 𝑠).The protocol described here applies to the case where the set of users remain
the same. If users leave the group, the operation can be done the same way, but
with the entries corresponding to the leaving users removed from the rekeying
message.
Protocol 5.29.
(1) User 𝒰𝑐𝑡 computes two new elements 𝑔′𝑐𝑡 and 𝑥′𝑐𝑡 ∈ 𝐺 that become his newprivate information.
(2) User 𝒰𝑐𝑡 computes the new session key 𝑔′𝑐𝑡 ⋅ 𝐾𝑡−1.
(3) User 𝒰𝑐𝑡 broadcasts the rekeying message
{𝑌𝑡,1, … , 𝑌𝑡,𝑐𝑡 , … , 𝑌𝑡,𝑛, 𝑅𝑡 , 𝑆𝑡},
where 𝑌𝑡,𝑖 = 𝑔′𝑐𝑡 ⋅ 𝑌𝑡−1,𝑖 for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑐𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡,𝑐𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡 − 𝑔′𝑐𝑡 ⋅ (𝑔′𝑐𝑡 ⋅ 𝑅𝑡−1) − 𝑔′𝑐𝑡 ⋅ (𝑥′𝑐𝑡 ⋅ 𝑆𝑡−1),and 𝑅𝑡 = 𝑔′𝑐𝑡 ⋅ 𝑅𝑡−1 and 𝑆𝑡 = 𝑔′𝑐𝑡 ⋅ 𝑆𝑡−1.
(4) Every user 𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑐𝑡 , computes 𝐾𝑡,𝑖 = 𝑌𝑡,𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖 ⋅ 𝑆𝑡 + 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑅𝑡 .
If instead users 𝒰𝑛+𝑗 for 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑙 wish to join the group, they proceed ac-
cording to the following protocol.
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Protocol 5.30.
(1) Every new user 𝒰𝑛+𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑙, sends a petition to user 𝒰𝑐𝑡 jointly withthe pair 𝑔𝑛+𝑗 ⋅ 𝑅𝑡−1, 𝑥𝑛+𝑗 ⋅ 𝑆𝑡−1, where 𝑔𝑛+𝑗 , 𝑥𝑛+𝑗 ∈ 𝐺 is the user𝒰𝑛+𝑗 ’s private
information.
(2) User 𝒰𝑐𝑡 computes two new elements 𝑔′𝑐𝑡 , 𝑥′𝑐𝑡 ∈ 𝐺 that become his new pri-vate information.
(3) User 𝒰𝑐𝑡 computes the new key 𝐾𝑡 = 𝑔′𝑐𝑡 ⋅ (𝐾𝑡−1 + ∑
𝑙
𝑖=1(𝑔𝑛+𝑖 ⋅ 𝑅𝑡−1)).
(4) User 𝒰𝑐𝑡 broadcasts the rekeying message
{𝑌𝑡,1, … , 𝑌𝑡,𝑐𝑡 , … , 𝑌𝑡,𝑛, 𝑌𝑡,𝑛+1, … , 𝑌𝑡,𝑛+𝑙 , 𝑅𝑡 , 𝑆𝑡}
where 𝑌𝑡,𝑖 = 𝑔′𝑐𝑡 ⋅ (𝑌𝑡−1,𝑖 + ∑
𝑙
𝑗=1(𝑟𝑛+𝑗 ⋅ 𝑅𝑡−1)), for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑐𝑡 ,𝑌𝑡,𝑐𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡−1 − 𝑔′𝑐𝑡𝑔′𝑐𝑡 ⋅ 𝑅𝑡−1 − 𝑔′𝑐𝑡𝑥′𝑐𝑡 ⋅ 𝑆𝑡−1,𝑌𝑡,𝑖 = 𝐾𝑡−1 − 𝑔′𝑐𝑡𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑅𝑡−1 − 𝑔′𝑐𝑡𝑥𝑖 ⋅ 𝑆𝑡−1, for 𝑖 = 𝑛 + 1, … , 𝑛 + 𝑙,𝑅𝑡 = 𝑔′𝑐𝑡 ⋅ 𝑅𝑡−1 and 𝑆𝑡 = 𝑔′𝑐𝑡 ⋅ 𝑆𝑡−1.
(5) Every user 𝒰𝑖 computes 𝐾𝑡,𝑖 = 𝑌𝑡,𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖 ⋅ 𝑆𝑡 + 𝑔𝑖 ⋅ 𝑅𝑡 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 + 𝑙, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑐𝑡 .
5.6 An Active Attack on GSAP-3
In this section, we will show an active attack on the protocol GSAP-3 of [STW96]
and our variant Protocol 5.8, which requires control of the communications of two
particular parties for only the duration of the key exchange. That is, unlike in a
regular man-in-the-middle attack, it is not necessary for the attacker to control
the communications after the key exchange in order to translate messages, since
all users are made to agree on the same key. This attack was published in [Sch+16].
Although it is not possible for the attacker to keep a copy of the key after the
users initiate rekeying operations, we will show how she can avoid being noticed
at that point.
5.6.1 The Attack
Recall that after the execution of GSAP-3 (Protocol 5.8), we have for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛−1
𝐶𝑖 = (
𝑖
∏
𝑗=1
𝑔𝑗) ⋅ 𝑠, 𝐷𝑖 = (
𝑛−1
∏
𝑗=1; 𝑗≠𝑖
𝑔𝑗) ⋅ 𝑠,
and finally
𝐾 = 𝐶𝑛 = (
𝑛
∏
𝑗=1
𝑔𝑗) ⋅ 𝑠.
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We describe an active attack on GSAP-3. Suppose that the attackerℳ wants
the users 𝒰1, … ,𝒰𝑛 to agree on a shared key as usual, except that she is in pos-
session of the key as well.
In order to carry out our attack, ℳ needs to have full control over the com-
munication of the users 𝒰𝑛−1 and 𝒰𝑛 for the duration of the key exchange.
In the beginning, ℳ chooses her own secret group element ?̂? ∈ 𝐺. She then
proceeds as follows:
(a) Step (1) of GSAP-3 is carried out as usual.
(b) ℳ intercepts the broadcast of𝒰𝑛−1 during step (2) and remembers the value
𝐶𝑛−1. At this point, all users except for 𝒰𝑛−1 are sitting in step (2), waiting
for the broadcast that was halted.
(c) 𝒰𝑛−1 proceeds to step (4), where he sends 𝑔−1𝑛−1 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−1 = 𝐶𝑛−2 to 𝒰𝑛. This is
also intercepted byℳ. 𝒰𝑛−1 is now waiting in step (5).
(d) ℳ now makes 𝒰𝑛 believe that he received the broadcast of step (2), but
actually sends him ?̂? ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−1. At this point, 𝒰𝑛 computes the shared key
𝐾 = 𝑔𝑛?̂? ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−1 and waits in step (4).
(e) ℳ now sends to 𝒰𝑛 the values {𝑚1, … ,𝑚𝑛−3, 𝐶𝑛−2, 𝐶𝑛−1}, pretending that
they were sent by the other users in step (4). The 𝑚𝑖 are random elements
of the orbit 𝐺 ⋅ 𝑠.
(f) In step (5), 𝒰𝑛 sends back, among others, the values 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−2 and 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−1,
whichℳ intercepts. The user 𝒰𝑛 is now finished, andℳ can compute the
shared key 𝐾 = ?̂?𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−1.
(g) Until now, 𝒰1, … ,𝒰𝑛−2 have been waiting for the broadcast in step (2),
whichℳ now provides in the form of 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−1.
(h) 𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1… , 𝑛 − 2, go to step (4) and send back 𝑔−1𝑖 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−1, which ℳ
intercepts.
(i) In step (5),ℳ broadcasts to 𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 2, the message
{?̂?𝑔−11 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−1, ?̂?𝑔−12 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−1, … , ?̂?𝑔−1𝑛−1𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−1, 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−1}
User𝒰𝑛−1 is sent the same message, but the last element, 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−1 is substi-
tuted by 𝐶𝑛−1.
(j) The users𝒰1, … ,𝒰𝑛−2 now all compute the shared secret𝐾 = 𝑔𝑖 ?̂?𝑔−1𝑖 𝑔𝑛 ⋅𝐶𝑛−1.
Let us make some comments on the attack introduced above. First, we can
observe that at the end of this procedure, all users as well as the attacker share
the same key
𝐾 = (
𝑛
∏
𝑗=1
𝑔𝑗) ⋅ (?̂? ⋅ 𝑠).
5.6. An Active Attack on GSAP-3 67
Any passive observer will still be unable to determine the key, for the same reason
that the original protocol is secure against passive attacks, whenever the action
is transitive and the Diffie-Hellman problem is hard (see Section 5.3 and [STW00,
Theorem 2.1]).
The attacker’s secret ?̂? is not strictly required for the attack to work, but with-
out it, the users may notice that something is amiss. Namely, in step (e), if we
leave out ?̂?, the user𝒰𝑛 may notice thatℳ sent the same value 𝐶𝑛−1 as in step (d).
Similarly, in step (i), the other users could notice that the attacker just returned
their transmission from (h). Using ?̂?, however, the users should be unable to tell
the difference between a regular execution of the protocol and the attack, again
as a consequence of [STW00, Theorem 2.1].
As in the original protocol, the broadcast element 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−1 is added at the end
of the message in step (i) in view of future rekeying operations and is not needed
by any of the users 𝒰1, … ,𝒰𝑛−2 to recover the shared key. Note that users 𝒰𝑖 ,
𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 2, expect that the last element of the message sent in step (i) is the
one broadcast in step (2) of the protocol, which the attacker substitutes precisely
by 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛−1. In the case of user 𝒰𝑛−1, who is also expecting the element sent in
step (2) of the protocol, the element thatℳ sends in step (b) is 𝐶𝑛−1. If this is not
satisfied, the users might notice that something is wrong.
Remark 5.31. We want to point out that since the protocol does not include any
authentication, it is always possible for an active attacker to do a simple man-
in-the-middle attack. However, in that case, the attacked user ends up with a
different key from the rest of the group. The attacker must therefore maintain
control over that user’s communications and translate messages between the at-
tacked user and the rest of the group. In our attack however, the attacker needs
to maintain control only for the duration of the key exchange, since all users end
up with the same key. Afterwards, the attacker can passively listen to the conver-
sation.
5.6.2 An Exit Strategy
After the attack of Section 5.6, the attacker ℳ shares the key with the users
𝒰1, … ,𝒰𝑛 and can listen in on their conversation without any further active mea-
sures. However, at some point after that, the users maywish to execute a rekeying
operation, which is to say a key refreshment, the addition of a newmember to the
group, etc. as described in [STW00, Section 5]. After this point, the attacker can
certainly no longer listen to the conversation. Even worse, the values the users
remember from step (5) of the protocol are substantially different from normal,
and any key refresh operation will thus fail completely, alerting the users about
the attack.
In what follows, we will describe how the attacker can avoid being noticed by
forging key refresh operations herself, assuming that any user may initiate a key
refreshment at any time.
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First, we recall the key refresh operation after a regular execution of GSAP-3,
see Section 5.2.5 and [STW00, Section 5.6]. Suppose user 𝒰𝑐 wishes to initiate a
key refreshment. He remembers from step (5) of the key agreement protocol the
values {𝐸1, … , 𝐸𝑛}, where 𝐸𝑘 = (∏𝑛𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑘 𝑔𝑗) ⋅ 𝑠, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑛. He picks a new secret𝑔′𝑐 ∈ 𝐺 and broadcasts
{𝑔′𝑐 ⋅ 𝐸1, … , 𝑔′𝑐 ⋅ 𝐸𝑐−1, 𝐸𝑐 , 𝑔′𝑐 ⋅ 𝐸𝑐+1, … , 𝑔′𝑐 ⋅ 𝐸𝑛}.
Now, all users can compute the new key 𝑔′𝑐 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛 = 𝑔′𝑐 ⋅ (∏𝑛𝑗=1 𝑔𝑗) ⋅ 𝑠. User 𝒰𝑐also replaces his own secret with 𝑔′𝑐𝑔𝑐 , and everyone replaces the information
remembered from step (5) with this new broadcast.
Remark 5.32. One important detail to note is that when 𝒰𝑐 initiates the key re-
freshment, the value 𝐸𝑐 he sends in position 𝑐 is unchanged and already known to
the other users. Hence, ifℳ wishes to forge a key refreshment coming from 𝒰𝑐 ,
she has to make sure that each user receives in position 𝑐 the value he previously
held there. Otherwise, the attack could be discovered.
Suppose now that the attackerℳ has just executed the attack from Section 5.6.
Instead of {𝐸1, … , 𝐸𝑛}, the users now remember the following values:
• For 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 2, 𝒰𝑖 remembers {?̂? ⋅ 𝐸1, … , ?̂? ⋅ 𝐸𝑛−1, 𝐶𝑛}.
• 𝒰𝑛−1 remembers {?̂? ⋅ 𝐸1, … , ?̂? ⋅ 𝐸𝑛−1, 𝐸𝑛}.
• 𝒰𝑛 remembers {𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝑚1, … , 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝑚𝑛−3, 𝐸𝑛−1, 𝐶𝑛, ?̂? ⋅ 𝐸𝑛}.
Evidently, if some user tries to initiate a key refreshment with these values,
the operation will fail. However,ℳ can bring the users into a consistent state by
forging two key refresh operations herself. For this, she needs to still have control
over the communications of 𝒰𝑛−1 and 𝒰𝑛, as in the original attack.
First, ℳ picks two new random values ̂𝑓 and ℎ̂ ∈ 𝐺. Then, she forges a key
refresh operation by sending the following values to the different users:
• To 𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 2, she sends
{ℎ̂?̂? ⋅ 𝐸1, ℎ̂?̂? ⋅ 𝐸2, … , ℎ̂?̂? ⋅ 𝐸𝑛−2, ?̂? ⋅ 𝐸𝑛−1, ̂𝑓 ℎ̂?̂? ⋅ 𝐸𝑛},
pretending it came from 𝒰𝑛−1.
• To 𝒰𝑛−1, she sends
{ ̂𝑓 ℎ̂?̂? ⋅ 𝐸1, ℎ̂?̂? ⋅ 𝐸2, … , ℎ̂?̂? ⋅ 𝐸𝑛−2, ℎ̂?̂? ⋅ 𝐸𝑛−1, 𝐸𝑛},
pretending it came from 𝒰𝑛.
• To 𝒰𝑛, she sends
{ ̂𝑓 ℎ̂?̂? ⋅ 𝐸1, ℎ̂?̂? ⋅ 𝐸2, … , ℎ̂?̂? ⋅ 𝐸𝑛−2, 𝐶𝑛, ℎ̂?̂? ⋅ 𝐸𝑛},
pretending it came from 𝒰𝑛−1.
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After this, the users will agree on the shared key ℎ̂?̂? ⋅𝐶𝑛, which is also known toℳ.
As remarked above, if a user is made to believe that he received a key refreshment
from 𝒰𝑐 , he must receive in position 𝑐 the value he already held there.
Now, the values held by the users are still inconsistent, so ℳ has to forge a
second key refreshment:
• To 𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 2, she sends
{ ̂𝑓 ℎ̂?̂? ⋅ 𝐸1, … , ̂𝑓 ℎ̂?̂? ⋅ 𝐸𝑛},
pretending it came from 𝒰𝑛.
• To 𝒰𝑛−1 and 𝒰𝑛, she sends
{ ̂𝑓 ℎ̂?̂? ⋅ 𝐸1, … , ̂𝑓 ℎ̂?̂? ⋅ 𝐸𝑛},
pretending it came from 𝒰1.
Now, all users and the attacker agree on the shared key ̂𝑓 ℎ̂?̂? ⋅ 𝐶𝑛. Furthermore, all
users remember the same consistent values for key refreshment. If in the future
any user initiates a key refreshment, the attacker will lose access to the key, but
the operation itself will work outwithout problems andwithout the users noticing
anything wrong.
Remark 5.33. An alternative course of action forℳ is to convert the attack into a
regular man-in-the-middle attack on 𝒰𝑛 at the time of the first key refreshment.
For this, note that given the values each user remembers, a key refreshment ini-
tiated by 𝒰𝑐 , 𝑐 ≤ 𝑛 − 2, works well for all users but 𝒰𝑛. The attacker can then
intercept the broadcast arriving at 𝒰𝑛 and replace it with random values, except
that at position 𝑛 she sends ℎ̂ ⋅ 𝐸𝑛 for some random ℎ̂ ∈ 𝐺, and at position 𝑐 she
sends 𝑔𝑛 ⋅ 𝑚𝑐 , which she knows from step (f) of the attack. Then,ℳ will have the
key ?̂?𝑔′𝑐 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛 in common with𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 −1, as well as ℎ̂ ⋅ 𝐶𝑛 with𝒰𝑛. From then on,
she can run a regular man-in-the-middle attack. A similar attack can be carried
out if 𝒰𝑛 initiates a key refreshment, but not if 𝒰𝑛−1 does so. In this case, the
attacker can intercept and apply ?̂? to the message for 𝒰𝑛 so that all users agree
on a common key without noticing the previous attack.
5.7 An Active Attack on the Burmester-Desmedt Pro-
tocol
In this section, we describe a similar attack to the one in Section 5.6 for the
protocol of Burmester and Desmedt [BD94; BD05]. This attack was published
in [Bao+16]. We first describe the protocol in an algebraic group setting, and
provide the active attack afterwards. Unlike the previous protocols, we will not
translate this one to the general situation of semigroup actions.
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We note that Remark 5.31 applies also to this attack: As opposed to a man-in-
the-middle attack, the attacker needs to be active only during the key exchange.
Since the rekeying operation in this case is carried out by rerunning the pro-
tocol completely, an exit strategy like in Section 5.6.2 is not needed. Instead, the
attacker can repeat the original attack (not necessarily on the same user) and keep
listening to all communications for an unlimited time.
5.7.1 The Burmester-Desmedt Protocol
Protocol 5.34 (Burmester-Desmedt). Let {𝒰1, … ,𝒰𝑛} be a set of users that want
to generate a shared key 𝐾 . Let 𝐺 be a group of prime order 𝑞. Let ℤ𝑞 be the
ring of integers modulo 𝑞. The users agree on a generator 𝑔 of 𝐺 and operate as
follows:
(1) Each user𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}, selects a random 𝑟𝑖 ∈ ℤ𝑞 and broadcasts 𝑧𝑖 = 𝑔𝑟𝑖 .
(2) Each user 𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}, broadcasts 𝑋𝑖 = (𝑧𝑖+1/𝑧𝑖−1)𝑟𝑖 .
(3) Each user 𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}, computes the key
𝐾𝑖 = (𝑧𝑖−1)𝑛𝑟𝑖 ⋅ 𝑋 𝑛−1𝑖 ⋅ 𝑋 𝑛−2𝑖+1 ⋯𝑋𝑛+𝑖−2 ∈ 𝐺.
In the above, indices should be interpreted modulo 𝑛. By [BD05, Lemma 3.1],
the users 𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛} compute the same key 𝐾 = 𝑔𝑟1𝑟2+𝑟2𝑟3+⋯+𝑟𝑛𝑟1 ∈ 𝐺.
5.7.2 The Attack
Under the conditions of the previous sections, let 𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}, be a set of
communicating users and letℳ be an active attacker that is able to take control
of one of the users’ communications, let us say 𝒰𝑘 . Then the attack is developed
as follows.
(a) Each user𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}, selects a random 𝑟𝑖 ∈ ℤ𝑞 and broadcasts 𝑧𝑖 = 𝑔𝑟𝑖
as in round (1) of the protocol.
(b) ℳ stops 𝑧𝑘 and, forging 𝒰𝑘 ’s identity, sends to 𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑘, 𝑧′𝑘 = 𝑔𝑎, where 𝑎
is such that 𝑎 − 1 is not zero in ℤ𝑞 .
(c) At the same time,ℳ stops the message 𝑧𝑘+1 for𝒰𝑘 and replaces it by 𝑧′𝑘+1 =
𝑧𝑎𝑘−1 = (𝑔𝑟𝑘−1 )𝑎.
(d) 𝒰𝑘 starts round (2) and computes 𝑋𝑘 = (𝑧′𝑘+1/𝑧𝑘−1)𝑟𝑘 = (𝑧𝑟𝑘𝑘−1)𝑎−1, which is
then broadcast.
(e) ℳ stops 𝑋𝑘 and𝒰𝑘 is waiting in round (2) to receive the remaining 𝑋𝑖 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑘.
(f) While 𝒰𝑘 is waiting in round (2), ℳ finishes running the key exchange
protocol with participants𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑘, usingℳ’s private information 𝑎. They
agree on a key 𝐾 .
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(g) ℳ computes 𝑏 = (𝑎 − 1)−1 mod 𝑞 and computes 𝑋 𝑏𝑘 = 𝑧𝑟𝑘𝑘−1.
(h) ℳ generates a list {ℎ1, … , ℎ𝑛−3} of elements in 𝐺 and provides 𝒰𝑘 the list
{𝑋1, … , 𝑋𝑘−1, 𝑋𝑘+1, … , 𝑋𝑛} given by
𝑋𝑘+1 = 𝑧−𝑟𝑘𝑘−1ℎ1,
𝑋𝑘+𝑗 = ℎ−1𝑗−1ℎ𝑗 , for 𝑗 ∈ {2, … , 𝑛 − 3},
𝑋𝑘−2 = 𝐾 𝑋 −(𝑛−1)𝑘 𝑧−2𝑟𝑘𝑘−1 ℎ−2𝑛−3∏𝑛−4𝑟=1 ℎ−1𝑟 ,
𝑋𝑘−1 = (∏𝑛𝑖=1,𝑖≠𝑘−1 𝑋𝑖)
−1,
where indices are again taken modulo 𝑛.
After the active attack, all users 𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}, andℳ share the same key:
It is clear from step (f) that ℳ and 𝒰𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑘 share the key 𝐾 . A
straightforward computation shows that
𝐾𝑘 = (𝑧𝑘−1)𝑛𝑟𝑘 ⋅ 𝑋 𝑛−1𝑘 ⋅ 𝑋 𝑛−2𝑘+1 ⋯𝑋𝑛+𝑘−2 = 𝐾.
Remark 5.35. Let us note that 𝑋𝑘−1 could be any arbitrary element since this is
not used to compute 𝐾𝑘 . However, in a proper execution of the protocol, it holds
that ∏𝑛𝑖=1 𝑋𝑖 = 1. User 𝒰𝑘 could check whether this holds. In order to avoidbeing detected, once we have computed all 𝑋𝑖 with 𝑖 ≠ 𝑘 − 1, we define 𝑋𝑘−1 =
(∏𝑛𝑖=1,𝑖≠𝑘−1 𝑋𝑖)
−1.
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